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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW 
 
Volume 103 Summer 2020 Number 4 
 
FULLY FUNDED PENSIONS 
JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN* 
At retirement, workers want to have enough income to support themselves 
throughout their retirement years.  In that regard, financial planners often 
suggest that retiring workers should aim to replace 70 to 80% of their annual 
preretirement earnings.  Social Security benefits typically replace around 35% 
of the typical worker’s preretirement earnings, and the purpose of this Article 
is to show how pensions could and should be designed to replace, say, 40% of 
the typical worker’s preretirement earnings throughout her retirement years.  
In particular, because so many public and private pension plans are 
underfunded, this Article focuses on how to fully fund those pensions. 
At the outset, Part II provides an overview of Social Security, pensions, 
annuities, and other lifetime income mechanisms.  In particular, Part II 
explains how Social Security works, how traditional pensions work, and how 
newer 401(k) plans and individual retirement accounts (IRAs) work. 
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Part III then focuses on funding issues for Social Security and pensions.  In 
particular, Part III shows that the Social Security system is currently 
underfunded by at least $13.9 trillion, that state and local government pension 
plans are currently underfunded by at least $4.7 trillion, that the U.S. 
government’s civilian pensions are currently underfunded by at least $968 
billion, and that the U.S. government’s military pensions are currently 
underfunded by at least $768 billion.  Part III also shows that private-sector 
pensions are also severely underfunded.  In that regard, traditional defined 
benefit pensions are currently underfunded by at least $553 billion.  Moreover, 
Part III shows that most workers with 401(k) plans or individual retirement 
accounts (IRAs) are not saving anywhere near enough to have pensions that 
could replace 40% of their preretirement income; indeed, many workers have 
no retirement savings of any kind. 
Part IV then looks at some basic compound-interest and pension 
mathematics, and Part V explains pension benefit accrual and funding in 
traditional defined benefit plans.  First, Section V.A develops a model, 
traditional defined benefit plan; and Section V.B then shows how that model 
defined benefit plan could provide a typical retiree with a pension that would 
replace 40% of her preretirement earnings.  Section V.C then uses that model 
defined benefit plan to explain and compare the various mechanisms that are 
currently used to fund such traditional pensions, including everything from the 
pay-as-you-go method to the principal actuarial cost methods that are used to 
prefund those traditional pensions. 
Part VI then looks at benefit accrual and funding in defined contribution 
plans (and IRAs).  Part VI develops two alternative model defined contribution 
plans that could replace 40% of a typical worker’s preretirement earnings.  For 
these model plans, the idea is for the worker to save enough money in her 
individual account by age 65 so that she could then buy a lifetime annuity that 
would replace 40% of her preretirement earnings. 
Part VII then expands the defined benefit and individual account models to 
address some of the most important problems of providing pensions in the real 
world, including, for example, the problem of postretirement inflation.  Part 
VIII then offers some recommendations about how to redesign—and fully 
fund—Social Security and real-world defined benefit plans, defined 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
At retirement, workers want to have enough income to support themselves 
throughout their retirement years.  In that regard, financial planners often 
suggest that retiring workers should aim to replace 70 to 80% of their annual 
preretirement earnings.1  Social Security benefits typically replace around 35% 
of the typical worker’s preretirement earnings.2  That leaves another 35 to 45% 
 
1. Robert C. Lawton, This Is How Much Money You Need To Retire, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertlawton/2018/08/26/this-is-how-much-money-you-need-to-
retire/#7 299d62947cf [https://perma.cc/C2RE-A3WF] (cross-referencing a number of retirement 
savings targets).  See infra Section III.A. 
2. NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS, FINANCES, AND POLICY OPTIONS: 
A PRIMER 6 (2019), 
https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/2019_Social_Security_Primer.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H5SF-NBV9] (showing that the current Social Security system replaces 40% of the 
preretirement earnings of a worker with “medium” earnings); see also MICHAEL CLINGMAN, KYLE 
BURKHALTER, & CHRIS CHAPLAIN, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ACTUARIAL 
NOTE NO. 2019.9, REPLACEMENT RATES FOR HYPOTHETICAL RETIRED WORKERS 3–4 tbl.A (2019), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/ran9/an2019-9.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW7N-M97F] (showing how 
replacement rates vary with preretirement earnings); CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S 2019 LONG-
TERM PROJECTIONS FOR SOCIAL SECURITY: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION tbl.B-8 (2019) [hereinafter 
CBO’S 2019 LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS], https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-09/55590-CBO-
longterm-projections-social-security.xlsx [https://perma.cc/CNB9-WXYX] (showing how 
replacement rates vary with preretirement earnings); PETER BRADY, KIMBERLY BURHAM, & SARAH 
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of preretirement earnings that needs to be financed through pensions and other 
savings.  Other than home equity, most retirees have little in the way of other 
savings,3 and most retirees are reluctant to sell (or reverse mortgage) their 
homes to come up with extra retirement income—until they have to.4  
Accordingly, this Article focuses quite simply on how pensions alone could and 
should be designed to replace, say, 40% of the typical worker’s preretirement 
earnings throughout her retirement years.5  In particular, this Article is 
concerned with how to fully fund those pensions. 
 
HOLDEN, INV. CO. INST., THE SUCCESS OF THE U.S. RETIREMENT SYSTEM 17−20 (2012), 
https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_success_retirement.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5A4-98UL] (showing how 
replacement rates vary with preretirement earnings). 
3. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-4-19, BACKGROUND DATA RELATING TO 
RETIREMENT INCOME 15−16 (2019), [hereinafter JCT, BACKGROUND DATA RELATING TO 
RETIREMENT INCOME], 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=5160&chk=5160&no_html=1 
[https://perma.cc/F3FS-ZTV4] (showing how few elderly Americans have interest or dividend 
income); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, THE NATION’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM: A 
COMPREHENSIVE RE-EVALUATION IS NEEDED TO BETTER PROMOTE FUTURE RETIREMENT SECURITY 
22 fig.2-1 (2017) [hereinafter GAO, THE NATION’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM], 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/690/687797.pdf [https://perma.cc/YMX4-JFGW] (showing that only 9% 
of the income of the elderly in 2015 came from home equity and non-retirement savings and 
investments). 
4. See KARAN KAUL & LAURIE GOODMAN, URBAN INST., SENIORS’ ACCESS TO HOME EQUITY: 
IDENTIFYING EXISTING MECHANISMS AND IMPEDIMENTS TO BROADER ADOPTION 8 (2017), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/88556/seniors_access_to_home_equity.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9V43-9PH7]. 
5. To be sure, individuals can save for retirement outside of pensions, and some do.  See infra 
note 39 and accompanying text.  Of course, most individuals will want to take advantage of the tax 
benefits associated with pensions.  See infra Section II.B.  Accordingly, this Article makes the 
simplifying (and heroic) assumption that all retirement savings will take place in tax-favored pensions; 
but, of course, readers should understand that free-standing savings could easily serve as a substitute 
for pension savings.  The focus of this Article is really on how much individuals need to save for 
retirement, and, for simplicity, the Article assumes that all of those savings will be held in tax-favored 
pensions. 
Although programs like Medicare, Medicaid, and veterans’ benefits can be quite important for 
retirement income security, they are not addressed in this Article.  See generally COMM. ON WAYS 
AND MEANS, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA 
ON THE PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS ch.2 
(2018) [hereinafter WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, GREEN BOOK], https://greenbook-
waysandmeans.house.gov/2018-green-book [https://perma.cc/2HCL-MN4G]; Medicaid, 
MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/index.html [https://perma.cc/J2CS-CUNC]; 
About VA Health Benefits, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, https://www.va.gov/health-care/about-
va-health-benefits/ [https://perma.cc/L5F9-TJXQ]. 
Finally, while this Article has selected a 40% target replacement rate for pensions, the 
methodology used here means that proportionally larger or smaller replacement rates would result from 
proportionately larger or smaller plan contributions. 
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The term “pensions” is used here in its broadest sense to encompass both 
traditional monthly pensions and also newer types of pension plans such as 
401(k) plans and even individual retirement accounts (IRAs).6  Pension plans 
generally fall into two broad categories based on the nature of the benefits 
provided: defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans.  In a defined 
benefit plan, an employer promises workers a specific benefit at retirement.7  
The default benefit for defined benefit plans is a retirement income stream in 
the form of an annuity for life (e.g., a monthly pension).8  For example, some 
defined benefit plans provide workers with an annual retirement benefit (B) 
equal to 2% times years of service (yos) times final average pay (fap) (B = 2% 
× yos × fap).9  Under that final-average-pay plan, a worker who retires after 30 
years of service with final average pay of $100,000 would receive a pension of 
$60,000 a year for life ($60,000 = 2% × 30 yos × $100,000 fap). 
To be sure, such generous traditional pension plans are uncommon today.10  
Among other things, increased longevity has made such traditional pensions 
 
6. See I.R.C. § 401(k) (2018). 
7. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-20-19, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING 




8. In the United States, defined benefit plans are generally designed to provide annuities, i.e., 
“definitely determinable benefits . . . over a period of years, usually for life, after retirement.”  26 
C.F.R. § 1.401-1(b)(1)(i) (2003). 
9. For example, 2% is a common benefit accrual rate in many traditional state and local pension 
plans.  See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL. 2786, NATIONAL 
COMPENSATION SURVEY: RETIREMENT PLAN PROVISIONS IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2016 tbl.12 (2017) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY, 2016], 
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/2016/ownership/govt/ebbl0060.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LJE6-U9AQ]; Natalie Kramer & Jesus Ranon-Hernandez, State and Local 
Government Workers Preparing for Retirement: Do You Understand Your Plan Formula?, BEYOND 
THE NUMBERS, May 2018, at 1, 2. 
In 2017, 63% of workers in private industry defined benefit plans were in plans with traditional 
plan formulas—with 32% using this type of final-average-pay formula.  BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL. 2788, NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY: HEALTH AND 
RETIREMENT PLAN PROVISIONS IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES, 2017 tbl.10 (2018) 
[hereinafter NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY, 2017], 
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/detailedprovisions/2017/ownership/private/health-retirement-private-
benefits-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5S5C-HQ3U].  Of those plans using a final-average-pay-formula, 
the median annual benefit accrual rate was 1.60%.  Id. at tbl.12. 
10. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-3-16, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING 
TO TAX-FAVORED RETIREMENT SAVING AND CERTAIN RELATED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 56, 57, 
57 fig.2 (2016), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=download&id=4865&chk=4865&no_html=1 
 
FORMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2020  12:11 PM 
1212 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:1205 
more expensive.11  Still, the traditional defined benefit plan approach is a very 
useful way to think about providing workers with adequate incomes throughout 
their retirement years.  Accordingly, this Article initially develops a simplified 
model defined benefit plan.  More specifically, this Article’s model defined 
benefit plan would provide retired workers with a pension benefit equal to 1% 
times years of service times final pay (fp).12  Under that plan, a typical worker 
with 40 years of service—say from age 25 through age 64—would end up with 
a pension starting at age 65 equal to 40% of her preretirement earnings.  For 
example, if a worker has final pay of $100,000, she would be entitled to a 
pension of $40,000 a year for life ($40,000 B = 1% × 40 yos × $100,000 fp). 
Alternatively, in a typical defined contribution plan, the employer simply 
withholds a specified percentage of the worker’s compensation, which it 
 
[https://perma.cc/G5BZ-YBMC]; see generally GEORGE A. MACKENZIE, THE DECLINE OF THE 
TRADITIONAL PENSION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREATS TO RETIREMENT SECURITY (2010); 
EDWARD A. ZELINSKY, THE ORIGINS OF THE OWNERSHIP SOCIETY: HOW THE DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PARADIGM CHANGED AMERICA (2007); William J. Wiatrowski, Changing Landscape 
of Employment-based Retirement Benefits, COMPENSATION & WORKING CONDITIONS ONLINE (Sept. 
29, 2011), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/changing-landscape-of-employment-based-retirement-
benefits.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5LK-GWCS]. 
11. These days, a 65-year-old man can expect to live, on average, until age 84, and a 65-year-
old woman can expect to live, on average, until age 86.5.  Benefits Planner/Life Expectancy, SOC. 
SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/planners/lifeexpectancy.html [https://perma.cc/G7EF-
WCTG] [hereinafter SSA, Benefits Planner].  The joint life expectancy of a 65-year-old couple is even 
more remarkable.  For example, there is a 50% chance that at least one 65-year-old spouse in a 
nonsmoking heterosexual couple in average health will live 27 years to age 92, a 25% chance that at 
least one will live 31 years to age 96, and a 10% chance that at least one will live 35 years to age 100.  
Calculations are from the Actuaries Longevity Illustrator, SOC’Y ACTUARIES & AM. ACAD. 
ACTUARIES, http://www.longevityillustrator.org/ [https://perma.cc/QFK6-85GB] (follow the “Get 
Started” hyperlink; Person 1 [Name: Man; Date of Birth: 12/17/1954; Age for Illustration to Start: 65; 
Gender: Male; Do you smoke?: No; General Health: Average]; Person 2 [Name: Woman; Date of 
Birth: 12/17/1954; Gender: Female; Do you smoke?: No; General Health: Average]; then select “View 
Results”); see also BD. OF TRS. OF THE FED. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INS. AND FED. DISABILITY 
INS. TR. FUNDS, THE 2019 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FEDERAL OLD-AGE 
AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE AND FEDERAL DISABILITY INSURANCE TRUST FUNDS 95 tbl.V.A4 
(2019), https://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/2019/tr2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/ER4T-SDUP] [hereinafter 
2019 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT] (showing period life expectancies for men and women at 
birth and at age 65 from 1940 through 2095); SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, LIFE EXPECTANCY IN 2019, at 1–
3 [hereinafter LIFE EXPECTANCY IN 2019], 
https://www.soa.org/globalassets/assets/files/resources/research-report/2019/life-expectancy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FT36-ZZ3E] (showing life expectancies at ages 25 and 65 from a variety of sources).  
In short, many individuals and couples will need to plan for the possibility of retirements that can last 
for 30 years or more. 
12. As more fully explained in Section V.A.3 infra, final pay is a simpler variable to model than 
final average pay. 
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contributes to an individual account for that worker.13  For example, 
contributions might be set at 5% of annual compensation.  Under such a plan, 
a worker who earned $50,000 in a given year would have $2,500 contributed to 
her individual account ($2,500 = 5% × $50,000).  Her benefit at retirement 
would be based on all such contributions plus investment earnings.  Unlike 
defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans usually make distributions as 
lump sum or periodic distributions rather than as lifetime annuities.14  Of 
course, a retiree can use the balance in her defined contribution plan (or, 
alternatively, in her IRA) to buy an annuity.  For example, consider a worker 
who retires after 40 years of service with a final salary of $100,000.  To replace 
40% of her preretirement earnings, she would need to accumulate enough in 
her individual account to be able to buy an annuity that would pay her $40,000 
a year for life. 
In short, both defined benefit plans and defined contribution plans could be 
designed to replace 40% of a worker’s preretirement earnings.  In the real 
world, however, relatively few retirees will actually collect pension benefits 
that equal or exceed 40% of their preretirement earnings.  At the outset, many 
workers are not even covered by pension plans of any kind.  For example, in 
March of 2019, just 71% of private-sector workers had access to an employer-
sponsored pension plan, and just 56% participated.15  However, even if a worker 
is covered by a pension of some kind, that worker may not end up with pension 
income that will replace 40% of her preretirement earnings; many pension plans 
are just not funded that well.  All in all, providing adequate pensions is largely 
a problem of inadequate funding.  Defined benefit plans or defined contribution 
plans could provide meaningful lifetime incomes for retirees, but contributions 
must be made at a high enough level to achieve that result.  
The purpose of this Article is to show how to provide workers with fully 
funded pensions that would replace 40% of their preretirement earnings.  At the 
outset, Part II provides an overview of Social Security, pensions, annuities, and 
 
13. JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 7, at 9. 
14. See WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, INTERNATIONAL PENSION PLAN SURVEY REPORT 2019, at 
3, 17 (2019), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/2020/01/2019-international-
pension-plan [https://perma.cc/34MZ-55T6] (indicating that lump sum distributions “continue to be 
the most popular form of distribution” for defined contribution plans). 
15. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL. 2791, NATIONAL 
COMPENSATION SURVEY: EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 2019, at 3 tbl.2 
(2019) [hereinafter NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY, 2019], 
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2019/employee-benefits-in-the-united-states-march-2019.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WE9B-K559]; see generally Peter J. Brady & Steven Bass, Who Participates in 
Retirement Plans, 2016, INV. CO. INST., Aug. 2019, at 1, 17 fig.9. 
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other lifetime income mechanisms; Part III focuses on funding issues for Social 
Security and pensions; and Part IV looks at some basic pension mathematics. 
Part V then explains pension benefit accrual and funding in defined benefit 
plans.  First, Section V.A develops a model, traditional defined benefit plan; 
and Section V.B then shows how that model defined benefit plan could provide 
a typical retiree with a pension that would replace 40% of her preretirement 
earnings.  Section V.C then uses that model defined benefit plan to explain and 
compare the various mechanisms that are currently used to fund such traditional 
pensions, including everything from the pay-as-you-go method to the principal 
actuarial cost methods that are used to prefund those traditional pensions. 
Part VI then looks at benefit accrual and funding in defined contribution 
plans.  Part VI develops two alternative model defined contribution plans that 
could replace 40% of a typical worker’s preretirement earnings.  For these 
model defined contribution plans, the idea is for the worker to save enough 
money in her individual account by age 65 so that she could then buy a lifetime 
annuity that would replace 40% of her preretirement earnings. 
Part VII then expands the defined benefit and defined contribution models 
to take into account some of the most important problems of providing pensions 
in the real world.  Then, Part VIII offers some recommendations about how to 
redesign—and fully fund—Social Security and real-world defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans; and, finally, Part IX offers some concluding 
remarks. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY, PENSIONS, AND OTHER LIFETIME 
INCOME MECHANISMS 
Retirees can generally count on Social Security benefits to cover a 
significant portion of their retirement income needs.  In addition, retirees use 
pensions, annuities, and a variety of other mechanisms to generate income in 
their retirement years.  These are discussed in turn. 
A.  Social Security 
1.  An Overview of the Social Security System 
Social Security provides monthly cash benefits to retirees and their 
families.16  A worker builds Social Security protection by working in 
employment that is covered by Social Security and paying the applicable 
 
16. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at ch. 1. 
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payroll taxes.17  At retirement, disability, or death, monthly benefits are paid to 
insured workers and to their eligible dependents and survivors.  While full 
retirement age was once age 65, it is currently age 66, and it is gradually 
increasing to age 67 for workers born after 1959 (who reach age 67 in or after 
2027).18  In January of 2019, Social Security paid retirement benefits to almost 
43.9 million retired workers, and the average monthly benefit paid to a retired 
worker was $1,463.97.19 
Social Security retirement benefits are financed primarily through payroll 
taxes imposed on individuals working in employment or self-employment that 
is covered by the Social Security system.20  Workers over the age of 62 
generally are entitled to Social Security retirement benefits if they have worked 
in covered employment for at least 10 years.21  Benefits are based on a measure 
of the worker’s earnings history in covered employment.22  The benefit formula 
is highly progressive,23 and, as a result, the Social Security benefits tend to favor 
 
17. Around 94% of workers in paid employment or self-employment are covered by Social 
Security (around 175.3 million workers in 2018).  SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2019 SOCIAL 
SECURITY/SSI/MEDICARE INFORMATION 1 (2019), 
https://www.ssa.gov/legislation/2019%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QU6-SCCY].  For 
various historical reasons, Social Security does not cover about one-fourth of public employees (i.e., 
certain state and local government workers and certain federal civilian workers that were hired before 
1984).  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-786T, SOCIAL SECURITY: COVERAGE OF 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 3 (2005), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/120/111755.pdf [https://perma.cc/UEA4-VD3Q]; see also WILLIAM G. 
GALE, SARAH E. HOLMES, & DAVID C. JOHN, SOCIAL SECURITY COVERAGE FOR STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT WORKERS: A RECONSIDERATION 123 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Download-the-paper-5.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSV6-LVAK]. 
18. Retirement Benefits Planner: Full Retirement Age, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/retirechart.htm [https://perma.cc/4827-GV49] [hereinafter 
Retirement Benefits Planner]. 
19. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., MONTHLY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT, JANUARY 2019, at tbl.2 (2019) 
[hereinafter MONTHLY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT], 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/stat_snapshot/2019-01.pdf [https://perma.cc/XVM7-
HG5W]. 
20. For 2020, employees and employers each pay a Social Security payroll tax of 6.2% on up to 
$137,700 of wages, for a combined Old-Age and Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) rate of 
12.4%.  SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 2020 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES [hereinafter 2020 SOCIAL SECURITY 
CHANGES], https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/colafacts2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NMZ-
26VG].  Self-employed workers pay an equivalent OASDI tax of 12.4% on up to $137,700 of net 
earnings.  Id. 
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a), 414(a)(2) (2018). 
22. Social Security Benefit Amounts, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/Benefits.html [https://perma.cc/P9S3-QREW]. 
23. Benefits for retired workers are based on a measure of the worker’s earnings history in 
covered employment known as the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME).  Id.; Benefit 
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workers with low lifetime earnings relative to workers with higher lifetime 
earnings.24  These redistributive Social Security retirement benefits play an 
important role in reducing poverty among the elderly.25  
Benefits may be increased or decreased for several reasons.  Most 
importantly, benefits are indexed each year for inflation as measured by the 
consumer price index.26  Also, the retirement earnings test can reduce the 
monthly benefits of individuals who have not yet reached full retirement age 
but who continue to work after starting to draw Social Security retirement 
benefits.27 
In addition, workers who retire before their full retirement age have their 
benefits actuarially reduced.28  On the other hand, benefits payable to workers 
who choose to retire after their full retirement age are actuarially increased (but 
 
Calculation Examples for Workers Retiring In 2020, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/ProgData/retirebenefit1.html [https://perma.cc/MHZ6-EHVN].  The starting 
point for determining the worker’s AIME is to determine how much the worker earned each year 
through age 60.  Once those benefit computation years and covered earnings for those years have been 
identified, the worker’s earnings are indexed for wage inflation, using the year the worker turns age 60 
to index the earnings of prior years.  The highest 35 years of earnings are then selected, and the other 
years are dropped out.  The AIME is then computed as the average earnings for the remaining 35 years 
(420 months). 
The AIME is then linked by a progressive formula to the monthly retirement benefit payable to the 
worker at full retirement age, a benefit known as the primary insurance amount (PIA).  For a worker 
turning 62 in 2020, the PIA equals 90% of the first $960 of the worker’s AIME, plus 32% of the AIME 
over $960 and through $5,785 (if any), plus 15% of the AIME over $5,785 (if any).  Social Security 
Benefit Amounts, supra note 22; Primary Insurance Amount, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/piaformula.html [https://perma.cc/JAQ4-BY2B]. 
24. MICHAEL CLINGMAN, KYLE BURKHALTER, & CHRIS CHAPLAIN, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF 
ACTUARY, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., ACTUARIAL NOTE NO. 2018.7, MONEY’S WORTH RATIOS UNDER THE 
OASDI PROGRAM FOR HYPOTHETICAL WORKERS (2019), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/ran7/an2018-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4L8-YV5A] (showing 
money’s worth ratios for various hypothetical workers). 
25. KATHLEEN ROMIG, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, SOCIAL SECURITY LIFTS MORE 
AMERICANS ABOVE POVERTY THAN ANY OTHER PROGRAM 1 (2019), 
https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-lifts-more-americans-above-poverty-
than-any-other-program [https://perma.cc/ZPF9-Y44A] (“Social Security lifts 15 million elderly 
Americans out of poverty.”); see also Bruce D. Meyer & Derek Wu, The Poverty Reduction of Social 
Security and Means-Tested Transfers passim (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
24567, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w24567.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TGX-3HJ4]; LIANA FOX, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-265, THE SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE: 2017, at 10 fig.8 (2018), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2018/demo/p60-265.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FM64-6888]; The Role of Benefits in Income and Poverty, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. 
INS., https://www.nasi.org/learn/socialsecurity/benefits-role [https://perma.cc/NE7C-PV97]. 
26. See 2020 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES, supra note 20. 
27. 42 U.S.C. § 403(b) (2018). 
28. Id. § 402(q). 
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only up to age 70).29  In effect, beneficiaries can buy additional annuity 
protection by delaying retirement.30  For example, consider various workers 
who retired in January 2020 with maximum taxable earnings since age 22.  A 
worker retiring at age 62 then would get a starting benefit of $2,265 per month, 
while a worker retiring at 65 then would get $2,857 per month, and a worker 
retiring at age 70 then would get $3,790 per month.31 
In addition to Social Security benefits, a means-tested Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI) program provides monthly cash benefits to certain low-
income elderly, disabled, or blind Americans.32  In 2020, the maximum federal 
benefit for a single individual is $783 per month, and the maximum for a couple 
is $1,175 per month.33  In January of 2019, almost 2.3 million elderly 
Americans received SSI benefits from the federal government, and the average 
monthly benefit was $458.54.34 
2.  The Adequacy of Social Security Benefits 
Social Security is the most common source of income for households aged 
65 or older.  For example, in 2015, 84% of households aged 65 or older received 
Social Security benefits.35  Moreover, Social Security provided more than half 
 
29. Id. § 402(w). 
30. See Melissa A. Z. Knoll & Anya Olsen, Incentivizing Delayed Claiming of Social Security 
Retirement Benefits Before Reaching the Full Retirement Age, 74 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 21, 39 (2014); 
Kenn Beam Tacchino, David A. Littell, & Bruce D. Schobel, A Decision Framework for Optimizing 
the Social Security Claiming Age, 28 BENEFITS Q. 40, 40–41 (2012). 
31. Workers with Maximum-Taxable Earnings, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/examplemax.html [https://perma.cc/92EC-UA8K]. 
32. WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE, GREEN BOOK, supra note 5, at ch.3. 
33. SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2020, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html [https://perma.cc/6FEG-75HR]. 
34. MONTHLY STATISTICAL SNAPSHOT, supra note 19, at tbl.3. 
35. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUBL’N NO. 13-11785, FAST FACTS & FIGURES ABOUT SOCIAL 
SECURITY, 2017, at 6 (2017), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2017/fast_facts17.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/36XC-E2WG] (a word of caution is in order here, as the Social Security 
Administration has since suspended publication of the relevant chart while the agency evaluates the 
adequacy of the chart’s data source) [hereinafter SSA, FAST FACTS 2017]; ADMIN. FOR CMTY. LIVING, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2017 PROFILE OF OLDER AMERICANS 10 (2018), 
https://www.acl.gov/sites/default/files/Aging%20and%20Disability%20in%20America/2017OlderA
mericansProfile.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XCG-8JY4]; see generally Irena Dushi, Howard M. Iams, & 
Brad Trenkamp, The Importance of Social Security Benefits to the Income of the Aged Population, 77 
SOC. SECURITY BULL. 1 (2017); SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUBL’N NO. 13-11785, FAST FACTS & FIGURES 
ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY, 2019 (2019), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2019/fast_facts19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NMM5-RBU3]; SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUBL’N NO. 13-11871, INCOME OF THE 
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of total income for 50% of aged beneficiary couples that year and 71% of total 
income for aged single beneficiaries.36  In 2014, only 43.8% of households 
received retirement benefits from sources other than Social Security, and only 
61.8% received income from other assets.37 
All in all, Social Security provided 33% of the personal income of 
households aged 65 or older in 2015.38  Earnings accounted for another 34% of 
their income, pensions accounted for another 20%, and asset income accounted 
for another 9%.39  Of course, as people age, their earnings decline, and their 
inflation-adjusted Social Security benefits become an even larger portion of 
their incomes.40  Still, as currently structured, Social Security alone cannot 
ensure that all Americans will have adequate incomes throughout their 
retirement years. 
B.  Pension Plans and Individual Retirement Accounts 
1.  Pensions 
The United States has a voluntary private pension system, and employers 
can decide whether and how to provide pension benefits for their employees.41  
However, when employers do provide pensions, those pensions are typically 
subject to regulation under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA).42  ERISA protects the pension benefits of most private-sector 
workers through sweeping participation,43 coverage,44 vesting,45 benefit 
 
POPULATION 55 OR OLDER, 2014 (2016), 
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/income_pop55/2014/incpop14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/XX5A-5QD2]. 
36. SSA, FAST FACTS 2017, supra note 35, at 8 (again, caution is advised). 
37. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., PUBL’N NO. 13-11727, INCOME OF THE AGED CHARTBOOK, 2014, at 8 
(2016), https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/income_aged/2014/iac14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PAX2-9XKZ]; see also JCT, BACKGROUND DATA RELATING TO RETIREMENT 
INCOME, supra note 3, at 2−4 (showing income sources of the elderly). 
38. SSA, FAST FACTS 2017, supra note 35, at 7 (again, caution is advised). 
39. Id. 
40. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Supporting the Oldest Old: The Role of Social Insurance, 
Pensions, and Financial Products, 21 ELDER L.J. 375, 382–84 (2013). 
41. See Jonathan Barry Forman & George A. (Sandy) Mackenzie, The Cost of “Choice” in a 
Voluntary Pension System, N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP. 6-1, 6-3 to 6-5 (2013). 
42. Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829; see generally JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, 
supra note 7. 
43. I.R.C. § 410(a) (2018); ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (2018). 
44. I.R.C. § 410(b). 
45. Id. § 411(a); ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053.  A worker’s retirement benefit is said to be 
vested when the worker has a nonforfeitable right to receive the benefit.  For example, under the 5-
 
FORMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2020  12:11 PM 
2020] FULLY FUNDED PENSIONS 1219 
accrual,46 funding,47 and reporting rules.48  ERISA also created the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) to administer a plan termination 
insurance program that insures the benefits of workers in private-sector single-
employer and multiemployer pension plans.49 
The federal government uses two major approaches to encourage 
Americans to save for retirement.50  First, the government gives most pension 
plans favorable tax treatment.51  Basically, employer contributions to a pension 
are not taxable to the employee;52 the pension fund’s earnings on those 
contributions are tax-exempt;53 employees pay tax only when they receive 
distributions of their pension benefits;54 and the employer is allowed a current 
deduction for its contributions (within limits).55  Distributions from a pension 
plan generally may be rolled over tax-free to another pension plan or to an 
 
year, cliff-vesting schedule, an employee who has completed at least 5 years of service must have a 
nonforfeitable right to 100% of her accrued benefits.  Alternatively, under 3-to-7-year graded vesting, 
an employee must have a nonforfeitable right to 20% of her accrued benefit after 3 years of service, 
40% after 4 years of service, and so on up to 100% after 7 years of service.  ERISA only imposes 
minimum vesting requirements, and plans are free to use a faster vesting schedule. 
46. I.R.C. § 411(b); ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054. 
47. I.R.C. § 412; ERISA § 302, 29 U.S.C. § 1082. 
48. See ERISA § 101, 29 U.S.C. § 1021 (requiring the plan administrator to provide a summary 
plan description to plan participants and annual, terminal, and supplementary reports to the Secretary 
of Labor). 
49. ERISA §§ 4001–4010, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1311.  A multiemployer plan is a defined benefit 
pension plan created through agreements between employers and a union.  See JOINT COMM. ON 
TAXATION, JCX-30-18, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO MULTIEMPLOYER DEFINED 
BENEFIT PLANS 53–56 (2018) [hereinafter JCT, PRESENT LAW RELATING TO MULTIEMPLOYER 
DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS], https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5089 
[https://perma.cc/BX6B-X5KD]. 
50. Forman & Mackenzie, supra note 41, at 6-17. 
51. Id. at 6-17 to 6-18. 
52. I.R.C. § 402. 
53. I.R.C. § 501(a).  Most pensions hold assets in a trust.  I.R.C. § 401(a); A Guide to Common 
Qualified Plan Requirements, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/Retirement-Plans/A-
Guide-to-Common-Qualified-Plan-Requirements [https://perma.cc/A22K-SREM].  “A trust is a 
medium under which the retirement plan assets are accumulated.  The employer or employees, or both, 
contribute to the trust, which forms part of the retirement plan.  The assets are held in the trust until 
distributed to the employees or their beneficiaries according to the plan’s provisions.”  Id. 
54. I.R.C. §§ 72(a), (f), 402(a); see generally INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N NO. 575, 
PENSION AND ANNUITY INCOME (2019), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p575.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VB9M-AN8S].  Contributions and benefits cannot exceed certain limits.  See 
I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(17), 415. 
55. I.R.C. § 404. 
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IRA.56  Second, the federal government gives employers a great deal of 
flexibility about designing their pension plans.57 
a.  Defined Benefit Plans 
In a defined benefit plan, an employer promises employees a specific 
benefit at retirement, and the default benefit takes the form of an annuity for 
life.58  For example, a plan might provide that a worker’s annual retirement 
benefit (B) is equal to 2% times the number of years of service (yos) times final 
average pay (fap) (B = 2% × yos × fap).59  Under this plan, a worker who retired 
after 30 years of service with final average pay of $100,000 would receive a 
pension of $60,000 a year for life (i.e., $60,000 = 60% × $100,000 fap = 2% × 
30 yos × $100,000 fap).60  The annual benefit for a participant in a defined 
benefit plan cannot exceed $230,000 in 2020.61  For married participants, 
defined benefit plans (and some defined contribution plans) are required to 
provide a qualified joint-and-survivor annuity (QJSA) as the normal benefit 
 
56. I.R.C. § 402(c); JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 7, at 20−21; Rollovers 
of Retirement Plan and IRA Distributions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/rollovers-of-retirement-plan-and-ira-
distributions [https://perma.cc/3872-BC8U]. 
57. Forman & Mackenzie, supra note 41, at 6-18. 
58. See supra notes 7−9 and accompanying text.  To provide that benefit, the employer typically 
makes payments into a trust fund, contributed funds grow with investment returns, and eventually the 
employer withdraws funds from the trust fund to pay the promised benefits.  See A Guide to Common 
Qualified Plan Requirements, supra note 53.  Employer contributions are based on actuarial valuations, 
and the employer bears all of the investment risks and responsibilities.  PENSIONS AND EMPLOYEE 
BENEFITS COMM., INT’L ACTUARIAL ASS’N, DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN FUNDING AND THE 
ROLE OF ACTUARIES 7–8 (2018) [hereinafter PENSIONS AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM., DEFINED 
BENEFIT PENSION PLAN FUNDING], 
https://www.actuaries.org/IAA/Documents/Publications/Papers/PEBC_Pension_Funding_Monograp
h_May2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8YD-3CKM]. 
59. The annual benefit accrual rate is 2%. 
60. The benefit factor for this worker is 60%.  Final average pay is often computed by averaging 
the worker’s salary over the last 3 or 5 years prior to retirement.  Alternatively, some plans use career-
average compensation instead of final-average compensation.  Under a career-average earnings 
formula, benefits are based on a percentage of an average of career earnings for every year of service 
by the employee.  See William J. Wiatrowski, The Last Private Industry Pension Plans: A Visual Essay, 
MONTHLY LABOR REV. (Dec. 2012), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2012/12/art1full.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J9UN-TR5Y]. 
61. I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(17), 415(b)(1)(A); I.R.S. Notice 2019-59, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1091 [hereinafter 
I.R.S. Notice 2019-59].  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUBL’N NO. 560, RETIREMENT PLANS FOR 
SMALL BUSINESS (SEP, SIMPLE, AND QUALIFIED PLANS) 15 (2019) [hereinafter IRS, RETIREMENT 
PLANS FOR SMALL BUSINESS], http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p560.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5UW-
PCPS]. 
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payment, unless the spouse consents to another form of distribution.62  Defined 
benefit plans generally cannot make in-service distributions to a participant 
before age 59½.63 
b.  Defined Contribution Plans 
Under a typical defined contribution plan, the employer simply withholds 
a specified percentage of the worker’s compensation, which it contributes to an 
individual investment account for the worker.64  For example, contributions 
might be set at 5% of annual compensation.  Under such a plan, a worker who 
earned $50,000 in a given year would have $2,500 contributed to an individual 
investment account for her ($2,500 = 5% × $50,000).  Her benefit at retirement 
would be based on all such contributions plus investment earnings.  Defined 
contribution plans are also known as “individual account” plans because each 
worker has her own individual account, as opposed to defined benefit plans, 
where the plan’s assets are pooled for the benefit of all of the employees.65  
Unlike defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans usually make 
distributions as lump sum or periodic distributions rather than as lifetime 
annuities.66  Indeed, relatively few defined contribution plans even offer annuity 
options, and, in any event, relatively few participants elect those annuity 
options.67  Many defined contribution plans also provide for loans to 
 
62. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11); ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055 (2018).  A QJSA is an immediate 
annuity for the life of the pension plan participant and a survivor annuity for the life of the participant’s 
spouse.  I.R.C. § 417(b); ERISA § 205(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1). 
63. I.R.C. § 401(a)(36) (as revised by the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. 
L. No. 116-94, Division M—Bipartisan American Miners § 104).  Certain defined benefit plans are 
permitted to make loans to participants, id., but hardly any of them do.  See, e.g., EMP. BENEFITS SEC. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN 27 tbl.C5(a), 29 tbl.C5(b), 31 
tbl.C5(c) (2019), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/EBSA/researchers/statistics/retirement-
bulletins/private-pension-plan-bulletins-abstract-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL6N-7L4D]. 
64. See JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 7, at 9. 
65. ERISA § 3(34), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(34). 
66. See WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, supra note 14, at 17. 
67. In 2016, for example, just 12% of private industry workers in savings and thrift plans had 
annuities available to them.  See NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY, 2016, supra note 9, at tbl.20. 
 
FORMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2020  12:11 PM 
1222 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:1205 
participants,68 and some plans can also provide in-service “hardship” 
distributions.69 
There are a variety of different types of defined contribution plans, 
including money purchase pension plans, target benefit plans, profit-sharing 
plans, stock bonus plans, and employee stock ownership plans (“ESOPs”).70  Of 
particular importance, profit-sharing and stock bonus plans often include a 
feature that allows workers to choose between receiving cash currently or 
deferring taxation by placing the money in a retirement account, according to 
Internal Revenue Code Section 401(k).71  Consequently, these plans are usually 
called 401(k) plans, and they are the most popular type of retirement plan in the 
United States.72  The maximum annual amount of such elective deferrals that 
can be made by an individual in 2020 is $19,500, although workers over the 
age of 50 can contribute another $6,500 (for a total of up to $26,000).73  Also, 
since 2006, employers have been permitted to set up Roth 401(k) plans.74  
Section 401(k) plans may be designed so that the employee automatically 
makes elective deferrals at a specified rate unless the employee elects 
otherwise.75  Such automatic enrollment features can lead to higher 
 
68. I.R.C. § 72(p); JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 7, at 31–33; Retirement 
Topics - Plan Loans, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-
participant-employee/retirement-topics-loans [https://perma.cc/AUE5-G7RL]; see also JACK 
VANDERHEI, SARAH HOLDEN, LUIS ALONSO, & STEVEN BASS, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE 
BRIEF NO. 458, 401(K) PLAN ASSET ALLOCATION, ACCOUNT BALANCES, AND LOAN ACTIVITY IN 
2016 (2018), https://www.ebri.org/docs/default-source/ebri-issue-brief/ebri_ib_458_k-update-
10sept18.pdf?sfvrsn=bca4302f_4 [https://perma.cc/65CV-3VHD]. 
69. JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 7, at 33. 
70. See Six Ways to Save for Retirement, PROGRAM PERSPS., Mar. 2001, at 1, 2; EMP. BENEFITS 




71. I.R.C. § 401(k). 
72. BLS Examines Popular 401(k) Retirement Plans, PROGRAM PERSPS., Nov. 2010, at 1, 1.  
73. I.R.C. § 402(g); I.R.S. Notice 2019-59, supra note 61, at 1091.  There is also a limit on the 
total annual contributions and additions that can go into a participant’s individual account (e.g., 
$57,000 in 2020).  I.R.C. §§ 401(a)(17), 415; I.R.S. Notice 2019-59, supra note 61, at 1091; see also 
IRS, RETIREMENT PLANS FOR SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 61, at 15 (explaining the limit on the total 
annual contributions and other additions that can be made to a defined contribution plans). 
74. I.R.C. § 402A.  Contributions to these plans are not excludable, but neither the plan’s 
investment returns nor distributions are taxable.  Id. 
75. JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 7, at 25. 
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participation rates, and automatically escalating the participants’ levels of 
contributions can lead to even greater retirement savings.76 
c.  Hybrid Retirement Plans 
So-called hybrid retirement plans mix the features of defined benefit and 
defined contribution plans.  For example, a cash balance plan is a defined 
benefit plan that looks like a defined contribution plan.77  Like other defined 
benefit plans, employer contributions to a cash balance plan depend on actuarial 
valuations, and the employer bears all of the investment risks.78  Like defined 
contribution plan, workers in cash balance plans have individual accounts 
(albeit hypothetical).79  For example, a simple cash balance plan might allocate 
5% of salary to each worker’s account each year and credit the account with 
5% interest on the balance in the account.  Under such a plan, a worker who 
earned $50,000 in a given year would get an annual cash balance credit of 
$2,500 ($2,500 = 5% × $50,000), plus an interest credit equal to 5% of the 
balance in her hypothetical account as of the beginning of the year. 
Similarly, a so-called “target benefit plan” is a defined contribution plan 
that looks like a defined benefit plan.80  A target benefit plan uses a defined 
benefit formula to establish a target benefit for each participant.81  The 
employer contributions for each participant are actuarially determined to 
achieve this goal, but the target benefit is not guaranteed.82  Instead, a worker’s 
ultimate retirement benefit is based on the actual balance in the worker’s 
individual account.83 
 
76. See OECD, OECD PENSIONS OUTLOOK 2012, at 45–76 (2013), http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-pensions-outlook-2012_9789264169401-en 
[https://perma.cc/R9AL-HDE7].  Of note, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 made it easier for 
employers to include automatic enrollment features in pension plans.  Pension Protection Act of 
2006 § 902, Pub. L. No. 109-280, 120 Stat. 1033–39 (adding I.R.C. §§ 401(k)(13), 401(m)(12) & 
414(w)). 
77. See JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 7, at 10; Jonathan Barry Forman & 
Amy Nixon, Cash Balance Pension Plan Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 380 (2000).  
78. Forman & Nixon, supra note 77, at 387. 
79. Id.  
80. See JANA STEELE, ANGELA MASEROLLE, & MEL BARTLETT, C.D. HOWE INST., 
COMMENTARY NO. 411, TARGET-BENEFIT PLANS IN CANADA – AN INNOVATION WORTH EXPANDING 
2 (2014), https://www.osler.com/uploadedFiles/Commentary_411.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y96T-
X3WT]. 
81. Id. at 7.  
82. Id. at 10. 
83. Id. at 11. 
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2.  Individual Retirement Accounts 
Favorable tax rules are also available for individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs).84  Almost any worker can set up an IRA with a bank or other financial 
institution.  In 2020, individuals without pension plans can contribute and 
deduct up to $6,000 to an IRA, although individuals over age 50 can contribute 
and deduct another $1,000 (for a total of up to $7,000); spouses can contribute 
and deduct similar amounts.85  Like private pensions, IRA earnings are tax-
exempt, and distributions are taxable.86 
Also, since 1998, individuals have been permitted to set up Roth IRAs.87  
Unlike regular IRAs, contributions to Roth IRAs are not deductible.  Instead, 
withdrawals are tax-free.88  Like regular IRAs, however, Roth IRA earnings are 
tax-exempt.89 
3.  Pension Coverage and Participation 
Pension coverage and participation rates are relatively low.  At any point in 
time, only about one out of two American workers has a pension plan.90  The 
probability of pension coverage is greater for older workers, for whites, for 
highly educated workers, for full-time workers, for higher-income workers, and 
for workers at larger firms.91  Participation in IRAs is even lower than 
participation in pensions.  For example, while 36% of U.S. households had an 
IRA in mid-2019, only around 12% of households made contributions to their 
IRAs (in 2018).92 
 
84. I.R.C. § 219 (2018); JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 7, at 37–40. 
85. I.R.S. Notice 2019-59, supra note 61, at 1091–92. 
86. I.R.C. § 408.  Also, a variety of simplified retirement plans allow self-employed workers to 
contribute more than they could otherwise contribute to a regular IRA.  See, e.g., IRS, RETIREMENT 
PLANS FOR SMALL BUSINESS, supra note 61, at 2 (explaining, inter alia, the operation of Simplified 
Employee Pensions [SEPs] and Savings Incentive Match Plans for Employees (SIMPLE IRAs)). 
87. I.R.C. § 408A. 
88. See JCT, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND, supra note 7, at 39–40. 
89. Id. 
90. For example, in March of 2019, 71% of private-sector workers had access to ERISA 
retirement plans, and 56% of them participated.  NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY, 2019, supra 
note 15, at tbl.2. 
91. See CRAIG COPELAND, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 499, RETIREMENT PLAN 
PARTICIPATION AND CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY: CHECKING IN ON THE RETIREMENT PLAN 
PARTICIPATION AND RETIREE INCOME ESTIMATES 9 fig.5 (2019), 
https://www.ebri.org/content/current-population-survey-checking-in-on-the-retirement-plan-
participation-and-retiree-income-estimates [https://perma.cc/H5AQ-XY8R]. 
92. Sarah Holden & Daniel Schrass, The Role of IRAs in U.S. Households’ Saving for Retirement, 
2019, INV. CO. INST., Dec. 2019, at 1, 2, 6 fig.3, 18. 
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All in all, low participation rates in pension plans, in general, and low 
contribution rates to 401(k) plans, in particular, have led many analysts to 
wonder whether current and future generations of retirees will have adequate 
retirement incomes.93  In that regard, just 52.1% of families had any retirement 
accounts in 2016, and of those families who did have accounts then, the median 
value was just $60,000.94  That year, just 49.8% of families age 65−74 had 
retirement accounts, and the median value of those accounts was $126,000.95  
Also, just 5% of elderly individuals in the lowest income quintile in 2018 had 
pension or IRA income that year, compared to 62.4% of individuals in the 
highest income quintile.96 
C.  Annuities and Other Sources of Lifetime Income 
In addition to Social Security, pensions, and IRAs, individuals can also save 
money outside of the retirement system.  In 2020, investment income is 
generally subject to federal income tax rates of up to 37%,97 but capital gains 
and dividends are generally taxed at a preferential tax rate of 0, 15, or 20%, 
depending on the income tax rate that would be assessed on the same amount 
 
93. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-408, RETIREMENT SECURITY: LOW 
DEFINED CONTRIBUTION SAVINGS MAY POSE CHALLENGES 6 (2016), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676942.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZYA2-A5FZ] (finding that around 60% 
of all households had no defined contribution plan savings at all in 2013); JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. 
BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 475, RETIREMENT SAVINGS SHORTFALLS: EVIDENCE 
FROM EBRI’S 2019 RETIREMENT SECURITY PROJECTION MODEL® (2019), 
https://www.ebri.org/content/retirement-savings-shortfalls-evidence-from-ebri-s-2019-retirement-
security-projection-model [https://perma.cc/K7B2-FDWV] (estimating that 40.6% of households with 
the head between 35 and 64 will run short of money in retirement and that the aggregate retirement 
deficit of this age cohort is $3.83 trillion); Andrew G. Biggs, Alicia H. Munnell, & Anqi Chen, Why 
Are 401(k)/IRA Balances Substantially Below Potential? 3, 13–14 (Ctr. for Ret. Res. at Boston College, 
Working Paper 2019-14, 2019), https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/wp_2019-14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WJ98-YKT2]; see generally ALICIA H. MUNNELL & ANNIKA SUNDEN, COMING UP 
SHORT: THE CHALLENGE OF 401(K) PLANS (2004). 
94. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, 2016 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES CHARTBOOK 435−36 
(2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/BulletinCharts.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP3D-
CJDD]. 
95. Id.  Also, 59.3% of families age 55−64 had retirement accounts, and the median value of 
those accounts was $120,000; and 40.8% of families age 75 and older had retirement accounts, and the 
median value of those accounts was also $120,000.  Id.; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY: MOST HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT 
HAVE LOW SAVINGS 8, 10 (2015), https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670153.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/T4L2-6BSA] (27% of households between age 55 and 64 and above had no 
retirement savings at all in 2013 and no defined benefit plan). 
96. JCT, BACKGROUND DATA RELATING TO RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note 3, at 2−3. 
97. I.R.C. § 1(j) (2018); Rev. Proc. 2019-44, 2019-47 I.R.B. 1093. 
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of ordinary income.98  There are also various tax advantages associated with 
investments in homes,99 state and local government bonds,100 annuities,101 and 
life insurance.102 
In particular, annuities are another common way to provide lifetime 
income.  For example, in December of 2018, for $100,000, a 65-year-old man 
could have purchased an immediate fixed (lifetime) annuity without inflation 
protection that paid around $6,660 a year.103  Because women tend to live longer 
than men,104 for $100,000, a 65-year-old woman could have purchased an 
immediate, level-payment (lifetime) annuity then that paid only around $6,324 
a year.105 
Inflation-adjusted annuities offer an even better way to hedge against living 
too long.  With inflation-adjusted annuities, annual payments would start out 
almost 40% lower than fixed-payment (lifetime) annuities but, over a long life, 
would eventually end up higher.  For example, if the hypothetical 65-year-old 
man in the last paragraph instead chose a lifetime annuity with a 3% annual 
escalator, the initial annual payment would be around $4,848, but, eventually, 
annual payments would exceed the $6,660 per year payments under the fixed-
payment (lifetime) annuity.106 
 
98. I.R.C. § 1(h). 
99. For example, home mortgage interest is generally deductible, and gains from the sale of a 
personal residence are often excludable.  I.R.C. §§ 163(a), 121. 
100. I.R.C. § 103 (interest exclusion). 
101. Under I.R.C. § 72, the individual can exclude a fraction of each annuity payment from 
income.  That fraction (the “exclusion ratio”) is based on the amount of premiums or other after-tax 
contributions made by the individual.  The exclusion ratio enables the individual to recover her own 
after-tax contributions tax free and to pay tax only on the remaining portion of benefits which 
represents income.  The net effect is a deferral of taxation. 
102. I.R.C. § 101(a) (exclusion for insurance proceeds paid by reason of the death of the 
insured). 
103. Immediate Annuities Update, ANNUITY SHOPPER BUYER’S GUIDE, Jan. 2019, at 17 tbl.5 
($6,660 = 12 × an average payment of $555 per month). 
104. See SSA, Benefits Planner, supra note 11.  
105. Immediate Annuities Update, supra note 103, at 17 tbl.5 ($6,324 = 12 × an average payment 
of $527 per month).  Unfortunately, while ERISA-covered pension plans cannot discriminate based on 
gender, insurance companies can: insurance companies are allowed to price the annuities that they 
offer to men and women differently.  Jonathan Barry Forman, Removing the Legal Impediments to 
Offering Lifetime Annuities in Pension Plans, 23 CONN. INS. L.J. 31, 61 (2016). 
106. Immediate Annuities Update, supra note 103, at 17 tbl.5 (showing average payments to 65-
year-old men with a 3%-cost-of-living adjustment of $404 per month in the first year of his retirement 
[$4,848 in the first year = 12 × an average payment of $404 per month]). 
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Another way retirees can protect against longevity risk is by purchasing 
longevity insurance.107  The typical approach is to buy a deferred income 
annuity at age 65 that starts making annual payments only if the annuitant lives 
past age 80 or 85.  For example, in December of 2018, for $100,000, a 65-year-
old man could have purchased a deferred income annuity that would pay around 
$22,953 a year when (and if) he turns age 80.108 
Pertinent here, people hardly ever choose to buy annuities voluntarily.109  
The demand for annuities is significantly lower than expected, and this shortfall 

















107. Forman, supra note 105, at 62; see generally Katherine G. Abraham & Benjamin H. Harris, 
The Market for Longevity Annuities, 3 J. RETIREMENT 12 (2016). 
108. Immediate Annuities Update, supra note 103, at 53 tbl.19. 
109. See AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, RISKY BUSINESS: LIVING LONGER WITHOUT INCOME FOR 
LIFE, INFORMATION FOR CURRENT AND FUTURE RETIREES 1 (2015), 
http://actuary.org/files/Retiree_PreRetirees_IB_102215.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2NN-8Y3K]; J. MARK 
IWRY, WILLIAM GALE, DAVID JOHN, & VICTORIA JOHNSON, WHEN INCOME IS THE OUTCOME: 
REDUCING REGULATORY OBSTACLES TO ANNUITIES IN 401(K) PLANS 4 (2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/ES_201907_IwryGaleJohnJohnson.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4TS2-B5C8] (noting that fixed annuities constituted less than 2% of all retirement 
assets at the beginning of 2018). 
110. See Shlomo Benartzi, Alessandro Previtero, & Richard H. Thaler, Annuitization Puzzles, 25 
J. OF ECON. PERSPS. 143, 150 (2011). 
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III.  FUNDING ISSUES FOR SOCIAL SECURITY AND PENSIONS 
The goal of retirement policy is to ensure that workers will have adequate 
incomes throughout their retirement years.  The first step is to determine a target 
level of retirement income.  The second step is to design Social Security and 
pension systems that can produce that target level of retirement income, and the 
final step is to fund those systems.  This Part starts this analysis by discussing 
retirement savings targets and by explaining the funding problems of the current 
Social Security and pension systems. 
A.  Retirement Savings Targets 
The principal goal of pension policy is to ensure that workers have adequate 
incomes throughout their retirement years.  Either implicitly or explicitly, most 
analysts adopt some kind of target replacement rate.  For example, as this 
Article does, a common approach is to suggest that pensions and Social Security 
together should replace 70 or 80% of preretirement earnings (i.e., a replacement 
rate of 70 or 80%).111  The desired replacement rate is almost always assumed 
to be less than 100% because of the elimination of work-related expenses and 
because some preretirement income was devoted to saving for retirement.112 
Sometimes, the retirement savings target is instead expressed as a target 
amount that needs to be saved by retirement—say a million dollars—or as some 
multiple of final pay—say, 10 times pre-retirement income.  Table 1 shows a 







111. GAO, THE NATION’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 6 (“[R]etirees will need 70% 
or more of pre-retirement earnings to live comfortably.”).  The replacement rate (or replacement ratio) 
is the ratio of annual income in retirement to preretirement earnings.  See also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
MEASURING THE ADEQUACY OF RETIREMENT INCOME: A PRIMER 12 (2017), 
https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/reports/53191-retirementadequacy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PAS2-5Z7Q]. 
112. See, e.g., AON CONSULTING, 2008 REPLACEMENT RATIO STUDY 24 (2008), 
http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-capital/attachments/human-capital-
consulting/RRStudy070308.pdf [https://perma.cc/8DYE-TW3Y] (estimating that required 
replacement rate ranged from 77% for a person earning $80,000 a year in 2008 to 94% for a person 
earning $20,000 that year; that is, somewhat higher replacement rates are needed for workers with 
lower lifetime earnings to maintain their preretirement standard of living than for those with higher 
lifetime earnings). 
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TABLE 1: VARIOUS RETIREMENT SAVINGS TARGETS113 
60% of pre-retirement income114 
70% of pre-retirement income115 
80% of pre-retirement income116 
$1 million to $1.5 million117 
9 times pre-retirement income at age 65118 
12 times pre-retirement income at age 65119 
 
The deviation in retirement savings targets depends on the many critical 
assumptions about the future that are used in the underlying retirement savings 
models, including assumptions about the age of retirement, the inflation rate, 
the salary growth rate, the rate of return on savings, and the worker’s life 
expectancy at retirement.120  
 
113. See, e.g., Lawton, supra note 1. 
114. See Ryan Derousseau, Retiring Soon? You May Spend a Lot Less Than You Expect, 
FORTUNE (Oct. 25, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/25/retirement-costs-lower/ 
[https://perma.cc/NGY5-G3KG?type=image]. 
115. See GAO, THE NATION’S RETIREMENT SYSTEM, supra note 3, at 6; Benefits Planner: 
Retirement: Learn About Social Security Programs, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., 
https://www.ssa.gov/planners/retire/r&m6.html [https://perma.cc/NBP7-EZDQ]; see also Retirement 
Calculator, NERDWALLET, https://www.nerdwallet.com/investing/retirement-calculator 
[https://perma.cc/2PQC-M97W]; How Much Money Do I Need to Retire?, RETIREMENT LIVING, 
https://www.retirementliving.com/how-much-money-do-i-need-to-retire [https://perma.cc/8L6J-
26X5]; Kathleen Elkins, $1 Million May Not Last You in Retirement—Here’s How to Figure Out How 
Much You Need, CNBC (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/11/how-to-figure-out-how-
much-money-you-need-to-retire.html [https://perma.cc/M6TL-SDFH]. 
116. See Quick Guide to How Much You Will Need to Retire, MONEY (May 30, 2014), 
http://time.com/money/collection-post/2791054/quick-guide-to-how-much-you-will-need-to-retire/ 
[https://perma.cc/KQU2-5U9N]; see also When Can I Retire?, VANGUARD, 
https://investor.vanguard.com/retirement/planning/when-can-i-retire [https://perma.cc/6PNX-99H3] 
(suggesting a retirement savings target of 75 to 85% of pre-retirement income). 
117. See Carolyn O’Hara, How Much Money Do I Need to Retire?, AARP THE MAGAZINE, 
https://www.aarp.org/work/retirement-planning/info-2015/nest-egg-retirement-amount.html 
[https://perma.cc/E2S2-JN45]; How Much Money Do I Need to Retire?, supra note 115. 
118. See How Much Do I Need to Save for Retirement?, FIDELITY (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/retirement/how-much-money-do-i-need-to-retire 
[https://perma.cc/JD9J-SUL3]. 
119. See, e.g., Quick Guide to How Much You Will Need to Retire, supra note 116; see also 
O’Hara, supra note 117 (suggesting a retirement savings target of 10 to 12 times pre-retirement 
income). 
120. See VICKIE BAJTELSMIT & ANNA RAPPAPORT, SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, RETIREMENT 
ADEQUACY IN THE UNITED STATES: SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED? 16–17, 22–24 (2018), 
https://www.soa.org/files/resources/research-report/2018/retire-adequacy-us-concern.pdf 
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Once a retirement savings target is selected, some kind of retirement-
savings accumulation strategy will be needed to reach that target.  For example, 
Table 2 suggests some savings targets that workers can use to see if their 
retirement savings are on track. 
TABLE 2: RETIREMENT SAVINGS TARGETS, BY AGE121 










Another common approach is to suggest that workers should save a fixed 
percent of salary each year for retirement—or a fixed dollar amount each year.  
For example, a worker might be advised to save 10 or 15% of her salary each 
year that she works.122  Alternatively, she might be advised to save $5,000 each 
 
[https://perma.cc/5E4N-LL2W]; Steve Vernon, Amal Harrati, & Jialu Streeter, Are Americans Saving 
Enough for an Adequate Retirement?, in STANFORD CTR. ON LONGEVITY, SEEING OUR WAY TO 
FINANCIAL SECURITY IN THE AGE OF INCREASED LONGEVITY 20, 20–21 (2018), 
http://longevity.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Sightlines-Financial-Security-Special-
Report-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/33FR-YHH4]. 
121. How Much Do I Need to Save for Retirement?, supra note 118, at n.1 (“In developing the 
series of salary multipliers corresponding to age, Fidelity assumed age-based asset allocations 
consistent with the equity glide path of a typical target date retirement fund, a 15% savings rate, a 1.5% 
constant real wage growth, a retirement age of 67 and a planning age through 93.  The replacement 
annual income target is defined as 45% of preretirement annual income and assumes no pension 
income.”).  See also JENNIFER ERIN BROWN, JOELLE SAAD-LESSLER, & DIANE OAKLEY, NAT’L INST. 
ON RET. SEC., RETIREMENT IN AMERICA: OUT OF REACH FOR WORKING AMERICANS? 24 tbl.A1 
(2018), https://www.nirsonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/SavingsCrisis_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X4XC-LHZK] (showing retirement savings targets by age); Are Your Retirement 
Savings On Track?, T. ROWE PRICE, https://www3.troweprice.com/usis/personal-investing/planning-
and-research/t-rowe-price-insights/retirement-and-planning/retirement-savings/are-you-on-track-for-
a-successful-retirement-.html [https://perma.cc/7T6D-QUP2] (showing retirement savings targets by 
age). 
122. See, e.g., 4 Rules of Thumb for Retirement Savings, FIDELITY (Jan. 25, 2020), 
https://www.fidelity.com/viewpoints/retirement/retirement-guidelines [https://perma.cc/VH74-PTN6] 
(suggesting that workers save 15% of their salary every year). 
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year.  These saving strategies are also highly dependent on underlying 
assumptions.  Finally, Table 3 shows how target savings rates are affected by 
both the age that contributions start and the projected retirement age. 
TABLE 3: SUGGESTED RETIREMENT CONTRIBUTIONS AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
CURRENT INCOME, BY STARTING AGE AND PROJECTED RETIREMENT AGE123 
Retire at 
Age 
Start Saving at 
Age 25 
Start Saving at 
Age 35 
Start Saving at 
Age 45 
62 15% 24% 44% 
65 10% 15% 27% 
67 7% 12% 20% 
70 4% 6% 10% 
B.  Fully Funded Pensions 
The term “full funding” is used in a variety of ways depending on the 
retirement plan being considered; and even in this Article, the meaning of being 
a fully funded pension can vary depending upon the context.  Generally 
speaking, however, in this Article, a pension plan is said to be fully funded if 
the plan has sufficient assets to meet its emerging benefit obligations in a timely 
fashion, given reasonable assumptions about future contributions and 
investment income.124 
While fully funded pension plans will often have enough assets on hand to 
settle all benefit claims in the event of insolvency of the plan sponsor and 
termination of the plan, that will not always be true.  For example, when a plan 
sponsor creates a new pension and promises benefits based on past service, the 
past service enhancement will immediately result in an unfunded actuarial 
accrued liability (UAAL)125 that could take years to amortize.  Of course, a plan 
 
123. ALICIA H. MUNNELL, ANTHONY WEBB, & WENLIANG HOU, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT BOS. 
COLL., ISSUE IN BRIEF NO. 14-11, HOW MUCH SHOULD PEOPLE SAVE? 5 tbl.5 (2014), 
https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/IB_14-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q93-4JB3]; see also 
Vernon, Harrati, & Streeter, supra note 120, at 21 tbl.2.1; AON HEWITT, THE REAL DEAL: 2015 
RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY AT LARGE COMPANIES 6 (2016), 
http://www.aon.com/attachments/human-capital-consulting/the-real-deal-highlights-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/87SR-WX2P]. 
124. See PENSIONS AND EMPLOYEE BENEFITS COMM., DEFINED BENEFIT PENSION PLAN 
FUNDING, supra note 58, at 23. 
125. The unfunded actuarial accrued liability (a/k/a unfunded accrued liability [UAL]) is the 
difference between the actuarial value of a pension plan’s assets and the plan’s actuarial accrued 
liability (AAL, i.e., the present value of the promised pension benefits).  See DAVID KAUSCH & PAUL 
ZORN, GABRIEL ROEDER SMITH & CO., DEVELOPING A PENSION FUNDING POLICY FOR STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 4 (2012), 
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sponsor could choose achieving solvency as its funding objective, in which 
case, that plan sponsor would always meet that funding objective if it 
immediately contributed enough to fully fund those past service credits. 
Finally, in the real world, asset values will fluctuate as market conditions 
change.  Consequently, the actual funding level of real-world defined benefit 
pension plans will typically fluctuate and almost never be exactly 100%. 
C.  Social Security is Funded on a Pay-as-You-Go Basis 
The Social Security system is underfunded.  The Social Security system 
operates largely on a pay-as-you-go basis (PAYG).  Social Security benefits are 
primarily paid out of current-year Social Security payroll taxes,126 and the 
Social Security Trust Funds maintain only enough reserves to cover a few years 
of benefits.  For example, in 2018, the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust 
Fund received $715.9 billion in payroll tax contributions, paid out $844.9 
billion in benefits, and had $2,797.9 billion on hand at the close of the year.127  
Similarly, in 2018, the Disability Insurance Trust Fund received $169.2 billion 
in payroll tax contributions, paid out $143.7 billion in benefits, and had $97.1 
billion on hand at the close of the year.128  The combined trust fund reserves are 
expected to be depleted in 2034.129 
All in all, as of January 1, 2019, the unfunded liability of the Social Security 
system over the agency’s 75-year projection period was estimated to be $13.9 
trillion, and that unfunded liability can also be expressed as 2.61% of taxable 
payroll or 0.9% of gross domestic product (GDP).130  Basically, to wipe out that 
deficit, it would take (1) an immediate and permanent payroll tax increase of 
2.70% (to 15.10% of payroll); (2) an immediate and permanent 17% cut in 
benefits; or (3) some combination of these two approaches.131  While some 




126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
127. 2019 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 11, at 6 tbl.II.B1. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 3; see generally Stephen C. Goss, The Future Financial Status of the Social Security 
Program, 70 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 111 (2010) (explaining the financial status of the Social Security 
program). 
130. 2019 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 11, at 200 tbl.VI.F1.  Over the 
infinite horizon, the unfunded obligation is estimated to be $34.3 trillion (4.1% of taxable payroll or 
1.4% of GDP).  Id. 
131. Id. at 4−5. 
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Social Security system’s long-term insolvency,132 the prospects for enacting 
any significant legislation seem slim at this time. 
D.  Many Pension Plans Are Underfunded 
As already mentioned, a pension plan is said to be fully funded if the plan 
has sufficient assets to meet its emerging benefit obligations in a timely 
fashion.133  Measured against that standard, many public and private pension 
plans are underfunded.  Moreover, even if a pension plan is technically fully 
funded, the plan may not be generous enough to replace 40% of each worker’s 
preretirement earnings. 
1.  Defined Contribution Plans (and IRAs) 
The funding requirements for defined contribution plans are 
straightforward: the plan sponsor meets the ERISA requirements by 
contributing what it promised to contribute.134  For example, a plan sponsor that 
promises to contribute 3% of compensation will meet its funding obligation 
when it deposits 3% of compensation into its workers’ individual accounts.  
That defined contribution plan is, technically speaking, “fully funded,” but, in 
operation, such a low level of contributions is unlikely to result in cumulative 
retirement savings that would replace 40% of a worker’s preretirement 
earnings. 
Indeed, having a fully funded defined contribution plan is no guarantee that 
a retiree will actually have an adequate retirement income.  After all, many 
workers do not participate in their employers’ defined contribution plans,135 and 
even among the workers that do participate, contribution rates are often 
 
132. See Office of the Chief Actuary’s Estimates of Proposals to Change Social Security, SOC. 
SECURITY ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/index.html [https://perma.cc/23N5-PYXJ] 
[hereinafter SSA, Proposals to Change Social Security]. 
133. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
134. In general, employers must follow the plan provisions.  See generally A Guide to Common 
Qualified Plan Requirements, supra note 53.  The rules governing the timing of contributions can be 
complicated, but employee contributions are generally supposed to be sent to the plan on the earliest 
date that the deferrals can reasonably be segregated from the employer’s general assets, and employer 
contributions generally must be made by the due date of the employer’s income tax return.  See 29 
C.F.R. § 2510.3-102(a) (2004); Retirement Topics – Contributions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/plan-participant-employee/retirement-topics-contributions 
[https://perma.cc/8AJB-979W]; 401(k) Plan Fix-It Guide - You Haven’t Timely Deposited Employee 
Elective Deferrals, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/401k-plan-fix-
it-guide-you-have-not-timely-deposited-employee-elective-deferrals [https://perma.cc/G3MB-LBFJ]. 
135. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
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dismally low.136  Moreover, workers often lose valuable accrued benefits when 
they change jobs before vesting.137  In short, while defined contribution 
sponsors can meet their legal funding obligations by contributing what they say 
that they will, if contribution levels are too low, workers will not end up with 
adequately funded pensions when they retire.  All in all, the defined 
contribution plans of most workers will not be able to provide them with 
adequate retirement income; in short, they are “underfunded” (at least in the 
colloquial sense of that word). 
2.  Defined Benefit Plans 
Defined benefit pension plan sponsors make benefit promises that can 
extend many years into the future.  Historically, some plans simply paid those 
liabilities on a pay-as-you-go-basis.  The triumph of ERISA was that it required 
private pension plans to prefund their pensions (i.e., meet certain minimum 
funding standards).138  Generally accepted accounting principles now also 
require private companies and government entities to report how well they are 
 
136. See Barbara A. Butrica, & Nadia S. Karamcheva, Automatic Enrollment, Employer Match 
Rates, and Employee Compensation in 401(k) Plans, MONTHLY LABOR REV. (May 2015), 
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2015/article/pdf/automatic-enrollment-employer-match-rates-and-
employee-compensation-in-401k-plans.pdf [https://perma.cc/USD9-5WX3]. 
137. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE, USDL-18-
1500, EMPLOYEE TENURE IN 2018, at 2 (2018) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE TENURE IN 2018], 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8S9-MRUV] (showing high 
levels of labor mobility: the median number of years that wage and salary workers had been with their 
current employer was 4.2 years in January of 2018).  Meanwhile, employer contributions to defined 
contribution plans may not vest for 3 or more years.  I.R.C. § 411(a) (2018); ERISA § 203, 29 
U.S.C. § 1053 (2018);  NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY, 2017, supra note 9, at tbl.18 (showing 
the vesting rules used by savings and thrift plans in 2017); see also infra Section VII.C (discussing the 
impact of vesting rules on the benefit accruals of participants in defined benefit plans). 
138. I.R.C. §§ 412, 430; ERISA §§ 302–03, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082–83.  For more information, see 
the author’s unattributed entry, Employee Retirement Income Security Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AGING, 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/economics-business-and-labor/businesses-
and-occupations/employee-retirement-income-security-act [https://perma.cc/3XEK-YMNS], stating: 
One of the seminal events leading up to the passage of ERISA was the December 
1963 shutdown of the Studebaker automobile company in South Bend, Indiana.  
Studebaker had promised its employees generous retirement benefits, but it had 
never adequately funded its plan.  Consequently, the Studebaker plan was able to 
pay full retirement benefits only to its 3,600 retirees and to those active workers 
who had reached the permitted retirement age of sixty, while the company’s 
remaining 7,000 workers were left with little or nothing to show for their years 
of work.   
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funding their pension obligations.139  Nevertheless, many defined benefit plans 
are underfunded, and, in any event, relatively few workers will actually earn a 
significant defined benefit pension.  In that regard, for example, defined benefit 
plans often use backloaded benefit formulas and have long vesting periods that 
penalize workers who change jobs frequently.140 
a.  Private-Sector Defined Benefit Plans 
All in all, the U.S. government estimated that private sector defined benefit 
plans were underfunded by $553.8 billion at the end of 2018, and those plans 
were just 84% funded then.141  
i.  Single-employer Plans 
Single-employer defined benefit plans are required to make annual 
contributions to their plans in accordance with certain minimum funding 
rules.142  Nevertheless, the average funded ratio for the 100 largest corporate 
defined benefit plan sponsors in 2018 was just 87.1%.143  In the event that an 
underfunded, single-employer defined benefit plan terminates (for example, 
because the employer goes out of business), the Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) will pay annual pension benefits of up to $69,750 for a 
 
139. The Financial Accounting Standards Board and Government Accounting Standards Board 
provide detailed guidance about how to determine annual pension expenses and about how to report 
plan assets and liabilities.  See infra notes 244 & 257 and accompanying texts. 
140. See Elizabeth Bauer, Pension Plan 101: What Is Backloading And Why Does It Matter?, 
FORBES (Nov. 19, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ebauer/2018/11/19/pension-plan-101-what-is-
backloading-and-why-does-it-matter/#5749c1bb2263 [https://perma.cc/7DTN-447C]; see also infra 
Section VII.C. 
141. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES: FLOW OF FUNDS, BALANCE SHEETS, AND INTEGRATED MACROECONOMIC ACCOUNTS: 
FOURTH QUARTER 2018, at 96 tbl.L.118.b (2019) [hereinafter FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES], https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20190307/z1.pdf [https://perma.cc/5ZRG-
3BXV] (0.839156 = 1.0 – ($553.8 billion claims of pension fund on sponsor / $3,443.1 billion pension 
entitlements [liabilities]). 
142. I.R.C. §§ 412, 430; ERISA §§ 302–03, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1082–83. 
143. ZORAST WADIA, ALAN H. PERRY, & CHARLES J. CLARK, MILLIMAN, 2019 CORPORATE 
PENSION FUNDING STUDY 1 (2019), http://assets.milliman.com/ektron/2019-corporate-pension-
funding-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KE6-WAEW]. 
 
FORMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2020  12:11 PM 
1236 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:1205 
65-year-old retiree in 2020.144  The PBGC paid over $6 billion in benefits to 
932,000 retirees from failed single-employer pensions in fiscal year 2019.145 
ii.  Multiemployer Plans 
Multiemployer defined benefit pension plans are even more underfunded 
than single-employer plans.146  For example, in 2015, multiemployer plans were 
only about 46% funded and had a total underfunded liability of $560.3 
billion.147  In fiscal year 2019, the PBGC paid $160 million to provide benefits 
for 66,900 beneficiaries of around 89 insolvent multiemployer plans.148 
In 2018, Congress created a Joint Select Committee on Solvency of 
Multiemployer Plans to try to solve the multiemployer funding problem, but 
that committee was not able to come up with a bipartisan solution.149  Many 
members of Congress are still working toward a solution.150  Of note, however, 
 
144. Maximum Monthly Guarantee Tables, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 
https://www.pbgc.gov/wr/benefits/guaranteed-benefits/maximum-guarantee [https://perma.cc/AZE6-
H67V] ($69,750 = 12 × $5,812.50 per month). 
145. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 2019 1–2 (2019) [hereinafter PENSION 
BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANNUAL REPORT], https://www.pbgc.gov/sites/default/files/pbgc-fy-2019-
annual-report.pdf?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdelivery [https://perma.cc/C44Z-T56H]. 
146. See JCT, PRESENT LAW RELATING TO MULTIEMPLOYER DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS, supra 
note 49, at 53−56; JOHN J. TOPOLESKI, CONG. RES. SERV., REPORT NO. R45187, DATA ON 
MULTIEMPLOYER DEFINED BENEFIT (DB) PENSION PLANS 3 (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45187.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZR4B-FBDX]. 
147. TOPOLESKI, supra note 146, at 3 (0.4602 = $477.7 billion in assets /$1,038.0 billion owed 
participants).  The PBGC’s multiemployer insurance program had a net deficit of $65,166 billion at 
the end of fiscal year 2019.  PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 26 
tbl.; see also LADD PREPPERNAU, REX BARKER, KEVIN CAMPE, TIM CONNOR, STUART KLITERNICK, 
NINA LANTZ, & JOEL STEWART, MILLIMAN ANALYSIS SHOWS MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION FUNDED 
STATUS FALTERS IN 2018, at 1 (2019), 
http://assets.milliman.com/ektron/mpfs/Multiemployer_Pension_Funding_Study_20190521.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N5WP-QJFT] (estimating that the aggregate funded status for multiemployer plans 
was 74% as of December 31, 2018—a shortfall of $176 billion). 
148. PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 145, at 3. 




150. See Hazel Bradford, Senate GOP Proposes Multiemployer Reform Bill, PENSIONS & INVS. 
(Nov. 20, 2019), https://www.pionline.com/legislation/senate-gop-proposes-multiemployer-reform-
bill [https://perma.cc/4QM4-F9QY]; see generally CHARLES E. GRASSLEY & LAMAR ALEXANDER, 
MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION RECAPITALIZATION AND REFORM PLAN (2019), 
https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2019-11-
20%20Multiemployer%20Pension%20Recapitalization%20and%20Reform%20Plan%20White%20P
aper.pdf [https://perma.cc/APC5-MBP8]; Hazel Bradford, Long Process Predicted for Multiemployer 
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the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020 recently authorized billions 
of dollars in present and future appropriations to bail out the underfunded 
United Mine Workers of America pension plan.151 
b.  Government Defined Benefit Plans 
Many governments also have defined benefit pension plans for their 
employees.  These plans are not covered by the ERISA funding rules, 
however,152 and most are underfunded.153  For example, the U.S. government’s 
civilian employee pension plans were underfunded by $968.1 billion in fiscal 
year 2018,154 and its military pensions were underfunded by $767.9 billion in 
fiscal year 2017.155  Similarly, the U.S. government estimated that state and 
local government pension plans were underfunded by $4.7 trillion at the end of 
 
Reforms, PENSIONS & INVS. (July 22, 2019), https://www.pionline.com/legislation/long-process-
predicted-multiemployer-reforms [https://perma.cc/26YQ-AKUN]; Rehabilitation for Multiemployer 
Pensions Act of 2019, H.R. 397, 116th Cong. (2019); see also John J. Topoleski, Cong. Res. Serv., 
Report No. R45311, Policy Options for Multiemployer Defined Benefit Pension Plans (2018), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45311.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QSV-92T2]; CHARLES P. BLAHOUS III, 
MERCATUS CTR., AVERTING THE MULTIEMPLOYER PENSION SOLVENCY CRISIS (2018), 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/blahous-multiemployer-pension-crisis-mercatus-research-
v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/FSB6-Y2S6]. 
151. Mary Williams Walsh, Congress Saves Coal Miner Pensions, but What About Others?, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/24/business/coal-miner-pensions-
bailout.html [https://perma.cc/M3Z2-MGLF]; Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. 
No. 116-94, Division M—Bipartisan American Miners; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO ESTIMATE FOR 
RULES COMMITTEE PRINT 116-44, THE FURTHER CONSOLIDATED APPROPRIATIONS ACT, 2020 (H.R. 
1865) (2019), https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2019-12/hr1865.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR5C-ZBBJ]. 
152. ERISA § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1) (2018). 
153. See LISA SCHILLING & PATRICK WIESE, SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, U.S. PUBLIC PENSION 
CONTRIBUTION ANALYSIS 2 (2019), https://www.soa.org/Files/resources/research-
report/2019/pension-plan-analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/XD5K-LSUM] (finding that most of the plans 
studied received insufficient contributions to reduce their unfunded liabilities). 
154. U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY FUND 
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 2018, at 20, 25, 25 tbl.1 (2019), 
https://www.opm.gov/about-us/budget-performance/other-reports/fy-2018-csrdf-annual-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H6YK-XRTJ]. 
155. OFFICE OF THE ACTUARY, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, VALUATION OF THE MILITARY 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM AS OF SEPTEMBER 30, 2017, at 24 tbl.6A (2019), 
https://media.defense.gov/2019/Apr/26/2002122105/-1/-
1/0/MRF%20VALRPT%202017%20[APRIL%202019]%20FINAL.PDF [https://perma.cc/Y4D7-
NENV]; see also FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 141, at 98 tbl.L.119.b 
(showing that, in the aggregate, federal pensions were underfunded by $1,650.9 billion at the end of 
2018). 
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2018 and were just 45% funded then,156 although other analysts estimate that 
the aggregate funding ratio for state and local government plans is around 
72%.157 
IV.  SOME BASIC PENSION ECONOMICS AND MATHEMATICS 
A.  Simple Present-Value and Future-Value Mathematics 
To see if a pension is fully funded, one typically looks to see how the assets 
in a pension plan compare with its liabilities.  If the value of the assets in a plan 
is at least equal to the value of its accrued liabilities, we can say that the plan is 
fully funded.  The value of assets typically involves a straightforward valuation.  
Determining a plan’s accrued liabilities at any point in time, however, often 
takes some simple calculations to determine. 
At the outset, pension plans get assets from contributions (C), and as those 
contributions are invested, the plan earns interest and similar returns on its 
investments (I).  The pension plan’s liabilities are the pension benefits that it 
will pay (B) and the expenses that it incurs to manage the plan (E).  Basically, 
a pension plan is fully funded when: 
C + I = B + E.158 
 
156. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 141, at 100 tbl.L.120.b 
(0.452812 = 1.0 − [$4.724.3 billion claims of pension fund on sponsor / $8,633.6 billion pension 
entitlements]); see also Janelle Cammenga, How Well-Funded Are Pension Plans in Your State?, TAX 
FOUND. (July 17, 2019), https://taxfoundation.org/state-pension-plan-funding-2019/ 
[https://perma.cc/58SG-ENFC] (includes a map). 
157. JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY & CAROLINE V. CRAWFORD, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT BOS. COLL., 
UPDATE ON THE FUNDED STATUS OF STATE AND LOCAL PENSION PLANS – FY 2018, at 1, 2 fig.1 
(2019), https://slge.org/assets/uploads/2019/09/funding-brief-oct2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y2A-
D58D]; JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY, CAROLINE V. CRAWFORD, & KEVIN WANDREI, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT 
BOS. COLL., STABILITY IN OVERALL PENSION PLAN FUNDING MASKS A GROWING DIVIDE 1, 2 (2018), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/slp_62.pdf [https://perma.cc/S47B-S4QQ] (estimating 
that state and local government pension plans were 72% funded in fiscal year 2017); REBECCA A. 
SIELMAN, MILLIMAN, 2019 PUBLIC PENSION FUNDING STUDY 1–2 (2019), 
http://assets.milliman.com/ektron/2019_Public_Pension_Funding_Study.pdf [https://perma.cc/K34Q-
4GSC] (estimating that the 100 largest public pension plans were 73.4% funded as of June 30, 2019). 
158. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RET. ADM’RS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO STATEWIDE PENSION PLANS: FY 17, at 1 (2019) [hereinafter NASRA, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS], https://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/NASRAADCBrief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6ZS6-8R85]. 
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Expenses are usually trivial compared to benefits and can be ignored 
here,159 leaving the full funding formula as: 
C + I = B. 
Analysts can use this formula to see how well funded a pension plan is at 
any point in time—now or in the future.  To be sure, most benefits will be paid 
in the future, and pension plans can collect a lot of contributions and earn a lot 
of investment income on plan assets between now and when those benefits are 
to be paid.  Accordingly, to decide whether a plan is fully funded, analysts need 
to compare the future value of the plan’s assets with the future value of the 
pension plan’s liabilities.  Alternatively, analysts can compare the present value 
of a plan’s assets with the present value of its liabilities, and this approach is 
what most analysts actually do.  Either way, some mathematics is involved.160 
At its simplest, suppose that a hypothetical employer promises to pay a 
current employee $10,000 in 10 years.  That is a $10,000 future liability, and 
the question is how much should the employer set aside today in order to have 
enough to pay that accrued liability in 10 years.  Certainly, $10,000 would be 
enough, but since any money that the employer sets aside today can be invested 
and earn interest for 10 years, the employer can set aside a much smaller amount 
today.  For example, as more fully explained below, if the hypothetical 
employer can earn 5% interest over each of the next 10 years, then setting aside 
$6,139.13 today will be enough, as the present value of $10,000 in 10 years 
discounted at 5% is $6,139.13 today.161  In short, the employer has an accrued 
liability of $6,139.13, and setting that amount aside today would fully fund its 
obligation to pay that hypothetical employee $10,000 in 10 years (i.e., 100% 
funded).  Here is the explanation. 
Basically, present value is the reverse of compound interest.  The 
compound interest formula to determine a future value (FV) is: 
FV = P (1 + r)Y, 
 
159. Of course, all plans should strive to minimize fees.  See generally Jonathan Barry Forman, 
The Future of 401(k) Plan Fees, N.Y.U. REV. OF EMP. BENEFITS & EXEC. COMP. 9-1 (2007) 
[hereinafter Forman, The Future of 401(k)]. 
160. Here is a very simple present value example.  Suppose you have $1,000 today, and you can 
earn 5% annual interest on an investment.  That means you can earn $50 interest in a year ($50 = 5% 
× $1,000), and if you made that investment and held it for one year, you would have $1,050 at the end 
of the year ($1,050 = $1,000 + $50), and the present value of the right to receive $1,050 in one year is 
$1,000.  Similarly, if you kept your money in that investment for another year (two years total), it 
would grow to $1,102.50 ($1,102.50 = $1,050 + $52.50; $52.50 = 5% × $1,050); and the present value 
of the right to receive $1,102.50 in two years is $1,000. 
161. See infra note 163 and accompanying text. 
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where P is the starting principal, r is the annual interest rate, and Y is the number 
of years invested.162  Thus, in the example, if the employer sets aside $6,139.13 
today and earns 5% interest for 10 years, the employer will have $10,000 in 10 
years to pay the employee, and we could say the employer’s liability is fully 
funded (i.e., 100% funded).163  If, instead, the employer only sets aside $4,000 
today, we would say that the employer’s obligation is underfunded.  On the 
other hand, if the employer sets aside $8,000 today, we would say that the 
obligation is overfunded. 
If we know a future value, the compound interest formula can easily be 
rearranged to solve for the starting principal P, which we will now rename as 
Present Value (PV).  Accordingly, the present value formula is: 
PV = FV / (1 + r)Y, 
and in the example, the present value of the right to receive $10,000 in 10 years 
is $6,139.13.164 
B.  The Mathematics of Converting a Lump Sum into an Annuity 
(and Vice Versa) 
The mathematics of converting a lump sum into a lifetime annuity or 
pension is pretty straightforward.  If an individual has a fixed principal sum to 
invest today and we know the interest rate that she can earn and how long she 
is expected to live, we can determine the annuity amount that that person (i.e., 
the annuitant) will receive each period.165  For example, if an individual has 
$100,000 to invest in an annuity today, can earn 5% interest per year, and can 
expect to receive 20 annual annuity payments (i.e., live for 20 years), a simple 
annuity calculator shows that each annual annuity payment would be 
 
162. The usual convention is to use “r” for the interest rate rather than “i” for interest.  This 
simple formula assumes that interest is compounded just once a year, and a slightly more complicated 
formula can be used if interest is to be compounded more frequently.  See Compound Interest 
Calculator, MONEYCHIMP, http://www.moneychimp.com/articles/finworks/fmfutval.htm 
[https://perma.cc/8JMW-E9F8]. 
163. $10,000 = FV = P (1 + r)Y = $6,139.13 × (1 + 0.05)10. 
164. $6,139.13 = PV = FV / (1 + r)Y = $10,000 / (1 + 0.05)10.  See Present Value Calculator, 
MONEYCHIMP, http://www.moneychimp.com/calculator/present_value_calculator.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EX98-EHTG]. 
165. The general formula to solve for the periodic annuity amount is: 
w = [P(1 + r)Y - 1r ] / [(1 + r)Y − 1] 
where P is the present value (= starting principal) of a stream of annual withdrawal amounts (w) given 
an interest rate (r) over a number of Years (Y).  See Annuity, MONEYCHIMP, 
http://www.moneychimp.com/articles/finworks/fmpayout.htm [https://perma.cc/TM3F-GJ4T]. 
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$8,024.26.166  Annuities (and pensions) typically make monthly payments, but 
the mathematical principles are the same for yearly or monthly payments. 
By the same token, the mathematics of converting a lifetime annuity into a 
lump sum is also quite straightforward.  Basically, a lump sum value is 
determined by converting a stream of projected future benefit payments into a 
present value.167  We just need to know the applicable interest rate and the 
number of future benefit payments that the annuitant expects to receive.168  The 
interest rate (also known as the discount rate) is the rate of return that can be 
earned on the investment, and it is determined by market forces.  The number 
of future benefit payments that the individual is expected to receive is 
extrapolated from a mortality table.  In the example, when the discount rate is 
5%, the present value of a stream of 20 annual payments of $8,024.26 
commencing one year from today is $100,000.169  In short, the present value of 
a 20-year, $8,024.26-per-year annuity is $100,000 (that is, when a 5% interest 
rate and a 20-year life expectancy are the correct actuarial assumptions).170 
 
166. Annuity Calculator, MONEYCHIMP, 
http://www.moneychimp.com/calculator/annuity_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc/QL23-AXHF] 
(Starting Principal: $100,000.00; Growth Rate: 5%; Years to Pay Out: 20; Make payouts at the: end of 
each year; result is Annual Payout Amount = $8,024.26). 
167. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-74, PRIVATE PENSIONS: 
PARTICIPANTS NEED BETTER INFORMATION WHEN OFFERED LUMP SUMS THAT REPLACE THEIR 
LIFETIME BENEFITS app. at 60 (2015), http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/668106.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KQ9C-CTHU]. 
168. The general formula for the present value of a stream of annuity payments is: 
P = w[(1 + r)Y − 1] / [(1 + r)Yr] 
where P is the present value (= starting principal) of a stream of annual withdrawal amounts (w) given 
an interest rate (r) over a number of Years (Y).  See Annuity, MONEYCHIMP, supra note 165. 
169. To check this result, see Present Value of an Annuity Calculator, MONEYCHIMP, 
http://www.moneychimp.com/calculator/present_value_annuity_calculator.htm 
[https://perma.cc/W58H-YL3H] (Annual Payout: $8,024.26; Growth Rate: 5%; Years to Pay Out: 20; 
Make payouts at the: end of each year; result is Present Value = $100,000.02; close enough!). 
170. Note, actuaries do not determine the present value of a lifetime annuity by using life 
expectancy.  Instead, each future annuity payment until the end of the mortality table is multiplied by 
the probability that the person will survive to receive that payment, and then those adjusted amounts 
are discounted to the present and summed.  For example, in the Social Security Administration’s 2016 
Period Life Table, a 65-year-old male has a death probability of 0.015808 (i.e., the probability of dying 
before he reaches age 66).  Actuarial Life Table, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN. 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/table4c6.html [https://perma.cc/N7WP-A4AL] (select the period 
life table for 2016).  Consequently, his probability of living to age 66 and collecting an annual annuity 
payment then is 0.984192 (0.984192 = 1.0 − 0.015808).  Accordingly, the expected value of the right 
to receive an annual annuity payment of, say, $10,000 at age 66 is $9,841.92 ($9,841.92 = 0.984192 × 
$10,000); and if the discount rate is 5%, then the present value (at age 65) of that $9,841.92 is $9,373.26 
($9,371 = $9,841.92 / 1.05).  Like most current actuarial life tables, the Social Security 
Administration’s 2016 period life table assumes that the last survivor dies at age 120, and, accordingly, 
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V.  BENEFIT ACCRUAL AND FUNDING TRADITIONAL DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS 
This Article develops several simplified model pension plans that are 
designed to replace 40% of a typical worker’s preretirement earnings.  These 
model pension plans are similar to—but less complicated than—real world 
pension plans.  These model pension plans also rely on a variety of simplifying 
demographic and economic assumptions, and all the model pension plans focus 
on a single hypothetical worker.  Using this approach makes it easier to focus 
on full funding issues without immediately getting bogged down in the 
cluttering details of real-world pension plans.171 
A.  The Model Defined Benefit Plan 
This Section develops a simplified model defined benefit plan that would 
provide a typical worker with a pension benefit equal to 40% of her 
preretirement earnings.  While there are many possible ways to design a model 
defined benefit plan that would provide a benefit equal to 40% of a worker’s 
preretirement earnings, this Article takes a simple and straightforward 
approach.  Basically, under the model defined benefit plan, each worker will 
earn a pension benefit (B) equal to 1% times years of service (yos) times final 
pay (fp) (B = 1% × yos × fp).  The model plan also assumes that the typical 
worker starts work at age 25, works from age 25 through age 64, and therefore 
earns a pension benefit equal to 1% of final pay in each of those 40 years.  The 
model plan further assumes that the typical worker then retires at age 65 and 
goes on to collect a pension equal to 40% of her final pay from retirement at 
age 65 until her death at age 85.  For example, if the hypothetical worker had 
final pay of $100,000, she would be entitled to a pension, starting at age 65, of 
$40,000 a year from age 65 through age 84 ($40,000 B = 1% × 40 yos × 
$100,000 fp).  At the outset, Table 4 summarizes the key assumptions for the 
model defined benefit plan, and these assumptions are explained in turn. 
 
 
death probabilities are provided for individuals through age 119.  The present value of a $10,000 
lifetime annuity equals the sum of the present value of the many expected future payments from age 
65 (or age 66 if payments instead start then) to age 120.  In the real world, insurance companies rely 
on actuarial present value determinations like this to determine the selling price for their annuity 
products. 
171. In that regard, the design of any model pension plan is always somewhat arbitrary, and the 
economic and demographic assumptions that are used with a model pension plan can also seem 
somewhat arbitrary—even if each of those assumptions is quite defensible.  As the focus of this Article 
is largely on the full funding of whatever pension benefits are promised, however, this Article’s 
analysis and ultimate recommendations are just not that dependent on the actual size or level of the 
promised pension benefits.  In any event, many real-world complications are discussed in Part VIII, 
infra. 
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TABLE 4: KEY ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE MODEL DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN 
Variable Model Assumption 
Economic Assumptions 
Interest (Discount) Rate 5.0% 
Inflation Rate 2.5% 
Salary Growth Rate 3.5% 
Worker Assumptions 
Entry Age 25 
Retirement Age 65 
Career Length 40 years (i.e., 25−64) 
Age at Death 85 
Length of Retirement 20 years (i.e., 65−84) 
Longevity at Entry Age 60 years (i.e., 25−85) 
Final Pay at Age 64 $100,000 
Plan Design Assumptions 
Benefit Based On Final Pay 
Annual Benefit Accrual Rate 1.0% 
Vesting Period Immediate 
Benefit Form Single-life Annuity 
Annuity Factor 10 
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1.  Economic Assumptions 
a.  Interest (Discount) Rate—5%  
The model defined benefit plan assumes that the annual interest rate is 
5%.172  That means investments earn a 5% rate of return, and present values and 
liabilities are also discounted at a 5% rate.173 
 
172. With respect to private-sector defined benefit plans, many Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
and PBGC pension calculations use a blended rate that is determined by applying an adjusted corporate 
bond-based yield curve.  See, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2007-81, 2007-44 I.R.B. 899; 26 C.F.R. § 1.430(h)(2)-
1 (2014); Monthly Interest Rate Statement, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 
https://www.pbgc.gov/prac/interest/monthly [https://perma.cc/F64F-KHBK] (those IRS segment rates 
are “used to determine the variable-rate premium”).  More specifically, the blended rate is based on a 
combination of segment rates that are promulgated by the IRS: the short term rate (for benefits that are 
payable within the first 5 years of calculation), the intermediate term rate (for benefits that are payable 
in the next 10 years of calculation, or years 5−15), and the long-term rate (for benefits that are payable 
in the years beyond year 15).  See Minimum Present Value Segment Rates, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/minimum-present-value-segment-rates 
[https://perma.cc/PM7N-QD62].  For example, in January of 2020, the IRS segment rates were 1.91% 
for the first segment, 2.93% for the second segment, and 3.54% for the third segment.  Id.; see also 
Funding Yield Curve Segment Rates, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/retirement-
plans/funding-yield-curve-segment-rates [https://perma.cc/BS9N-7DNC] (showing various funding 
yield curve segment rates); Pension Discount Yield Curve and Index Rates in US, MERCER, 
https://www.mercer.us/our-thinking/wealth/mercer-pension-discount-yield-curve-and-index-rates-in-
us.html [https://perma.cc/YJ3M-93V2] (showing Mercer Index Rates for its large sample of private 
pension plans of 2.87% for the Retiree plan, 3.10% for the Mature plan, 3.23% for the Average plan, 
and 3.27% for the Young plan); WADIA, PERRY, & CLARK, supra note 143, at 1, 2 fig.2, 9 fig.16 
(showing that the Milliman 100 largest pension plan sponsors used a 4.01% discount rate in 2018 and 
had an expected rate of return on assets of 6.6%); LISA SCHILLING, SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, U.S. 
PENSION PLAN DISCOUNT RATE COMPARISONS 2009−2014, at 1–2 (2016), 
https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Projects/research-2016-us-pension-plan-discount-rate-
comparison.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7X2-M8YC] (showing discount rates for 2009−2014); LEON C. 
LABRECQUE, LUMP-SUM PENSIONS AND INTEREST RATES: HOW LUMP-SUMS CAN GO DOWN WHEN 
INTEREST RATES RISE 1–4 (2017), https://ljpr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Interest-Rates-and-
Lump-Sums-APPROVED.pdf [https://perma.cc/23SQ-7GQ9] (explaining how interest rates and other 
factors can change the value of a lump-sum distribution). 
With respect to public sector defined benefit plans, see NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RET. ADM’RS, 
PUBLIC PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT RETURN ASSUMPTIONS 2 fig.2 (2019) [hereinafter NASRA, 
PUBLIC PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT], 
https://www.nasra.org/files/Issue%20Briefs/NASRAInvReturnAssumptBrief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B4L2-RCWD] (finding an average assumed nominal rate-of-return assumption of 
7.36% (in 2017) in a survey of state and local pension plans). 
173. Much has been written about the topic of discount rate, and it is not the author’s intention 
to wade into that discussion here (except to say that the author believes that the 7.36 average discount 
rates used by public sector pension plans seem to be way too high).  See generally JOHN A. TURNER, 
HUMBERTO GODINEZ-OLIVARES, DAVID D. MCCARTHY, & MARIA DEL CARMEN BOADO-PENAS, 
SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES, DETERMINING DISCOUNT RATES REQUIRED TO FUND DEFINED BENEFIT 
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b.  Inflation Rate—2.5% 
The model plan assumes that the annual inflation rate is 2.5%.174  The 
inflation rate does not actually figure directly into the simple model pension 
plans created in this Article; nevertheless, it is an important economic variable.  
For example, given the nominal interest (discount) rate is assumed to be 5%, 
the real economic rate of return is 2.5% (2.5% real rate of return = 5% nominal 
interest rate – 2.5% inflation rate).175 
c.  Salary Growth Rate—3.5% a Year 
To calculate the value of a worker’s accrued pension benefit, one also needs 
to make assumptions about how a worker’s salary will grow over the course of 
her career.  The model pension plan assumes that each worker’s salary will 
grow by 3.5% every year.176  For example, if the salary of a worker in the 
current year is $30,000, the model plan assumes that it will be $31,050 next 
year ($31,050 = 1.035 × $30,000), and so on until retirement. 
2.  Worker Assumptions 
a.  Entry Age—25, Retirement Age 65, and a 40-year Career (from age 25 
through age 64) 
The model defined benefit plan assumes that the hypothetical worker starts 
working for her employer at age 25 and stays with that employer until retiring 
at age 65.  In that regard, age 65 is the typical retirement age used in analyses 
 
PLANS (2017), https://www.soa.org/Files/Research/Projects/determining-discount-rates.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7K7T-PVLM] (discussing the appropriate discount rate); Craig Foltin, Dale L. 
Flesher, Gary J. Previts, & Mary S. Stone, State and Local Government Pensions at the Crossroads: 
Updating Accounting Standards Highlight the Challenges, CPA J. (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.cpajournal.com/2017/05/08/state-local-government-pensions-crossroads/ 
[https://perma.cc/MMP4-DGV2] (discussing the appropriate discount rate).  In any event, choosing a 
different discount rate would not make much difference in this Article’s analysis and conclusions. 
174. See 2019 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 11, at 8, 98−100 (2.60% a year 
is the Social Security Administration’s intermediate inflation assumption.  “The intermediate 
assumptions reflect the Trustees’ best estimates of future experience.”); see also NASRA, PUBLIC 
PENSION PLAN INVESTMENT, supra note 172, at 2 fig.2 (finding an average assumed inflation rate of 
2.80% in a survey of 129 state and local pension plans). 
175. The model pension plans do not provide cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs); however, the 
cost of providing a COLA is considered in Section VII.B infra. 
176. See, e.g., 2019 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 11, at 100−103 (1.21% is 
the Social Security Administration’s intermediate real-wage differential assumption, i.e., nominal 
wage growth is 3.81% = 1.21% real-wage differential + 2.60% inflation). 
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such as this,177 and it is not intended here to be a recommended retirement age.  
While most Americans do, in fact, retire by age 65,178 the full retirement age 
for Social Security is already age 66 and headed to age 67,179 and many analysts 
recommend that workers maximize their Social Security benefits by working 
until age 70 if they can.180  Pertinent here, ERISA generally defines the normal 
retirement age for pensions as age 65,181 and the required minimum distribution 
rules generally require pension plan participants to begin taking distributions 
soon after they reach age 72.182 
Implicitly, the model defined benefit plan also assumes a 40-year working 
career with pension coverage.  To be sure, many traditional pensions in the real 
world today assume that workers will retire after 30 years of service.183  Still, 
the 40-year career assumed here is reasonable given the longer lives and longer 
retirements that today’s workers should plan on having.  In any event, the model 
has to start somewhere, and 40 years is a reasonable length for a career.184 
 
177. JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 473, HOW MUCH 
WOULD IT TAKE? ACHIEVING RETIREMENT INCOME EQUIVALENCY BETWEEN FINAL-AVERAGE-PAY 
DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN ACCRUALS AND AUTOMATIC ENROLLMENT 401(K) PLANS IN THE PRIVATE 




178. ALICIA H. MUNNELL, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT BOSTON COLLEGE, ISSUE IN BRIEF NO. 11-
11, WHAT IS THE AVERAGE RETIREMENT AGE? 1, 3, (2011), https://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/08/IB_11-11-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2TD-F8S8]. 
179. See Retirement Benefits Planner, supra note 18. 
180. See Knoll & Olsen, supra note 30, at 22. 
181. More specifically, ERISA generally defines “normal retirement age” as the earlier of the 
time specified in the plan or age 65.  I.R.C. § 411(a)(8) (2018); ERISA § 3(24), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) 
(2018). 
182. I.R.C. § 401(a)(9) (as revised by the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. 
L. No. 116-94, Division O—Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement § 114). 
183. For example, many plans permit employees with 30 years of service to retire even before 
they reach age 65.  See, e.g., NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY, 2016, supra note 9, at tbl.9. 
184. Of note, the author is currently in his 42nd year as a full-time attorney since graduating law 
school in 1978 (at age 25), and he is currently in his 34th year as a professor at the University of 
Oklahoma College of Law. 
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To be sure, in the real world, very few employees actually work for 40 years 
before retiring,185 let alone for 40 years with the same employer.186  In planning 
for adequate retirement incomes, however, workers should want to earn some 
kind of pension benefits on almost every job they hold and certainly on almost 
every job they hold from age 25 until retirement.  Making the assumption that 
the hypothetical employee works for a single employer throughout her career 
avoids the complexity of trying to consolidate pension benefits earned from 
multiple employers.187 
 
185. Estimating the average career length of American men and women is a challenge.  The 
U.S.’s Bureau of Labor Statistics stopped producing “worklife estimates” in 1986.  Labor Force 
Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
https://www.bls.gov/cps/lfcharacteristics.htm#worklife [https://perma.cc/4LXH-9LWF]; NATIONAL 
COMPENSATION SURVEY, 2016, supra note 9, at tbl.12.  See generally BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BULL. NO. 2254, WORKLIFE ESTIMATES: EFFECTS OF RACE AND EDUCATION 
(1986), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/worklife-estimates/archive/worklife-estimates-1986.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EWN4-TG39].  Since then, various forensic economists have developed worklife 
expectancy charts to help answer tort damages questions like “How much would a 40-year-old doctor 
killed in a car accident have earned over the rest of his then-expected working career?”  See, e.g., Kurt 
V. Krueger & Frank Slesnick, Total Worklife Expectancy, 25 J. FORENSIC ECON. 51, 61 tbl.3 (2014) 
(estimating that 25-year-old males who were actively participating in the labor force would spend about 
33.67 more years in the labor force, and active 25-year-old females would spend about 27.36 more 
years in the labor force). 
Another approach for estimating average career length involves looking at Social Security 
records.  In order to compute an individual’s Social Security benefits, the Social Security 
Administration reviews each worker’s earnings in covered employment.  See supra note 23 and 
accompanying text.  In that regard, one study used Social Security administrative data files to determine 
the median number of Social-Security-covered work years from ages 14−61 for a sample of birth cohort 
1945 individuals who were newly eligible for retired worker benefits in 2007; it found that the median 
worker had around 36 years in covered employment (41 years for males and 31 years for females).  
Hilary Waldron, The Sensitivity of Proposed Social Security Benefit Formula Changes to Lifetime See 
Earnings Definitions, 72 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 1, 13 tbl.5 (2012).  Pertinent here, 48% of women and 
42% of men who claimed Social Security retired-worker benefits in 2013 were age 62.  ALICIA H. 
MUNNELL & ANQI CHEN, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT BOS. COLL., ISSUE IN BRIEF NO. 15-8, TRENDS IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMING 1 (2015), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/IB_15-8.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/95MW-ZLHR]. 
186. See, e.g., EMPLOYEE TENURE IN 2018, supra note 137, at 1–2 (showing that the median 
number of years that wage and salary workers had been with their current employer was about 4.2 
years in January of 2018).  The median job tenure is higher for older workers than younger workers.  
Id. at tbl.1 (showing that the median tenure of workers ages 55 to 64 was 10.1 years compared with 
just 2.8 years for workers ages 25 to 34). 
187. As more fully explained in the discussion infra Section VIII.B, making it easier for workers 
to consolidate the benefits that they earn from working for multiple employers over the course of their 
careers could help them achieve higher retirement incomes.  To be sure, workers can sometimes 
consolidate benefits through rollovers, but most analysts favor additional portability mechanisms.  See 
generally COMMON WEALTH & ASPEN INST. FIN. SEC. PROGRAM, PORTABLE NON-EMPLOYER 
RETIREMENT BENEFITS: AN APPROACH TO EXPANDING COVERAGE FOR A 21ST CENTURY 
 
FORMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2020  12:11 PM 
1248 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:1205 
b.  Mortality Assumptions—A 20-year Retirement and Death at Age 85 
The model defined benefit plan also assumes a 20-year retirement from age 
65 through age 84—with death at age 85.  Again, the model has to start 
somewhere, and a 20-year retirement is quite plausible.  For example, according 
to the National Center for Health Statistics, the life expectancy of a 65-year-old 
in 2017 was 19.4 years (18.1 years for men and 20.6 years for women).188  To 
be sure, life expectancies are increasing, and today’s new entrants can expect 





188. NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2018 tbl.4 (2018), 
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/hus18.pdf [https://perma.cc/WE2S-YP2D] (on p. viii, click on 
Table 4); see, e.g., 2019 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 11, at 95 tbl.V.A4; see also 
infra Table 12 (where columns 6 and 7 show the Social Security Administration’s similar estimates of 
period life expectancy in 2016 for males and females of various ages (e.g., 17.9-year period life 
expectancy for a 65-year-old man and 20.5-year period life expectancy for a 65-year-old woman)).  
Another source of slightly different life expectancy estimates is the HUMAN MORTALITY DATABASE, 
https://www.mortality.org/ [https://perma.cc/2FQL-FK48].  See generally Magali Barbieri, 
Investigating the Difference in Mortality Estimates between the Social Security Administration 
Trustees’ Report and the Human Mortality Database (Mich. Ret. Res. Ctr., Working Paper No. 2018-
394, 2018), https://mrdrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp394.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND3H-
UYGV]. 
There are two types of life expectancy tables: cohort or period.  A cohort life expectancy table 
presents the expected mortality experience of a particular age cohort—all persons who turned age 65 
in 2016, for example—from then on, and a cohort table includes projected improvements in their life 
expectancy in the future.  On the other hand, a period life expectancy table does not represent the 
mortality experience of an actual birth cohort; instead, the period life table presents what would happen 
to that cohort if it experienced throughout its entire life the mortality conditions that existed as of a 
particular point in time.  For example, a period life table in 2017 assumes that a 65-year-old man will 
experience throughout his entire life the age-specific death rates that prevailed in the actual population 
in 2017.  See Elizabeth Arias & Jiaquan Xu, United States Life Tables, 2017, NATIONAL VITAL 
STATISTICS REPORTS, June 24, 2019, at 1, 1 (showing period life expectancies).  As health care 
improves and longevity increases, cohort life expectancies are generally longer than period life 
expectancies.  At age 65, however, they are not all that different.  For example, while the Social 
Security Trustees’ 2016 period life expectancy table shows a 17.9-year period life expectancy for a 65-
year-old man and 20.5-year period life expectancy for a 65-year-old woman, its 2016 cohort life 
expectancy table shows an 18.8-year cohort life expectancy for a 65-year-old man and a 21.3-year 
cohort life expectancy for a 65-year-old woman.  See 2019 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT, 
supra note 11, at 95 tbl.V.A4, 96 tbl.V.A5. 
189. See, e.g., id. at 95 tbl.V.A4 (showing period life expectancies for men and women at birth 
and at age 65 from 1940 through 2095); id. at 96 tbl.V.A5 (showing cohort life expectancies at birth 
and at age 65 from 1940 to 2095). 
 
FORMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2020  12:11 PM 
2020] FULLY FUNDED PENSIONS 1249 
longer retirement (i.e., death at an older age), a 20-year retirement is certainly 
plausible, and 20 is certainly an easy-to-work-with number. 
Implicitly, the model defined benefit plan also ignores the reality that some 
25-year-olds will not, in fact, live to age 65.  In that regard, for example, 
extrapolating from the Social Security Administration’s 2016 Period Life 
Table, of 100,000 male live births, approximately 98,055 might be expected to 
survive to age 25, and of those survivors, approximately 79,893 (81.5%) might 
be expected to survive until age 65 (0.8147 = 79,893 / 98,055).190  Choosing to 
ignore employee deaths before retirement would not affect the benefit accrual 
of those workers who live to age 65 that are the focus of this Article; however, 
in passing, it is worth noting that those deaths of employees younger than age 
65 usually reduce the funding obligations of real-world defined benefit plan 
sponsors as the accrued benefits of those who die before age 65 are typically 
forfeited.191 
c.  Final Salary—$100,000 Leads to Starting Salary Around $26,000  
The model defined benefit plans also assumes that the hypothetical worker 
has an easy-to-work-with final salary of $100,000 a year at age 64.  Given the 
assumed salary growth rate of 3.5%, that $100,000 final salary leads to a 
plausible starting salary of around $26,141 ($26,141.25 = $100,000 / 
1.03539).192 
 
190. See Actuarial Life Table, supra note 170.  Similarly, of 100,000 female live births, 
approximately 98,861 might be expected to survive to age 25.  Of those survivors, 87,574 (88.6%) 
might be expected to survive until age 65 (0.8858 = 87,574 / 98,861).  Id.  The phrase “might be” is 
used with respect to these extrapolations, as this period life table is not quite the right resource for 
making such survival predictions. 
191. In short, assuming that all 25-year-old workers live to age 65 is heroic.  The model plan 
also ignores terminations.  In the real world, however, plan sponsors often count on getting actuarial 
gains when at least some of their workforce leave when they have fewer years of service and lower 
salaries than they would have had if they had stayed until age 65.  That is, as some workers die or leave 
before retirement, any given defined benefit plan sponsor can meet its funding obligations with lower 
contributions. 
192. Excel was used to create most of the tables and figures in this article, but rounded numbers 
are usually used in this Article’s text and footnotes. 
As this footnote explains, that $26,141 starting salary is probably a little bit low, but it is directly tied 
to that $100,000 final salary number that will so greatly simplify many explanations and discussions 
in this Article.  Pertinent here, in the fourth quarter of 2018, the Bureau of Labor Statistics reported 
that the median usual weekly earnings of full-time workers age 20 to 24 was $594 a week ($30,888 a 
year = 52 weeks × $594 median usual weekly earnings), and the median usual earnings for workers 
age 25 to 34 was $820 a week ($42,640 year = 52 weeks × $820 median usual weekly earnings).  
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE, USDL-19-0077, USUAL 
WEEKLY EARNINGS OF WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS, FOURTH QUARTER 2018, at tbl.3 (2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/wkyeng_01172019.pdf [https://perma.cc/QQ5Y-EJQB]. 
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3.  Plan Design Assumptions 
a.  Benefit Based on Final Pay Rather than Final Average Pay 
The model defined benefit plan uses final pay rather than final average pay.  
Admittedly, most traditional plans in the real world use average pay over 
several final years,193 rather than basing the pension on the single final year, 
and the single-year approach for this model plan is the more expensive of the 
two possibilities; however, the single-year approach makes for less complicated 
discussions in this Article. 
b.  Annual Benefit Accrual Rate—1% 
The model defined benefit plan also assumes a 1%-per-year annual benefit 
accrual rate.  Historically, many traditional defined benefit plans provided 
higher annual benefit accrual rates (e.g., 2% over a 30-year career),194 and even 
today, 2% is a common annual benefit accrual rate in many state and local 
pension plans.195  On the other hand, the annual benefit accrual rate for most 
federal employees covered by the Federal Employees Retirement System 
(FERS) is now just 1%,196 down from 2% for most workers hired under the 
predecessor Civil Service Retirement System.197  In any event, the model 
defined benefit plan assumes a 1% annual benefit accrual rate, and that would 
result in a pension equal to 40% of final pay for a worker with a 40-year 
career.198  In short, the model defined benefit plan uses 1% over 40 years as a 
 
193. See Wiatrowski, supra note 60, at 16. 
194. See, e.g., Barbara A. Butrica, Howard M. Iams, Karen E. Smith, & Eric J. Toder, The 
Disappearing Defined Benefit Pension and Its Potential Impact on the Retirement Incomes of Baby 
Boomers, 69 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 1, 1, 15 (2009); see also Richard Works, Trends in Employer Costs 
for Defined Benefit Plans, BEYOND THE NUMBERS, Feb. 2016, at 1, 7 (showing the average costs to 
employers per hour for providing their employees with defined benefit plan coverage). 
195. See Kramer & Ranon-Hernandez, supra note 9, at 2. 
196. KATELIN P. ISAACS, CONG. RES. SERV., 92-972, FEDERAL EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT 
SYSTEM: SUMMARY OF RECENT TRENDS 1 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/98-972.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q4YL-3K8Q]; FERS Information: Computation, U.S. OFFICE PERSONNEL MGMT., 
https://www.opm.gov/retirement-services/fers-information/ [https://perma.cc/83DD-7US7] (then, 
select the Computation hyperlink) (explaining that the Federal Employees Retirement System provides 
typical workers with a basic annuity of 1% of the employee’s high-3 average salary for each year of 
service). 
197. CSRS Information, U.S. OFFICE PERSONNEL MGMT., https://www.opm.gov/retirement-
services/csrs-information/ [https://perma.cc/2D4D-KRYB] (then, select the Computation hyperlink to 
see how benefits accrue over the course of a covered worker’s career). 
198. Also, if a reader believes that a larger pension is needed for any reason, that higher pension 
could easily be created (1) by multiplying this Article’s 1%-per-year benefit accrual rate by a factor 
of, say, 1.5 or 2; or, alternatively, (2) by increasing the employee’s working career by, say, 5 years. 
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perfectly reasonable way to accrue retirement benefits today.  In that regard, as 
longevity has increased, more workers can expect to make it to retirement, and 
they are likely to collect retirement benefits for many years.199 
c.  Vesting Period—Immediate Vesting 
The model defined benefit plan also implicitly assumes that there is no 
vesting period.  That is, a worker is eligible for a pension benefit, beginning at 
age 65, regardless of the number of years of her service.200 
d.  Benefit Form—A Fixed, Single-life Annuity 
The model defined benefit plan also assumes that the pension benefit takes 
the form of a fixed, single-life annuity.  As a result, the model avoids the 
complexities associated with joint-and-survivor annuities and cost-of-living 
adjustments (COLAs), although these variations are discussed in Part VII 
below. 
e.  Annuity Factor—10 
When the hypothetical worker retires, the actuarial liability for the defined 
benefit plan is the starting amount of the pension times an annuity factor.201  For 
simplicity, the model defined benefit plan assumes an easy-to-work-with 
annuity factor at age 65 of 10.202  Accordingly, if a 65-year-old retiree with a 
final salary of $100,000 wants to receive a life annuity of $40,000 a year, then 
the plan will need to have saved $400,000 for her ($400,000 = 10 × $40,000).  
Conversely, if the plan has saved $400,000 for a 65-year-old retiree, then it will 
 
199. See 2019 SOCIAL SECURITY TRUSTEES REPORT, supra note 11, at 3–4. 
200. In the real world, 5-year vesting periods are common, and employees who terminate before 
vesting only get their own contributions back (if any), so the model plan is more generous in that 
regard.  See I.R.C. § 411(a) (2018); ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2018); see also supra note 45 
and accompanying text. 
201. The annuity factor is the expected present discounted value of the employee’s pension, 
adjusted to an initial pension amount of $1.  Calculating the annuity factor is a standard exercise.  See 
Jonathan Barry Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Tontine Pensions, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 791 n.140 
(2015). 
202. See Table S – Based on Life Table 2000CM, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,  
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/sec_1_table_s_2009.xls [https://perma.cc/AER3-LWWB] (showing 
an annuity factor of 10.7925 for an individual age 65 and a 5.0% interest rate); see also Annuity Factor 
Calculator, SOC’Y ACTUARIES, https://afc.soa.org/#Calculator [https://perma.cc/LFY6-6XFD] (For a 
65-year-old male, and a discount rate of 5% in 2020, the annuity factor for a single life annuity payable 
at the end of each month is calculated to be 12.1457; [12.8615 for a 65-year-old female]); VANDERHEI, 
HOW MUCH WOULD IT TAKE?, supra note 177, at 8 (using annuity factors of 11.61 for 65-year-old 
men and 12.34 for 65-year-old women). 
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be able to buy her a life annuity that pays her $40,000 a year ($40,000 = 
$400,000 / 10).203 
B.  Benefit Accrual in the Model Defined Benefit Plan 
This Section shows how benefits will accrue under the model defined 
benefit plan for the hypothetical 25-year-old worker.  At the outset, Column 1 
of Table 5 shows the worker’s age (x)—from age 25 when she starts working 
to age 65 when she retires.  Column 2 of Table 5 shows the hypothetical 
worker’s salary (Sx)—starting at $26,141 at age 25 and growing by 3.5% a year 
until it reaches $100,000 at age 64.  Column 3 of Table 5 shows the hypothetical 
worker’s number of years of service completed by the end of each year (Yx)—
starting at 1 year of service by the end of the year that she starts working (age 























203. See discussion infra Section VII.B (explaining that if a defined benefit plan or annuity has 
a cost-of-living adjustment (COLA), then the annuity factor would be larger, as more money would be 
needed at retirement to pay for larger benefits in the years subsequent to the year of retirement); see  
also Forman & Sabin, supra note 201, at 793–94 n.143. 
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25 $26,141 1 1% $0 $0 $380 1.46% 
26 $27,056 2 2% $261 $390 $447 1.65% 
27 $28,003 3 3% $541 $847 $521 1.86% 
28 $28,983 4 4% $840 $1,381 $605 2.09% 
29 $29,998 5 5% $1,159 $2,002 $700 2.33% 
30 $31,048 6 6% $1,500 $2,719 $807 2.60% 
31 $32,134 7 7% $1,863 $3,546 $927 2.88% 
32 $33,259 8 8% $2,249 $4,496 $1,062 3.19% 
33 $34,423 9 9% $2,661 $5,584 $1,213 3.52% 
34 $35,628 10 10% $3,098 $6,827 $1,382 3.88% 
35 $36,875 11 11% $3,563 $8,243 $1,572 4.26% 
36 $38,165 12 12% $4,056 $9,854 $1,784 4.68% 
37 $39,501 13 13% $4,580 $11,683 $2,022 5.12% 
38 $40,884 14 14% $5,135 $13,754 $2,287 5.59% 
39 $42,315 15 15% $5,724 $16,097 $2,582 6.10% 
40 $43,796 16 16% $6,347 $18,743 $2,912 6.65% 
41 $45,329 17 17% $7,007 $21,727 $3,280 7.24% 
42 $46,915 18 18% $7,706 $25,088 $3,689 7.86% 
43 $48,557 19 19% $8,445 $28,868 $4,145 8.54% 
44 $50,257 20 20% $9,226 $33,115 $4,652 9.26% 
45 $52,016 21 21% $10,051 $37,882 $5,216 10.03% 
46 $53,836 22 22% $10,923 $43,227 $5,843 10.85% 
47 $55,720 23 23% $11,844 $49,214 $6,539 11.74% 
48 $57,671 24 24% $12,816 $55,914 $7,312 12.68% 
49 $59,689 25 25% $13,841 $63,407 $8,170 13.69% 
50 $61,778 26 26% $14,922 $71,779 $9,122 14.77% 
51 $63,940 27 27% $16,062 $81,126 $10,177 15.92% 
52 $66,178 28 28% $17,264 $91,554 $11,347 17.15% 
53 $68,495 29 29% $18,530 $103,182 $12,644 18.46% 
54 $70,892 30 30% $19,863 $116,137 $14,079 19.86% 
55 $73,373 31 31% $21,268 $130,564 $15,669 21.36% 
56 $75,941 32 32% $22,746 $146,621 $17,429 22.95% 
57 $78,599 33 33% $24,301 $164,480 $19,376 24.65% 
58 $81,350 34 34% $25,938 $184,334 $21,530 26.47% 
59 $84,197 35 35% $27,659 $206,396 $23,911 28.40% 
60 $87,144 36 36% $29,469 $230,898 $26,544 30.46% 
61 $90,194 37 37% $31,372 $258,098 $29,454 32.66% 
62 $93,351 38 38% $33,372 $288,279 $32,669 35.00% 
63 $96,618 39 39% $35,473 $321,754 $36,219 37.49% 
64 $100,000 40 40% $37,681 $358,868 $40,141 40.14% 
65    $40,000 $400,000   
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Column 4 of Table 5 then shows the hypothetical worker’s benefit factor 
(BFx) at the end of each year starting at 1% at the end of the year she starts 
working (age 25) and increasing to 40% by the end of the year in which she 
turns age 64 (BFx = 1% benefit accrual rate × Yx years of service). 
Column 5 of Table 5 then shows the amount of the future annual pension 
that the hypothetical worker has earned and will receive at age 65 (FPx).  When 
she starts working at age 25, she has not yet earned any pension benefits, and 
thus her future annual pension is $0 (FP25 = $0).  After she completes a 
year of service during age 25, she will be entitled to a pension benefit starting 
at age 65 of $261 per year for life, and thus, at the beginning of age 26, her 
future annual pension is $261 ($261 FP26 = 1% BF25 × $26,141 S25 = FPx = BFx-
1 × Sx-1).204  Similarly, at the beginning of age 27, she will be entitled to a future 
pension of $541 per year ($541 FP27 = 2% BF26 × $27,056 S26), and so on until 
at age 65, she will have earned a pension of $40,000 per year ($40,000 FP65 = 
40% BF64 × $100,000 S64). 
Column 6 of Table 5 then shows the present value of the hypothetical 
worker’s future pension as of the beginning of each year (present value of future 
benefits [PVFBx]).205  The computation of the amounts in Column 6 involves 
several steps.  For example, Column 5 shows that when the hypothetical worker 
turns age 26, she will be entitled to a pension starting at age 65 of $261 per year 
for life (FP26 = $261).  Given that the assumed annuity factor at age 65 is 10, at 
age 65, the value of her right to receive that $261-a-year pension will be $2,610 
then ($2,610 = 10 × $261 FP26).  Of course, this 26-year-old will have to wait 
39 years to get that pension (at age 65).  Given the assumed discount rate of 
5%, Column 6 shows that the value—when she turns age 26—of the right to a 
pension worth $2,610 at age 65 (i.e., her present value of future benefits) is 
$390 (PVFB26 = $390 = $2,610 / [1 + 0.05]39 = PV = FV / [1 + r]Y).  All in all, 
Column 6 of Table 5 shows how the present value of the hypothetical worker’s 
future benefits will grow from $0 when she starts working at age 25 (PVFB25 = 
0) to $400,000 at age 65 when she retires (PVFB65 = $400,000).206 
Column 7 of Table 5 focuses on how and when the hypothetical worker 
earns that pension over the course of her career.  More specifically, Column 7 
shows how much of her pension she earns in each year that she works—i.e., her 
annual benefit accrual (Bx).  For example, by working through age 25, the 
 
204. For simplicity, Column 5 of Table 5 treats the pension benefit earned in a given year as if 
it accrued on the first day of the next year, i.e., after the year of service. 
205. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, FUNDAMENTALS OF CURRENT PENSION FUNDING AND 
ACCOUNTING FOR PRIVATE SECTOR PENSION PLANS 5 (2004) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS OF 
CURRENT PENSION FUNDING], https://www.actuary.org/pdf/pension/fundamentals_0704.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/48A2-F236]. 
206. Note that $400,000 PVFB65 = 10 annuity factor × $40,000 FP65. 
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hypothetical worker earned a future pension worth $390 at the beginning of age 
26 (PVFB26 = $390, Column 6 of Table 5).  She really earned that future pension 
by working all through the prior year (age 25), and Column 7 estimates the 
value of that annual benefit accrual as of the midpoint of the year that she was 
age 25 (i.e., at the midpoint of the year that she worked to earn that portion of 
her pension, e.g., July 1 of the calendar year).  Given the 5% assumed discount 
rate, the value of that $390 present value of future benefits six months earlier 
would be $380 (B25 = $380 = $390 PVFB26 / √1.05).207  Similarly, by working 
through age 26, her present value of future benefits as of the beginning of age 
27 would be $847 (PVFB27 = $847 Column 6 of Table 5).  That is an increase 
from age 26 to age 27 of $457 ($457 = $847 PVFB27 − $390 PVFB26), and the 
value of that $457 six months earlier (i.e., at the midpoint of the prior year) is 
$447 (B26 = $447).208  All in all, Column 7 of Table 5 shows how the 
hypothetical worker’s annual benefit accrual (Bx) will grow from $380 at age 
25 (B25 = $380) to $40,141 at age 64 (B64 = $40,141). 
In summary, Figure 1 shows how the hypothetical worker’s annual salary 
(Sx), annual benefit accrual (Bx), and present value of future benefits (PVFBx) 

















207. Here is the math: $380 B25 = $390 PVFB26 / √1.05.  The factor √1.05 (i.e., 1.051/2) is used 
here to model the interest that can be earned on a salary paid in installments throughout the year (e.g., 
monthly paychecks), and, conversely, the factor 1 / √1.05 is used to model a half-year discount rate 
(when needed in subsequent computations). 
208. $447 B26 = $457 / √1.05 = ($847 PVFB27 − $390 PVFB26) / √1.05. 
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FIGURE 1: SALARY, ANNUAL BENEFIT ACCRUAL, AND PRESENT VALUE OF 
FUTURE BENEFITS IN THE MODEL DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN 
 
Finally, Column 8 of Table 5 shows the hypothetical worker’s annual 
benefit accrual as a percentage of her salary in the year that she earned that 
benefit—i.e., her annual benefit accrual percentage (BPx).  For example, by 
working through age 25, the hypothetical worker accrued a pension benefit 
worth $380 (B25 = $380, Column 7 of Table 5) based on her salary that year of 
$26,141 (S25 = $26,141, Column 2 of Table 5).  Therefore, her annual benefit 
accrual percentage at age 25 is 1.46% (0.0146 BP25 = $380 B25 / $26,141 S25).  
Similarly, her annual benefit accrual percentage at age 26 is 1.65% (0.0165 
BP26 = $447 B26 / $27,056 S26), and the remainder of Column 8 shows similar 
computations for subsequent years until her annual benefit accrual percentage 



















Present Value of Future Benefits
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Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of these annual benefit accrual 
percentages (BPx).  More specifically, Figure 2 shows that the hypothetical 
worker’s annual benefit accruals are a much greater percentage of her salary at 
the end of her career than at the beginning; that is, her annual benefit accruals 
under the model defined benefit plan are backloaded at the end of her career.209  
That is, traditional defined benefit plans provide disproportionately larger 
benefits for older workers than for younger workers.210  Indeed, well over half 
of the value of a worker’s traditional defined benefit plan pension can accrue in 
the last 5 or 10 years of her service.211 
FIGURE 2: ANNUAL BENEFIT ACCRUAL IN THE MODEL DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN, 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF CURRENT SALARY 
 
 
209. Figure 1 also shows this backloading of annual benefit accruals (in dollars)—from B25 = 
$380 at age 25 to B64 = $40,141 at age 64; however, that backloading is less recognizable in Figure 1 
because of the scale used in that figure. 
210. In passing, it is worth noting that the backloading of annual benefit accruals can have an 
impact on worker turnover and the timing of retirement.  JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, MAKING 
AMERICA WORK 225−31 (2006). 
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C.  Funding Methods for Traditional Defined Benefit Plans 
Over the course of a 40-year career, the hypothetical worker covered by the 
model defined benefit plan would earn the right to a pension that would pay her 
$40,000 a year from retirement at age 65 until her death at age 85, and that 
pension would be worth $400,000 at age 65 (Columns 5 and 6 of Table 5).  The 
plan sponsor needs to pay those $40,000-a-year annual pension benefits as they 
become due, and this Section explains the basic methods that a plan sponsor 
could use to fund those future benefit payments. 
In effect, this Section shifts from the perspective of the worker who has 
earned the pension benefits to the perspective of the plan sponsor who must pay 
those benefits.  Put simply, the pension benefits accrued by a worker in a 
defined benefit plan are an accrued liability for the plan sponsor.  For example, 
as the hypothetical worker’s present value of future benefits grows from $390 
when she turns age 26 (PVFB26 = $390, Column 6 of Table 5) to $400,000 when 
she turns age 65 and retires (PVFB65 = $400,000, Column 6 of Table 5), the 
plan sponsor’s accrued liability (ALx) similarly grows from $390 when the 
hypothetical worker turned 26 (AL26 = $390) to $400,000 when she turns 65 
and retires (AL65 = $400,000).  In short, the plan sponsor’s accrued liability for 
any worker in any year is equal to the present value of the worker’s future 
pension benefits (that is, ALx = PVFBx).  Of course, the total accrued liability 
of a plan sponsor in any particular real-world defined benefit plan would 
depend on the age and service characteristics of all of the employees covered 
by that plan.  That total accrued liability of the plan sponsor to its workers is 
known as the plan sponsor’s accumulated benefit obligation (ABO);212 and, if 
a private-sector employer were to terminate its defined benefit plan,213 then the 
ABO is roughly equal to its termination liability.214 
 
212. The accumulated benefit obligation is the approximate amount of a pension plan’s liability 
at any particular point in time.  Will Kenton, Defining Accumulated Benefit Obligation, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/accumulated-benefit-obligation.asp 
[https://perma.cc/955L-N7SF]; W. ASSET MGMT. CO., DERISKING YOUR PENSION PLAN, PART 1: 
PBO OR ABO FUNDING TARGET? 3 (2011), http://www.westernasset.com/common/pdfs/2011-05-
derisking-your-pension-plan-part-1.pdf?srcid=WA_Investment_Report [https://perma.cc/5PTW-
MPD3]. 
213. Employers can end their defined benefit plans through a process that is known as “plan 
termination.”  How Pension Plans End, PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 
https://www.pbgc.gov/about/pg/other/how-pension-plans-end [https://perma.cc/VTS4-S8J7]. 
214. FUNDAMENTALS OF CURRENT PENSION FUNDING, supra note 205, at 5; BOB COLLIE, 
RUSSELL INVS., A COMPARISON OF VARIOUS MEASURES OF PENSION LIABILITIES 2 (2015), 
https://www.nasra.org/files/Topical%20Reports/Actuarial/comparison-of-various-measures-of-
pension-liabilities.pdf [https://perma.cc/52X5-WRLY]; see also LONIE HASSEL, PRACTICAL LAW CO., 
DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS: DISTRESS AND INVOLUNTARY TERMINATIONS 4 (2010), 
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To be sure, the determination of the amount of a plan sponsor’s accrued 
liability to its workers is independent of how and when that liability is to be 
funded,215 and this Section considers the whole range of possible funding 
methods. 
1.  The Unfunded Method: Pay as You Go (PAYG) 
Theoretically, one way that a plan sponsor can meet its obligation to pay 
the pension benefits that it has promised to its workers is to simply pay the 
annual pension benefits as they become due—out of the plan sponsor’s then-
current budgets.  This is the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) method (a/k/a, the current 
disbursement method).216  Thus, under the PAYG method, the plan sponsor 
does not prefund its pension plan at all: the plan sponsor simply pays each 
retiree’s pension out of the plan sponsor’s then-current budget.  In short, the 
plan is completely unfunded.  Figure 3 shows how this PAYG method would 
work for the model defined benefit plan.  The plan sponsor would make no 
contributions to its plan on behalf of the hypothetical worker as she works from 
age 25 through age 64; instead, the plan sponsor would simply pay her a 
$40,000-a-year pension from age 65 through age 84 (again assuming that she 










Involuntary-Terminations-9-502-5005.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ZSR-YGDS] (noting that “[t]ermination 
liability is the difference between the fair market value of plan assets on the date of plan termination 
and the value of the plan’s liabilities on the date of plan termination.”). 
215. See, e.g., FINDLEY, GOVERNMENT PENSION PLANS IN FOCUS: IS THE PLAN ACTUARIALLY 
SOUND? 4 (2018), https://findley.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/GovtPensionPlaninFocus.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PVD5-M37S]. 
216. See, e.g., Charles L. Trowbridge, Fundamentals of Pension Funding, in SOC’Y OF 
ACTUARIES, 50TH ANNIVERSARY MONOGRAPH, M-AV99-1, at 101, 103 (1999), 
https://www.soa.org/essays-monographs/50th-anniversary/ [https://perma.cc/P8DD-QHTS]. 
Trowbridge also calls this Class I funding.  Id. at 103 (“No contributions are made to the plan beyond 
those immediately necessary to meet benefit payments falling due.”).  Trowbridge distinguishes it from 
Class II funding that is not discussed in this Article.  Id. (“If no funding whatsoever is contemplated 
for active lives, but if the present value of future pension benefits is contributed for each life as it 
reaches retirement, we have what has come to be known as ‘terminal’ funding.”). 
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FIGURE 3: PAY-AS-YOU-GO (PAYG) FUNDING FOR A DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN 
 
Real world examples of PAYG-style systems include Social Security 
(which has modest trust fund surpluses that could cover no more than a few 
years of benefits),217 most state and local government retiree health care 
programs,218 and many forms of nonqualified deferred compensation in the 
private sector.219 
In theory, the PAYG method can provide retirees with their promised 
pensions.  In the real world, however, prior to the enactment of the Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), many private-sector, PAYG 
pensions failed because the employers that sponsored them went out of 
business.220  Indeed, ERISA was enacted in large part to avoid underfunding by 
 
217. See supra notes 127−28 and accompanying text. 
218. See, e.g., ALICIA H. MUNNELL, JEAN-PIERRE AUBRY, & CAROLINE V. CRAWFORD, CTR. 
FOR RET. RES. AT BOS. COLL., HOW BIG A BURDEN ARE STATE AND LOCAL OPEB BENEFITS? 3–4 
(2016), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/slp_48.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR4W-LKK8]. 
219. See Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Audit Techniques Guide (June 2015), INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/corporations/nonqualified-deferred-compensation-
audit-techniques-guide [https://perma.cc/3GMQ-4L5B]. 
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imposing prefunding discipline on private-sector plan sponsors.221  Basically, 
ERISA requires private-sector defined benefit plans to meet certain minimum 
funding requirements, and promised defined benefit plan pension benefits are 
also guaranteed, within limits, by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
(PBGC).222  These ERISA funding requirements do not apply to state and local 
governmental plans,223 however, and most of those plans are underfunded.224 
2.  Prefunding Methods 
Most analysts believe that prefunding is one of the best ways to help ensure 
that retirees will actually get their promised defined benefit plan pension 
benefits.  The idea here is to make sure that the defined benefit plan accumulates 
enough money during each worker’s career so that the plan can pay that 
worker’s promised pension benefits throughout her retirement.  For example, 
the model defined benefit plan should accumulate $400,000 by the time the 
hypothetical worker turns age 65 so that the plan can pay her a $40,000-a-year 
pension for 20 years, from age 65 through age 84 (still assuming that she will 
die at age 85) (PVFB65 = $400,000, Column 6 of Table 5; FP65 = $40,000, 
Column 5 of Table 5).225  This Section explains how various prefunding 
methods could accumulate that $400,000 over the course of her career.226 
 
221. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
222. ERISA § 4006, 29 U.S.C. § 1306 (2018). 
223. ERISA § 4(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1003(b)(1). 
224. See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text. 
225. Recall that the model defined benefit plan assumes that the annuity factor is 10; that is, for 
example, that $400,000 will buy an annuity of $40,000-a-year for 20 years.  See supra Section V.A.3.e. 
226. In passing, it should be acknowledged that fully funding pensions is not the only plausible 
prefunding target.  For example, in the public sector, many analysts suggest that plans are adequately 
funded if they are 80% funded.  AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, THE 80% PENSION FUNDING STANDARD 
MYTH 2 (2012), https://www.actuary.org/sites/default/files/files/80_Percent_Funding_IB_071912.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CJW8-9RBT]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-1156, STATE AND 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT RETIREE BENEFITS: CURRENT STATUS OF BENEFIT STRUCTURES, 
PROTECTIONS, AND FISCAL OUTLOOK FOR FUNDING FUTURE COSTS 30, 30 n.44 (2007), 
https://www.gao.gov/assets/270/267150.pdf [https://perma.cc/VJT7-5P4F] (noting that “[a] funded 
ratio of 80% or more is within the range that many public sector experts, union officials, and advocates 
view as a healthy pension system”). 
Moreover, plans can be fiscally sustainable (i.e., require no outside funding) even if they never 
achieve full funding.  JAMIE LENNEY, BYRON LUTZ, & LOUISE SHEINER, THE SUSTAINABILITY OF 
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PENSIONS: A PUBLIC FINANCE APPROACH 6 (2019), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/lenney_lutz_sheiner_MFC_Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GY4B-GN7E]; see also Henning Bohn, Should Public Retirement Plans Be Fully 
Funded?, 10 J. PENSION ECON. & FIN. 195, 196 (2011). 
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a.  An Overview of Prefunding Methods 
Basically, prefunding methods are designed to ensure that the plan sponsor 
will have enough money set aside by retirement to pay all of the promised 
pension benefits.  Theoretically, a plan sponsor could fully fund a worker’s 
pension the moment that she is hired.  For example, as there should be $400,000 
available when the hypothetical worker retires at age 65, the plan sponsor could 
set aside $56,818.27 at the moment she was hired at age 25,227 and that 
$56,818.27 would grow—for 40 years at 5% annual interest—to $400,000 
when she turns age 65.228  Realistically, few employers would be prosperous 
enough to prefund their pensions in this way.229  In any event, the tax rules 
generally do not allow private employers to overfund their pension plans in this 
way.230 
Instead, most plan sponsors use various actuarial cost methods to prefund 
future pension benefits over the course of their workers’ careers.  Basically, 
these prefunding methods attempt to equitably allocate the cost of the future 
pension benefits to each year that those benefits are earned.  More specifically, 
this Section outlines the principal actuarial methods by which the value of a 
worker’s future pension benefits is allocated to each year of service—the so-
called normal cost for each year.  Basically, the normal cost is the portion of 
the present value of the future benefits that is attributable to the current year of 
service under the applicable prefunding method, and it “is the current value of 
the compensation that is being deferred this year.”231  Normal cost is computed 
differently under the various actuarial cost methods. 
 
227. See, e.g., Present Value Calculator, supra note 164 (Future Value = $400,000; Years = 40; 
Discount Rate = 5%; result is Present Value = $56,818.27). 
228. See, e.g., Compound Interest Calculator, supra note 162 (Current Principal = $56,818.27 
annual Addition = $0, Years = 40, Interest Rate = 5%; Compound Interest = 1 time(s) annually; result 
is Future Value = $399,999.98; close enough!). 
229. See FINDLEY, supra note 215, at 4.  However, this fully prefunded approach might be 
exactly the approach used with respect to a bonus to be paid in a few years.  For example, to entice a 
worker to leave a stable employment situation, a new start-up company might promise to pay the 
prospective employee a $300,000 bonus if the prospective employee will quit her job and come work 
for the start-up for 5 years: the prospective employee might demand that that bonus be set aside in a 
trust for her benefit.  In that regard, if the employer put around $235,000 in a trust today, it should 
grow to $300,000 in 5 years.  See, e.g., Present Value Calculator, supra note 164 (Future Value = 
$300,000; Years = 5; Discount Rate = 5%; result is Present Value = $235,057.85). 
230. For example, there are a variety of limits on the deductibility of contributions to defined 
benefit plans.  See I.R.C. §§ 404, 415 (2018); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., INTERNAL REVENUE 
MANUAL § 4.72.15.3 (2017), https://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-072-015#idm139904710374320 
[https://perma.cc/RJ9H-WLRH]. 
231. FUNDAMENTALS OF CURRENT PENSION FUNDING, supra note 205, at 5. 
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Again, a bit of caution is in order.  This Section looks at funding for a single 
worker’s pension benefits.  In the real world, however, an employer typically 
thinks about funding a pension that covers its entire workforce.  In that regard, 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 showed that an individual worker’s pension benefits 
under a traditional defined benefit plan accrue in a very backloaded way; that 
is, annual benefit accruals are often much greater at the end of her career than 
at the beginning.  In looking at how to fund her pension benefits however, it is 
important to remember that the overall cost of funding an employer’s pension 
plan for its entire workforce is unlikely to increase so dramatically over time.  
If an employer has numerous workers with varying age and service records, the 
employer’s accruing pension liability can be quite flat over time—or just 
increase at roughly the same modest rate that wages increase (e.g., at the 3.5% 
salary growth rate in the model defined benefit plan).  In effect, the low accruing 
pension liabilities associated with young and new employees will offset the 
much higher accruing pension liabilities associated with older and longer-
serving employees.  Mathematically speaking, the normal cost for funding the 
pension plan is an average of the normal costs associated with the individual 
employees.  In short, while the normal cost of funding the pension of a single 
employee will typically increase dramatically over time, the employer’s normal 
cost for funding its pension plan will tend to increase quite modestly.232  
b.  The Traditional Unit Credit (TUC) Method 
At the outset, the classic approach for prefunding a traditional defined 
benefit plan is the traditional unit credit (TUC) method.233  The idea here is to 
make contributions that are sufficient to cover the worker’s accruing benefit 
each year (i.e., the annual benefit accruals [Bx], Column 7 of Table 5), and 
Table 6 shows how this TUC method works.  At the outset, Column 1 of Table 
6 again shows the hypothetical worker’s age (x)—from age 25 when she starts 
working to age 65 when she retires, and Column 2 again shows her salary (Sx)—
starting at $26,141 at age 25 and growing by 3.5% a year until it reaches 





232. Of course, if the employer has a shrinking workforce (or closes its plan to new entrants), 
plan costs could grow quite dramatically as the average age, service, and salary of the covered workers 
increase. 
233. See Trowbridge, supra note 216, at 104; KAUSCH & ZORN, supra note 125, at 8. 
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Value of the 
Pension Assets at 
the End of the Year 
(VTUCx) 




25 $26,141 $380 $390 1.46% 
26 $27,056 $427 $847 1.58% 
27 $28,003 $480 $1,381 1.71% 
28 $28,983 $538 $2,002 1.86% 
29 $29,998 $603 $2,719 2.01% 
30 $31,048 $674 $3,546 2.17% 
31 $32,134 $754 $4,496 2.35% 
32 $33,259 $842 $5,584 2.53% 
33 $34,423 $941 $6,827 2.73% 
34 $35,628 $1,049 $8,243 2.95% 
35 $36,875 $1,170 $9,854 3.17% 
36 $38,165 $1,304 $11,683 3.42% 
37 $39,501 $1,452 $13,754 3.67% 
38 $40,884 $1,615 $16,097 3.95% 
39 $42,315 $1,797 $18,743 4.25% 
40 $43,796 $1,997 $21,727 4.56% 
41 $45,329 $2,219 $25,088 4.90% 
42 $46,915 $2,465 $28,868 5.25% 
43 $48,557 $2,736 $33,115 5.64% 
44 $50,257 $3,036 $37,882 6.04% 
45 $52,016 $3,367 $43,227 6.47% 
46 $53,836 $3,733 $49,214 6.93% 
47 $55,720 $4,138 $55,914 7.43% 
48 $57,671 $4,584 $63,407 7.95% 
49 $59,689 $5,076 $71,779 8.50% 
50 $61,778 $5,619 $81,126 9.10% 
51 $63,940 $6,219 $91,554 9.73% 
52 $66,178 $6,880 $103,182 10.40% 
53 $68,495 $7,609 $116,137 11.11% 
54 $70,892 $8,412 $130,564 11.87% 
55 $73,373 $9,298 $146,621 12.67% 
56 $75,941 $10,275 $164,480 13.53% 
57 $78,599 $11,350 $184,334 14.44% 
58 $81,350 $12,535 $206,396 15.41% 
59 $84,197 $13,840 $230,898 16.44% 
60 $87,144 $15,278 $258,098 17.53% 
61 $90,194 $16,860 $288,279 18.69% 
62 $93,351 $18,602 $321,754 19.93% 
63 $96,618 $20,519 $358,868 21.24% 
64 $100,000 $22,630 $400,000 22.63% 
65 (Annuity = $40,000/year)   
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Column 3 of Table 6 then shows the contributions that should be made 
under the TUC method.  For example, when the hypothetical 25-year-old 
worker earns $26,141, she accrues a pension benefit with a present value of 
$380 (B25 = $380, Column 7 of Table 5, modeled as of the mid-point of the 
year).  Therefore, under the TUC method, $380 would be the plan sponsor’s 
normal cost for that hypothetical 25-year-old worker’s first year of work, and 
that $380 is the amount that the plan sponsor should contribute to the plan that 
year on her behalf (CTUC25 = $380, Column 3 of Table 6). 
In subsequent years, the plan sponsor needs to contribute enough to ensure 
that the plan always has enough assets on hand to cover the worker’s growing 
present value of future benefits (PVFBx, Column 6 of Table 5).  Of course, prior 
contributions and the current year’s contribution will earn interest.  
Accordingly, after the first year, required TUC contributions will be lower than 
the worker’s subsequent annual benefit accruals.  For example, by working 
through age 26, the hypothetical worker had an annual benefit accrual of $447 
(B26 = $447, Column 7 of Table 5), but the plan sponsor need only contribute 
$427 (CTUC26 = $427, Column 3 of Table 6) because both the prior year’s 
contribution of $380 and this year’s contribution of $427 will earn 5% 
interest.234 
Column 3 of Table 6 shows how those annual contributions will grow from 
$380 at age 25 (CTUC25 = $380) to $22,630 at age 64 (CTUC64 = $22,630),235 and  
Figure 4 provides a graphic representation of those TUC contributions over the 
course of the hypothetical worker’s 40-year career.  Figure 4 shows clearly that 
under the TUC method, contributions are significantly backloaded; that is, 






234. $426.96 = $437.50 / √1.05; $437.50 = ($847 PVFB26 − $390 PVFB25) × 1.05. 
235. The difference between annual benefit accruals and contributions under the traditional unit 
credit method continues to grow each year until age 64 when the annual benefit accrual is $40,141 
(B64 = $40,141, column 7 of Table 5) but the plan sponsor’s TUC contribution will be just $22,630 
(CTUC64 = $22,630, column 3 of Table 6).  Basically, if all prior contributions were timely made, then 
the plan would have already accumulated $358,868 by the time the hypothetical worker turned 64 
(PVFB64 = $358,868, column 6 of Table 5 [and VTUC63 = $358,868, column 4 of Table 6]), and that 
$358,868 would earn $17,943 in interest that year ($17,943 = 0.05 × $358,868 PVFB64).  As a total of 
$400,000 will be needed for her pension when she turns age 65, just $22,630 in contributions will be 
needed at age 64 ($22,630 = $23,189 / √1.05; $23,189 = $400,000 PVFB65 − $358,868 PVFB64) × 
1.05. 
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FIGURE 4: VARIOUS METHODS FOR PREFUNDING A DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN 
 
Column 4 of Table 6 shows how the value of the pension assets for the 
hypothetical worker will grow (at 5% interest) from $390 at the end of the year 
she turns age 25 (VTUC25 = $390, i.e., at the moment she turns age 26) to 
$400,000 at the end of the year she turns age 64 (VTUC64 = $400,000, i.e., at the 
moment she turns age 65).  Of course, that means that the plan will have 
accumulated enough assets to pay her that $40,000-a-year pension throughout 
her 20-year retirement (again from age 65 when she retires through age 84, 
again assuming that she will die at age 85).  Finally, Column 5 of Table 6 and 
Figure 5 show how annual contributions will grow as a percentage of her annual 
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Age
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(7.27 Percent of Salary)
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FIGURE 5: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DEFINED BENEFIT PLAN AS A PERCENTAGE OF 
CURRENT SALARY 
 
The traditional unit credit method at least initially looks like a full funding 
method.  All other things being equal, a plan that always makes its TUC 
contributions should always have enough funds to be able to pay all of the 
pension benefits that its workers have accrued (i.e., to cover its accumulated 
benefit obligation (ABO)).  Pertinent here, the Pension Protection Act of 2006 
requires that private pension plans use the traditional unit credit method to 
measure funded status.237  
Of course, in the real world, a plan that uses the traditional unit credit 
method to determine its contributions can become somewhat overfunded or 
underfunded depending on its actual investment experience, variations in wage 
growth, longevity, and the like.  In particular, real-world pensions often become 
 
237. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-38-06, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF H.R. 4, THE 
“PENSION PROTECTION ACT OF 2006,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE ON JULY 28, 2006, AND AS 
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underfunded when pension benefits are enhanced.  When those enhancements 
have a retroactive effect, they immediately create an unfunded actuarial accrued 
liability (UAAL).238 
More typically, however, real-world pensions become underfunded when 
they simply fail to make their so-called annual required contributions 
(ARCs).239  For example, New Jersey contributed an average of just 38% of its 
ARC to its pension plans over the 2001−2013 period, and Pennsylvania 
contributed an average of just 41.2% of its ARC over that period; and those 
funding shortfalls led to precipitous declines in the funding levels of the plans 
in those states.240  All in all, because the traditional unit credit method backloads 
contributions, employers with aging workforces can face significantly 
increasing contribution burdens over time that can make it especially difficult 
to meet their ongoing ARC and UAAL funding obligations.241 
c.  The Projected Unit Credit (PUC) Method 
Of course, there are a number of ways to reduce the backloading that is 
inherent in the traditional unit credit (TUC) method (the method that makes 
normal cost contributions that merely cover annual benefit accruals).  Basically, 
these approaches would require plan sponsors to make larger contributions 
earlier in each worker’s career. 
For example, under the projected unit credit (PUC) method, plan sponsors 
make much larger normal cost contributions each year—contributions that are 
based on their workers’ projected final salaries and ultimate pensions, rather 
than on their current salaries and current annual benefit accruals (as under the 
TUC method).242  Rather than just funding the plan’s accumulated benefit 
obligation (ABO), the PUC method determines the amount that the plan 
currently needs to cover its projected benefit obligation (PBO).243  Pertinent 
 
238. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
239. KEITH BRAINARD & ALEX BROWN, NAT’L. ASS’N OF STATE RET. ADM’RS, THE ANNUAL 
REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION EXPERIENCE OF STATE RETIREMENT PLANS, FY 01 TO FY 13, at 2 (2015), 
https://www.nasra.org/files/JointPublications/NASRA_ARC_Spotlight.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V6N-
WNTB]. 
240. Id. at 2, 8. 
241. See PGIM, LONGEVITY AND LIABILITIES: BRIDGING THE GAP 5 (2016), 
https://www.prudential.com/media/managed/documents/rp/RP_Longevity_Liabilities.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/58VY-5PW6]; see also supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
242. See, e.g., KAUSCH & ZORN, supra note 125, at 8−9. 
243. See Daniel Liberto, Projected Benefit Obligation (PBO), INVESTOPEDIA (May 6, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/pbo.asp [https://perma.cc/4YAB-UUBY]; see also 
FUNDAMENTALS OF CURRENT PENSION FUNDING, supra note 205, at 5–6 (explaining the projected 
unit credit cost method); W. ASSET MGMT. CO., supra note 212, at 2 (“So long as a plan is not hard-
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here, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) requires companies to 
use the projected unit credit actuarial cost method to account for their accruing 
pension benefits for financial accounting purposes (i.e., for what they report to 
managers, shareholders, leaders, suppliers, tax authorities, and regulators).244 
Recall that the annual benefit accrual for the hypothetical worker at age 25 
was determined based on 1% of her then-final salary of $26,141; that is, by the 
beginning of the year that she turns age 26, she will be entitled to a pension of 
$261 a year starting at age 65 ($261 FP26 = 1% BF25 × $26,141 S25, Columns 5, 
4, and 2 of Table 5, respectively).  Under the PUC method, the plan instead 
views the worker as having earned a pension equal to 1% of her projected final 
salary of $100,000 (S64 = $100,000, Column 2 of Table 5); that is, at the 
beginning of the year that she turns age 26, the PUC method views her as having 
earned the right to $1,000 a year starting at age 65 ($1,000 = 1% × $100,000 
S64), not just $261 a year under the TUC method.  Therefore, in the early years 
of the hypothetical worker’s career, larger contributions are required under the 
PUC method than under the TUC method.  For example, as more fully 
explained below, at age 26, the contribution that would be required by the PUC 
method would be roughly four times larger than the required contribution under 
the TUC method as $1,000 is roughly four times larger than $261 (3.8314 = 
$1,000 / $261).245 
Table 7 and Figure 4 show how the PUC method works.  Before exploring 
Table 7, however, it is worth noting that another way of viewing the PUC 
method is to understand that the hypothetical worker will have a final salary of 
$100,000 at age 64, and she will be entitled to a pension of $40,000 a year 
starting at age 65 ($40,000 FP65 = 40% BF64 × $100,000 S64, Columns 5, 4, and 
2 of Table 5, respectively).  In effect, the PUC method presumes that each year 
of her service will fund exactly one-fortieth of that ultimate $40,000-a-year 
pension, and $1,000 also equals $40,000 divided by 40 years of service ($1,000 
= $40,000 FP65 / 40 Y64, Columns 5 and 3 of Table 5, respectively). 
 
 
frozen, its eventual obligations are most accurately described by its PBO.  Funding to an ABO target 
essentially ignores costs that eventually will have to be addressed. Also, it instills greater volatility in 
required cash contributions.”) (footnote omitted); see also Edspira, How to Calculate the Projected 
Benefit Obligation, YOUTUBE (Jan. 17, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wXORYv9C9Qk 
[https://perma.cc/X6SD-W4ZG]. 
244. Sylvester J. Schieber, The Evolution and Implications of Federal Pension Regulation, in 
THE EVOLVING PENSION SYSTEM: TRENDS, EFFECTS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 11, 35–36 
(William G. Gale, John B. Shoven, & Mark J. Warshawsky eds., 2005); Financial Accounting, BUS. 
DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/financial-accounting.html 
[https://perma.cc/YX36-MQL4]. 
245. See infra note 246 and accompanying text. 
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Value of the 
Pension at the End 
of the Year 
(VPUCx) 
Contributions as a 
Percentage of Current 
Salary 
(CPUCPx) 
25 $26,141 $1,456 $1,491 5.57% 
26 $27,056 $1,528 $3,132 5.65% 
27 $28,003 $1,605 $4,933 5.73% 
28 $28,983 $1,685 $6,906 5.81% 
29 $29,998 $1,769 $9,065 5.90% 
30 $31,048 $1,858 $11,421 5.98% 
31 $32,134 $1,951 $13,991 6.07% 
32 $33,259 $2,048 $16,789 6.16% 
33 $34,423 $2,150 $19,832 6.25% 
34 $35,628 $2,258 $23,138 6.34% 
35 $36,875 $2,371 $26,724 6.43% 
36 $38,165 $2,489 $30,611 6.52% 
37 $39,501 $2,614 $34,820 6.62% 
38 $40,884 $2,745 $39,374 6.71% 
39 $42,315 $2,882 $44,295 6.81% 
40 $43,796 $3,026 $49,611 6.91% 
41 $45,329 $3,177 $55,347 7.01% 
42 $46,915 $3,336 $61,533 7.11% 
43 $48,557 $3,503 $68,199 7.21% 
44 $50,257 $3,678 $75,378 7.32% 
45 $52,016 $3,862 $83,104 7.42% 
46 $53,836 $4,055 $91,415 7.53% 
47 $55,720 $4,258 $100,348 7.64% 
48 $57,671 $4,471 $109,947 7.75% 
49 $59,689 $4,694 $120,254 7.86% 
50 $61,778 $4,929 $131,318 7.98% 
51 $63,940 $5,175 $143,187 8.09% 
52 $66,178 $5,434 $155,914 8.21% 
53 $68,495 $5,706 $169,557 8.33% 
54 $70,892 $5,991 $184,174 8.45% 
55 $73,373 $6,291 $199,829 8.57% 
56 $75,941 $6,605 $216,589 8.70% 
57 $78,599 $6,936 $234,525 8.82% 
58 $81,350 $7,282 $253,713 8.95% 
59 $84,197 $7,646 $274,234 9.08% 
60 $87,144 $8,029 $296,173 9.21% 
61 $90,194 $8,430 $319,620 9.35% 
62 $93,351 $8,852 $344,671 9.48% 
63 $96,618 $9,294 $371,429 9.62% 
64 $100,000 $9,759 $400,000 9.76% 
65 (Annuity = $40,000/year)   
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Column 1 of Table 7 again shows the hypothetical worker’s age (x)—from 
age 25 to age 65, and Column 2 again shows her salary (Sx)—starting at $26,141 
at age 25 and growing to $100,000 at age 64.  Column 3 of Table 7 then shows 
how contributions that follow the PUC method would grow from $1,456 at age 
25 (CPUC25 = $1,456, Column 3 of Table 7) to $9,759 at age 64 (CPUC64 = $9,759, 
Column 3 of Table 7).  For example, a contribution of $1,456 at age 25 will 
grow (at 5% interest) to be enough to pay $1,000 a year of the hypothetical 
worker’s $40,000-a-year pension at age 65 (CPUC25 = $1,456, Column 3 of Table 
7),246 and so on until the final contribution of $9,759 at age 64 would also grow 
to be enough to fund the final $1,000 a year of her $40,000 pension at age 65 
(CPUC64 = $9,759, Column 3 of Table 7).247 
Column 4 of Table 7 then shows how the value of the hypothetical worker’s 
pension will grow (at 5% interest) from $1,491 at the end of the year she turns 
age 25 (VPUC25 = $1,491)248 to $400,000 at the end of the year that she turns age 
64 (VPUC64 = $400,000).  Of course, that means that the plan will have 
accumulated enough assets to pay her that $40,000-a-year pension throughout 
her 20-year retirement (again from age 65 when she retires until she dies at age 
85).  Finally, Column 5 of Table 7 and Figure 5 show how annual contributions 
increase as a percentage of her annual salary from 5.57% at age 25 (CPUCP25 = 
5.57%) to 9.76% at age 64 (CPUCP64 = 9.76%).249 
The PUC method certainly looks like a full funding method.  To be sure, 
contributions that follow the PUC method are still backloaded, but not nearly 
as much as they were under the TUC method.  Of course, some might even say 
that funding that follows the PUC method would actually overfund the model 
defined benefit plan.  In that regard, the plan sponsor’s accumulated benefit 
obligation (ABO) for the hypothetical worker under the PUC method would, in 
 
246. Given the model defined benefit plan’s annuity factor of 10, the value of the right to receive 
a $1,000 annual pension at age 65 will be $10,000 then ($10,000 = 10 × $1,000).  Of course, the 25-
year-old hypothetical worker will have to wait around 39.5 years to collect that pension (from the 
midpoint of the year she is 25), and $10,000 = $1,456 × 1.0539.5.  See, e.g., Compound Interest 
Calculator, supra note 162 (Current Principal = $1,456; Annual Addition = $0; Years = 39.5; Interest 
Rate = 5%; Compound Interest: = 1 time(s) annually; result is Future Value = $10,003.19; close 
enough!). 
Note that this $1,456 PUC contribution is roughly four times as large as the $380 TUC 
contribution (3.8316 = $1,456 CPUC25 / $380 CTUC25).  See supra note 245 and accompanying text. 
247. $10,000 = $9,759 × √1.05. 
248. $1,491 = $1,456 CPUC25 × √1.05. 
249. 5.57% CPUCP25 = $1,456 CPUC25 / $26,141 S25; 9.76% CPUCP64 = $9,759 CPUC64 / $100,000 
S64.  Note that this 5.57%, age-25 contribution percentage under the PUC method is roughly four times 
as large at the 1.46%, age-25 contribution percentage under the TUC method (3.8151 = 5.57 CPUCP25 / 
1.46 CTUCP25). 
 
FORMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2020  12:11 PM 
1272 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:1205 
almost all years, be much less than the actual value of the plan’s assets.  For 
example, imagine that the hypothetical worker quit right when she turned 26.  
She would then be entitled to a pension of $261 a year at age 65 under the model 
defined benefit plan (FP26 = $261, Column 5 of Table 5), and that pension 
would have a present value when she turns age 26 of $390 (PVFB26 = $390, 
Column 6 of Table 5).  Nevertheless, a plan sponsor using the PUC method 
would have contributed $1,456 when she was age 25 (CPUC25 = $1,456, Column 
3 of Table 7), and that $1,456 contribution would have grown to $1,491 by the 
time she turns age 26 (VPUC25 = $1,491, Column 4 of Table 7).  Arguably, the 
pension would then be overfunded by $1,101 ($1,101 = $1,491 − $390). 
d.  The Entry Age Normal Cost Method 
The entry age normal cost method is another projected benefit obligation 
(PBO) way for a plan sponsor to prefund the cost of a defined benefit plan over 
the careers of its workers.250  Once again, the actuary estimates the total 
projected pension at retirement.  For example, the hypothetical worker is 
projected to receive a $40,000-a-year pension starting at age 65, and that 
pension will be worth $400,000 when she retires at age 65 (FP65 = $40,000, 
Column 5 of Table 5; PVFB65 = $400,000, Column 6 of Table 5).  The actuary 
then calculates the actuarial present value of that future pension as of the 
worker’s entry date and allocates that cost to each year of service according to 

















250. See, e.g., KAUSCH & ZORN, supra note 125, at 8−9. 
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i.  The Entry Age Normal Cost Level-Dollar Method 
The entry age normal cost level-dollar method works like a fixed-rate, 30-
year home mortgage.  This method allocates the pension costs in a constant 
dollar amount over all of the years of the worker’s service from her entry age 
until retirement.251  For example, in the model defined benefit plan, the plan 
sponsor will need to accumulate roughly $400,000 for the hypothetical worker 
by the time she turns age 65, and Table 8 shows how level-dollar contributions 
of $3,231-per-year on behalf of the hypothetical worker would grow to 






















251. Under the standard amortization method used for a typical 30-year mortgage, the monthly 
payment remains constant: the portion of each payment applied to principal increases while the interest 
component declines.  Of course, there are a variety of other types of mortgages that are not modeled 
here.  For example, some borrowers enter into interest-only mortgage loans.  See, e.g., Michele Lerner, 
What Is an Interest-Only Mortgage?, U.S. NEWS (Mar. 29, 2018), https://loans.usnews.com/what-is-
an-interest-only-mortgage [https://perma.cc/R5YH-FXVX].  On the other hand, a borrower might 
enter into a mortgage where the principal payment remains constant while the interest portion declines 
over time.  See, e.g., Joel Rosenberg, Level Principal Pay as an Alternative to Standard Amortization, 
PRECISION LENDER, https://explore.precisionlender.com/blog/level-principal-pay-as-an-alternative-
to-standard-amortization-2 [https://perma.cc/4HMD-T5DM].  In such a level-principal-payment 
mortgage, monthly payments would decline over time.  Id. 
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($3,231 a year) 
(CLDx) 
Value of the Pension 
at the End of the 
Year 
(VLDx) 




25 $26,141 $3,231 $3,311 12.36% 
26 $27,056 $3,231 $6,787 11.94% 
27 $28,003 $3,231 $10,437 11.54% 
28 $28,983 $3,231 $14,270 11.15% 
29 $29,998 $3,231 $18,294 10.77% 
30 $31,048 $3,231 $22,520 10.41% 
31 $32,134 $3,231 $26,956 10.05% 
32 $33,259 $3,231 $31,615 9.71% 
33 $34,423 $3,231 $36,507 9.39% 
34 $35,628 $3,231 $41,643 9.07% 
35 $36,875 $3,231 $47,036 8.76% 
36 $38,165 $3,231 $52,698 8.47% 
37 $39,501 $3,231 $58,644 8.18% 
38 $40,884 $3,231 $64,887 7.90% 
39 $42,315 $3,231 $71,442 7.64% 
40 $43,796 $3,231 $78,325 7.38% 
41 $45,329 $3,231 $85,552 7.13% 
42 $46,915 $3,231 $93,140 6.89% 
43 $48,557 $3,231 $101,108 6.65% 
44 $50,257 $3,231 $109,474 6.43% 
45 $52,016 $3,231 $118,259 6.21% 
46 $53,836 $3,231 $127,483 6.00% 
47 $55,720 $3,231 $137,168 5.80% 
48 $57,671 $3,231 $147,337 5.60% 
49 $59,689 $3,231 $158,014 5.41% 
50 $61,778 $3,231 $169,226 5.23% 
51 $63,940 $3,231 $180,998 5.05% 
52 $66,178 $3,231 $193,359 4.88% 
53 $68,495 $3,231 $206,337 4.72% 
54 $70,892 $3,231 $219,965 4.56% 
55 $73,373 $3,231 $234,274 4.40% 
56 $75,941 $3,231 $249,299 4.25% 
57 $78,599 $3,231 $265,074 4.11% 
58 $81,350 $3,231 $281,639 3.97% 
59 $84,197 $3,231 $299,032 3.84% 
60 $87,144 $3,231 $317,294 3.71% 
61 $90,194 $3,231 $336,469 3.58% 
62 $93,351 $3,231 $356,604 3.46% 
63 $96,618 $3,231 $377,745 3.34% 
64 $100,000 $3,231 $399,943 3.23% 
65 (Annuity ~ $40,000/year)   
 
FORMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2020  12:11 PM 
2020] FULLY FUNDED PENSIONS 1275 
At the outset, Column 1 of Table 8 again shows the hypothetical worker’s 
age (x)—from age 25 to age 65, and Column 2 again shows her salary (Sx)—
growing from $26,141 at age 25 to $100,000 at age 64.  Column 3 of Table 8 
then shows the required level-dollar contributions of $3,231 (CLDx = $3,231), 
and Figure 4 shows these $3,231-level-dollar contributions as a horizontal line. 
Next, Column 4 of Table 8 shows how the value of the hypothetical 
worker’s pension at the end of each year will grow from $3,311 at the end of 
the year she turns age 25 (VLD25 = $3,311)252 to almost $400,000 at age 65 
(VLD64 = $399,943).  Finally, Column 5 of Table 8 and Figure 5 show how these 
contributions decrease from 12.36% of current salary at age 25 (CLDP25 = 
12.36%) to just 3.23% of salary at age 64 (CLDP64 = 3.23%).253 
ii.  The Entry Age Normal Cost Level-Percentage-of-Salary Method 
Alternatively, the entry age normal cost method can be used to calculate 
contributions as a level percentage of salary over the course of each worker’s 
career.  For example, Table 9 shows how contributions equal to 7.27% of the 
hypothetical worker’s salary each year would grow to approximately $400,000 



















252. $3,311 VLD25 = $3,231 CLD25 × √1.05. 
253. 12.36% CLDCP25 = $3,231 CLD25 / $26,141 S25; 3.23% CLDP64 = $3,231 CLD64 / $100,000 S64. 
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Value of the 
Pension at the 
End of the Year 
(VLPx) 
Contributions as a 
Percentage of Current 
Salary 
(CLPPx) 
25 $26,141 $1,900 $1,947 7.27% 
26 $27,056 $1,967 $4,060 7.27% 
27 $28,003 $2,036 $6,349 7.27% 
28 $28,983 $2,107 $8,826 7.27% 
29 $29,998 $2,181 $11,502 7.27% 
30 $31,048 $2,257 $14,390 7.27% 
31 $32,134 $2,336 $17,503 7.27% 
32 $33,259 $2,418 $20,856 7.27% 
33 $34,423 $2,503 $24,463 7.27% 
34 $35,628 $2,590 $28,341 7.27% 
35 $36,875 $2,681 $32,505 7.27% 
36 $38,165 $2,775 $36,973 7.27% 
37 $39,501 $2,872 $41,764 7.27% 
38 $40,884 $2,972 $46,898 7.27% 
39 $42,315 $3,076 $52,395 7.27% 
40 $43,796 $3,184 $58,278 7.27% 
41 $45,329 $3,295 $64,568 7.27% 
42 $46,915 $3,411 $71,292 7.27% 
43 $48,557 $3,530 $78,474 7.27% 
44 $50,257 $3,654 $86,141 7.27% 
45 $52,016 $3,782 $94,323 7.27% 
46 $53,836 $3,914 $103,050 7.27% 
47 $55,720 $4,051 $112,353 7.27% 
48 $57,671 $4,193 $122,267 7.27% 
49 $59,689 $4,339 $132,827 7.27% 
50 $61,778 $4,491 $144,071 7.27% 
51 $63,940 $4,648 $156,037 7.27% 
52 $66,178 $4,811 $168,769 7.27% 
53 $68,495 $4,980 $182,310 7.27% 
54 $70,892 $5,154 $196,707 7.27% 
55 $73,373 $5,334 $212,008 7.27% 
56 $75,941 $5,521 $228,266 7.27% 
57 $78,599 $5,714 $245,534 7.27% 
58 $81,350 $5,914 $263,871 7.27% 
59 $84,197 $6,121 $283,337 7.27% 
60 $87,144 $6,335 $303,996 7.27% 
61 $90,194 $6,557 $325,915 7.27% 
62 $93,351 $6,787 $349,165 7.27% 
63 $96,618 $7,024 $373,820 7.27% 
64 $100,000 $7,270 $399,961 7.27% 
65 (Annuity ~ $40,000/year)   
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At the outset, Column 1 of Table 9 again shows the hypothetical worker’s 
age (x)—from age 25 to age 65, and Column 2 again shows her salary (Sx)—
growing from $26,141 at age 25 to $100,000 at age 64.  Next, Column 5 of 
Table 9 and Figure 5 show the 7.27 level-percentage-of-salary contribution rate 
(CLPPx = 7.27%). 
Column 3 of Table 9 and Figure 4 then show how the actual dollar 
contributions will increase from $1,900 at age 25 (CLP25 = $1,900) to $7,270 at 
age 64 (CLP64 = $7,270).254  Basically, contributions will increase modestly over 
time—at the assumed 3.5% annual salary growth rate.  Finally, Column 4 of 
Table 9 shows how the value of the hypothetical worker’s pension at the end of 
each year will grow from $1,947 at the end of the year she turns age 25 (VLP25 
= $1,947)255 to almost $400,000 at age 65 (VLP64 = $399,961). 
iii.  State and Local Pension Plans Now Use the Entry Age Normal Cost 
Method for Financial Reporting 
Like the PUC method, the entry age normal cost method is a projected 
benefit obligation (PBO) method.  Since 2014, the Government Accounting 
Standards Board (GASB) has required state and local pensions to use the entry 
age normal cost method for financial reporting purposes (i.e., the entry age 
level-percentage-of-salary method).256  At the same time, however, GASB has 
clearly abandoned the traditional annual required contribution (ARC) 
standard.257  Instead, state and local governments are encouraged to develop 
their own formal funding policies separate from their financial reporting 
calculations.258 
 
254. $1,900 CLP25 = 7.27% CLPP25 × $26,141 S25; $7,270 CLP64 = 7.27% CLPP64 × $100,000 S64. 
255. $1,947 VLP25 = $1,900 CLP25 × √1.05. 
256. Jason W. Chute, Stephanie H. McCulla, & Shelly Smith, Preview of the 2018 
Comprehensive Update of the National Income and Product Accounts: Changes in Methods, 
Definitions, and Presentations, in 98 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS (2018), 
https://apps.bea.gov/scb/2018/04-april/pdf/0418-preview-2018-comprehensive-nipa-update.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/K834-5FTJ]; see also AUBRY & CRAWFORD, supra note 157, at 6–7. 
257. See, e.g., Kim Nicholl & Paul Angelo, GASB Approves New Accounting Standards for 
Public Sector Pension Plans and Sponsoring Employers, SOC’Y OF ACTUARIES PENSION SECTION 
NEWSLETTER (Nov. 2012), https://www.soa.org/news-and-publications/newsletters/pension-section-
news/2012/november/psn-2012-iss78/gasb-approves-new-accounting-standards-for-public-sector-
pension-plans-and-sponsoring-employers/ [https://perma.cc/6725-D2B8].  Public pension plans now 
typically use an actuarially determined contribution (ADC) concept instead of an annual required 
contribution (ARC).  NASRA, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT CONTRIBUTIONS, supra note 158, at 
2. 
258. Nicholl & Angelo, supra note 257. 
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Pertinent here, one significant response to the new GASB financial 
reporting standards was that the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of 
Economic Analysis changed the way that it estimates defined benefit pension 
liabilities and normal costs for state and local governments in its widely-used 
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA).259  Basically, the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis shifted from using an ABO approach to a PBO approach 
for state and local pensions, and that change immediately increased the Federal 
Reserve Board’s estimate of total state and local unfunded pension liabilities 
by more than $2 trillion.260 
e.  Comparing the Various Prefunding Methods as a Percentage of Current 
Salary 
Table 6 through Table 9 and Figure 4 show the annual dollar contributions 
that would be required under the various actuarial funding methods described 
here: (1) the traditional unit credit (TUC) method; (2) the projected unit credit 
(PUC) method; (3) the entry age level-dollar method; and (4) the entry age 
level-percentage-of-salary method.  Also, Figure 5 shows those contributions 
as a percentage of current salary.  A few observations are in order. 
First, if a plan sponsor actually makes contributions that follow any of these 
four actuarial methods, the plan sponsor’s pension will be fully funded in the 
sense that it will have the $400,000 needed at age 65 to provide the promised, 
 
259. Chute, McCulla, & Smith, supra note 256; Summary – Statement No. 67, GOVERNMENTAL 
ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD (June 2012), 
https://www.gasb.org/jsp/GASB/Pronouncement_C/GASBSummaryPage&cid=1176160219444 
[https://perma.cc/S5U7-HJ9T]; see Michael Caparoso, GASB 74/75: Calculation Specifics on 
Individual Entry Age Normal, PERISCOPE (May 2016), https://milliman-cdn.azureedge.net/-
/media/milliman/importedfiles/uploadedfiles/insight/periodicals/peri/pdfs/gasb-7475-calculation-
specifics-individual-entry-age-normal.ashx [https://perma.cc/C9NU-AYCW]. 
260. See Alex Tanzi, Fed Accounting Change Boosts Unfunded Pension Obligations, 
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/fed-accounting-change-boosts-
unfunded-pension-obligations-1.1144231 [https://perma.cc/WL3B-G33K]; Rupert Hargreaves, 
Moody’s: Schools Suffer as Unfunded Pension Liabilities Grow, ETF TRENDS (Oct. 30, 2018), 
https://www.etftrends.com/advisor-solutions-channel/moodys-schools-suffer-unfunded-pension-
liabilities-grow/ [https://perma.cc/J7ZF-W7TH]; see also FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, supra note 141, at 100 tbl.L.120.b (showing unfunded pension liabilities of $4.7 trillion at the 
end of 2018); EFA: State Pensions, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/dataviz/pension/ [https://perma.cc/2W47-JAWK]; 
Matthew Hoops, Paul Smith, & Irina Stefanescu, State and Local Pension Funding in the Enhanced 




FORMAN_22MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/30/2020  12:11 PM 
2020] FULLY FUNDED PENSIONS 1279 
$40,000-a-year pension.261  Second, Figure 5 shows how backloaded such 
contributions would be under the traditional unit credit (TUC) method, with 
contributions growing as a percentage of salary from 1.46% of current salary 
when the hypothetical worker is age 25 to 22.63% of current salary when she 
is age 64.  In that regard, it will likely be much more challenging for the plan 
sponsor to make the TUC-method annual required contributions at the end of 
the hypothetical worker’s career, and the plan may well become underfunded 
or even fail for that reason. 
Contributions that follow the projected unit credit (PUC) method would be 
less backloaded.  Because larger contributions would be made earlier in the 
hypothetical worker’s career, contributions at the end of her career would be 
less burdensome, topping out at just 9.76% of her age-64 salary.  Of course, 
contributions that follow the projected unit credit method can be said to 
overfund the pension, as the current value of the plan’s assets will exceed the 
hypothetical worker’s present value of future benefits every year until age 65.262 
Contributions that follow the entry age level-percentage-of-salary method 
are even less backloaded, if at all: contributions are a level 7.27% of current 
salary but do increase from $1,900 when the hypothetical worker is age 25 to 
$7,270 when she is 64 (Columns 5 and 3 of Table 9, respectively).  While 
funding that follows this level-percentage-of-salary method also somewhat 
overfunds the model defined benefit plan from a termination liability 
standpoint, many believe that this is a very plausible way to ensure that full 
funding is achieved.  In that regard, the entry age level-percent-of-salary 
method is fairly popular among plan sponsors, and it is the method that is 
preferred by the Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) for state 
and local government pension plan financial reporting.263  In the real world, 
however, as we have seen, fully funded state and local government pension 
plans are uncommon.264 
Finally, contributions that follow the entry age level-dollar method are 
actually frontloaded: level contributions of $3,231 per year fall as a percentage 
of current salary from 12.36% of current salary at age 25 to just 3.23% of 
 
261. PVFB65 = $400,000, column 6 of Table 5; FP65 = $40,000, column 5 of Table 5. 
262. That is, the plan’s assets would exceed the plan’s accumulated benefit obligation (i.e., 
termination liability) every year until age 65 when they would finally match up (i.e., at $400,000).  For 
example, compare the hypothetical worker’s present value of future benefits (PVFBx in column 6 of 
Table 5) with the value of her pension at the end of the year (VPUCx in column 4 of Table 7). 
263. See supra notes 256–57 and accompanying text. 
264. See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note 141, at 100 tbl.L.120.b 
(showing an aggregate unfunded liability for state and local plans of $4.7 trillion, as measured against 
the entry age normal cost actuarial method). 
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current salary at age 64 (Columns 3 and 5 of Table 8, respectively).  
Accordingly, funding based on the entry age level-dollar method would be 
more challenging in the early years of the hypothetical worker’s career, but 
funding would be much less challenging in the later years of her career.  Like a 
fixed-rate, 30-year mortgage, the payments should get relatively easier to make 
as the years go by.  As many homeowners appreciate, as time goes by, inflation 
invariably reduces the burden of level-dollar mortgage payments, and family 
income to cover those mortgage payments also tends to go up over the course 
of the mortgage.265  The real economic cost of level-dollar contributions to a 
defined benefit plan would also decline with inflation.  Moreover, as the 
hypothetical worker’s salary and productivity are likely to increase over time,266 
those level-dollar contributions should further shrink as a percentage of her 
current-year salary.267 
VI.  BENEFIT ACCRUAL AND FUNDING FOR DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 
Benefit accrual and funding for defined contribution plans is pretty 
straightforward.  The future benefit that a worker will get is based on the 
balance in her individual account at retirement, and the balance in her account 
is simply the sum of the contributions made to her account and the investment 
income earned on those contributions.  To understand the funding needed in 
order for a defined contribution plan to provide meaningful retirement income 
to its participants, this Part develops two slightly different model defined 
contribution plans. 
 
265. The text says “invariably” as inflation is virtually omnipresent.  See, e.g., Consumer Price 
Index, 1913−, FED. RES. BANK MINNEAPOLIS, https://www.minneapolisfed.org/community/financial-
and-economic-education/cpi-calculator-information/consumer-price-index-and-inflation-rates-1913 
[https://perma.cc/CM2T-NGCQ] (showing annual inflation since 1913); Consumer Price Index for All 
Urban Consumers: All Items in U.S. City Average, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL [https://perma.cc/D834-QQTW] (showing a graph of 
annual inflation from 1947 to the present).  On the other hand, if deflation were instead the norm, over 
time borrowers would actually find it more difficult to make level-dollar payments, let alone increasing 
nominal-dollar payments that would be required if contributions followed one of the other actuarial 
funding methods. 
266. See Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Output Per Hour of All Persons, FED. RES. BANK ST. 
LOUIS, 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/OPHNFB?utm_source=series_page&utm_medium=related_content
&utm_term=related_resources&utm_campaign=categories [https://perma.cc/59A8-GGNU] (showing 
how labor productivity generally grows over time). 
267. Recall that the model assumes that inflation is 2.5% and that wage growth is 3.5%.  See 
supra Section V.A.1.  Implicitly, the model assumes that worker productivity grows faster than 
inflation. 
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Pertinent here, the economic and demographic assumptions used in this Part 
are the same ones that this Article used to develop the model defined benefit 
plan in Part V above.  At the outset, the two model defined contribution plans 
developed in this Part again assume that the hypothetical worker wants her 
defined contribution plan to provide her with pension benefits that will replace 
around 40% of her final year’s salary.  In that regard, the two model plans again 
assume that inflation is 2.5% each year, that the hypothetical worker starts 
working at age 25 with a salary of $26,141 a year, that her salary grows by 3.5% 
a year to $100,000 at age 64, that she retires at age 65, and that she goes on to 
live exactly 20 years and dies at age 85.268 
Both model defined contribution plans developed in this Part are also 
designed to ensure that the hypothetical worker will accumulate around 
$400,000 by the time that she turns age 65.  The two model defined contribution 
plans also adopt two more assumptions from Section V.A, but here those 
assumptions are heroic.  First, the two model defined contribution plans 
heroically assume that the hypothetical worker can still earn a 5% rate of return 
on her investments—even though it is well-known that individual investors 
tend to earn lower rates of return on their investments than large, professionally-
managed defined benefit plans.269  Second, the model defined contribution 
plans heroically assume that the hypothetical worker’s annuity factor is still 10 
(i.e., that she can use $400,000 in retirement savings to buy a lifetime annuity 
that will pay her $40,000 a year over the course of her 20-year retirement)—
even though it is well-known that individuals usually cannot buy annuities at 
the same, favorable group-annuity rates that large defined benefit pension plans 
can.270  In short, it might be more realistic if the two model defined contribution 
plans in this Part instead used a 4.5% rate-of-return assumption and an annuity 
factor assumption of 12 or 13.271  In short, individuals in defined contribution 
 
268. See supra Section V.A and Table 4. 
269. See supra Section V.A.1.a (interest rate = 5%); Forman, The Future of 401(k), supra note 
159, at 9-6 to 9-7. 
270. See supra Section V.A.3.e (annuity factor = 10); Forman, supra note 105, at 105−07. 
271. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.  Even higher annuity factors might be 
appropriate for lifetime annuities purchased in the individual annuity marketplace.  In that regard, the 
annuity factor for a lifetime annuity for a 65-year-old woman in the individual annuity market at the 
beginning of January of 2019 might be as high as 16, computed as follows.  Recall that in December 
of 2018, for $100,000, a 65-year-old woman could have bought an immediate, fixed-payment (lifetime) 
annuity that would pay her around $6,324 a year.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  
Consequently, an annuity that would pay her $40,000 a year would have cost around $633,000 
($632,511 = 6.32511 × $100,000; 6.32511 = $40,000 / $6,324), and, if it took her $633,000 to buy a 
$40,000-a-year lifetime annuity, then the appropriate annuity factor would be around 16 (15.825 = 
$633,000 / $40,000). 
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plans (and IRAs) will almost certainly need to save more each year and 
accumulate more savings by age 65 than plan sponsors will need to save for 
participants in defined benefit plans—say, 10 or 20% more.272  Nevertheless, 
using the same assumptions for both the model defined benefit plan and the 
model defined contribution plans discussed in this Article makes it much easier 
to compare the two types of plans and to generalize about how much savings 
are needed to fund pensions that will last for a lifetime. 
A.  A Level-Percentage-of-Salary Model Defined Contribution Plan 
Under the first model defined contribution plan, every year the plan sponsor 
will contribute 7.27% of the hypothetical worker’s salary to the plan,273 and 
Table 10 shows how her benefits would accrue under this level-percentage-of-
salary plan.  While it would be simpler to discuss a model defined contribution 
plan with, say, a 7% contribution rate, the 7.27%-of-salary contribution rate 
was chosen because, as we saw in Section V.C.2.d above, the resulting 
contributions would grow (at 5% interest) to the almost $400,000 that would be 
needed at age 65 to provide the hypothetical worker with a $40,000-a-year 
annuity that would replace 40% of her $100,000 age-64 salary.  Consequently, 
this model level-percentage-of-salary defined contribution plan mimics the 
entry age level-percentage-of-salary defined benefit plan described in Section 






Similarly, the annuity factor for a lifetime annuity for a 65-year-old man in the individual annuity 
market might be around 15, computed as follows.  In December of 2018, for $100,000, a 65-year-old 
man could have bought an immediate, fixed-payment (lifetime) annuity that would pay him around 
$6,600 a year.  See supra note 103 and accompanying text.  Consequently, an annuity that paid him 
$40,000 a year would have cost around $600,601 ($600,601 = 6.00601 × $100,000; 6.00601 = $40,000 
/ $6,660), and, if it took him $600,601 to buy a $40,000-a-year lifetime annuity, then the appropriate 
annuity factor would be around 15 (15.015 = $600,601 / $40,000). 
Of course, defined contribution plans could allow individual participants to invest in lifetime 
annuities throughout their careers, in which case those individual participants should be able to buy 
lifetime annuities earlier in their careers and at much more favorable group-like rates. 
272. Also, recall that defined benefit plans in the real world can save on benefit costs because 
some workers leave or die before retirement.  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
273. The text says that the plan sponsor will make the contributions, but in reality it does not 
matter whether the contributions come from the plan sponsor, from the worker, or are split between 
the two.  Thus, although the Article focuses on the design of employer-sponsored defined contribution 
plans, the defined contribution plan models are equally applicable to workers trying to provide for their 
own retirement income needs through 401(k) or IRA contributions. 
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TABLE 10: BENEFIT ACCRUAL IN A LEVEL-PERCENTAGE-OF-SALARY MODEL 


















25 $26,141 1 7.27% $1,900 $1,947 
26 $27,056 2 7.27% $1,967 $4,060 
27 $28,003 3 7.27% $2,036 $6,349 
28 $28,983 4 7.27% $2,107 $8,826 
29 $29,998 5 7.27% $2,181 $11,502 
30 $31,048 6 7.27% $2,257 $14,390 
31 $32,134 7 7.27% $2,336 $17,503 
32 $33,259 8 7.27% $2,418 $20,856 
33 $34,423 9 7.27% $2,503 $24,463 
34 $35,628 10 7.27% $2,590 $28,341 
35 $36,875 11 7.27% $2,681 $32,505 
36 $38,165 12 7.27% $2,775 $36,973 
37 $39,501 13 7.27% $2,872 $41,764 
38 $40,884 14 7.27% $2,972 $46,898 
39 $42,315 15 7.27% $3,076 $52,395 
40 $43,796 16 7.27% $3,184 $58,278 
41 $45,329 17 7.27% $3,295 $64,568 
42 $46,915 18 7.27% $3,411 $71,292 
43 $48,557 19 7.27% $3,530 $78,474 
44 $50,257 20 7.27% $3,654 $86,141 
45 $52,016 21 7.27% $3,782 $94,323 
46 $53,836 22 7.27% $3,914 $103,050 
47 $55,720 23 7.27% $4,051 $112,353 
48 $57,671 24 7.27% $4,193 $122,267 
49 $59,689 25 7.27% $4,339 $132,827 
50 $61,778 26 7.27% $4,491 $144,071 
51 $63,940 27 7.27% $4,648 $156,037 
52 $66,178 28 7.27% $4,811 $168,769 
53 $68,495 29 7.27% $4,980 $182,310 
54 $70,892 30 7.27% $5,154 $196,707 
55 $73,373 31 7.27% $5,334 $212,008 
56 $75,941 32 7.27% $5,521 $228,266 
57 $78,599 33 7.27% $5,714 $245,534 
58 $81,350 34 7.27% $5,914 $263,871 
59 $84,197 35 7.27% $6,121 $283,337 
60 $87,144 36 7.27% $6,335 $303,996 
61 $90,194 37 7.27% $6,557 $325,915 
62 $93,351 38 7.27% $6,787 $349,165 
63 $96,618 39 7.27% $7,024 $373,820 
64 $100,000 40 7.27% $7,270 $399,961 
65 (Annuity ~ $40,000/year)    
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At the outset, Column 1 of Table 10 again shows the hypothetical worker’s 
age (x)—from age 25 to age 65, and Column 2 again shows her salary (Sx)—
growing from $26,141 at age 25 to $100,000 at age 64.  Column 3 then shows 
the number of years of service she has completed by the end of each year (Yx)—
starting at 1 year of service at the end of the year that she started working (Y25 
= 1) and increasing to 40 years of service by the end of the year that she turns 
age 64 (Y64 = 40). 
Column 4 of Table 10 then shows the 7.27% of salary contribution rate 
(CPx), and Column 5 shows the resulting annual contribution amounts (CPx), 
starting at $1,900 at age 25 (CP25 = $1,900) and growing to $7,270 at age 64 
(CP64 = $7,270).274  Figure 6 shows these level-percentage-of-salary 
contributions as a horizontal line. 
FIGURE 6: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLAN AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF CURRENT SALARY 
 
 
274. The numbers in this column are the same as those in Column 3 of Table 9 (relating to a 
defined benefit plan that was funded with under the entry age level-percentage-of-salary method—at 












25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65
Age
Level-Dollar Contributions ($3,231 a Year)
Entry Age Level-Percentage-of-Salary Method
(7.27 Percent of Salary)
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Finally, Column 6 of Table 10 shows the account balance at the end of the 
year (AccBPx) (i.e., the value of the pension at the end of the year).  For 
simplicity, the model again treats annual contributions as made at the midpoint 
of the prior year, and given the assumed 5% interest rate, the initial age-25 
contribution of $1,900 (CP25 = $1,900) would grow to $1,947 by the end of that 
year (AccBP25 = $1,947).275  Similarly, by working through age 26, the balance 
in the account of this hypothetical worker will grow to $4,060 by the end of that 
year (AccBP26 = $4,060, Column 6 of Table 10).276  At retirement, the balance 
in her account will grow to almost $400,000 (AccBP64 = $399,961, Column 6 
of Table 10), and given the assumed annuity factor of 10, that balance could be 
used to buy her an annuity that would pay her almost $40,000 a year for life277—
which is again roughly 40% of her $100,000 final salary at age 64. 
B.  A Level-Dollar Model Defined Contribution Plan 
Alternatively, under the second model defined contribution plan, every year 
the plan sponsor will contribute $3,231 to the plan, and Table 11 shows how 
her benefits will accrue under this level-dollar plan.  This time, that $3,231 
annual contribution amount was chosen because, as we saw in Section V.C.2.d 
above, the resulting contributions would grow (at 5% interest) to almost 
$400,000 at age 65, and that sum could be used to buy her a $40,000-per-year 
annuity that would replace around 40% of her $100,000 salary at age 64.  Thus, 
this model level-dollar defined contribution plan mimics the entry age level-
dollar defined benefit plan described in Section V.C.2.d above (e.g., compare 










275. $1,947 AccBP25 = $1,900 CP25 × √1.05. 
276. $4,060 AccBP26 = $1,947 AccBP25 × 1.05 + $1,967 CP26 × √1.05. 
277. $39,996 = $399,961 AccBP64 / 10 annuity factor.  See supra Section V.A.3.e. 
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25 $26,141 1 $3,231 12.36% $3,311 
26 $27,056 2 $3,231 11.94% $6,787 
27 $28,003 3 $3,231 11.54% $10,437 
28 $28,983 4 $3,231 11.15% $14,270 
29 $29,998 5 $3,231 10.77% $18,294 
30 $31,048 6 $3,231 10.41% $22,520 
31 $32,134 7 $3,231 10.05% $26,956 
32 $33,259 8 $3,231 9.71% $31,615 
33 $34,423 9 $3,231 9.39% $36,507 
34 $35,628 10 $3,231 9.07% $41,643 
35 $36,875 11 $3,231 8.76% $47,036 
36 $38,165 12 $3,231 8.47% $52,698 
37 $39,501 13 $3,231 8.18% $58,644 
38 $40,884 14 $3,231 7.90% $64,887 
39 $42,315 15 $3,231 7.64% $71,442 
40 $43,796 16 $3,231 7.38% $78,325 
41 $45,329 17 $3,231 7.13% $85,552 
42 $46,915 18 $3,231 6.89% $93,140 
43 $48,557 19 $3,231 6.65% $101,108 
44 $50,257 20 $3,231 6.43% $109,474 
45 $52,016 21 $3,231 6.21% $118,259 
46 $53,836 22 $3,231 6.00% $127,483 
47 $55,720 23 $3,231 5.80% $137,168 
48 $57,671 24 $3,231 5.60% $147,337 
49 $59,689 25 $3,231 5.41% $158,014 
50 $61,778 26 $3,231 5.23% $169,226 
51 $63,940 27 $3,231 5.05% $180,998 
52 $66,178 28 $3,231 4.88% $193,359 
53 $68,495 29 $3,231 4.72% $206,337 
54 $70,892 30 $3,231 4.56% $219,965 
55 $73,373 31 $3,231 4.40% $234,274 
56 $75,941 32 $3,231 4.25% $249,299 
57 $78,599 33 $3,231 4.11% $265,074 
58 $81,350 34 $3,231 3.97% $281,639 
59 $84,197 35 $3,231 3.84% $299,032 
60 $87,144 36 $3,231 3.71% $317,294 
61 $90,194 37 $3,231 3.58% $336,469 
62 $93,351 38 $3,231 3.46% $356,604 
63 $96,618 39 $3,231 3.34% $377,745 
64 $100,000 40 $3,231 3.23% $399,943 
65 (Annuity ~ $40,000/year)    
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More specifically, Column 1 of Table 11 again shows the hypothetical 
worker’s age (x)—from age 25 to age 65; Column 2 again shows her salary 
(Sx)—growing from $26,141 at age 25 to $100,000 at age 64; and Column 3 of 
Table 11 again shows the number of years of service she has completed by the 
end of each year (Yx)—growing from 1 year of service by the end of the year 
that she started working (Y25 = 1) to 40 years of service by the end of the year 
that she turns age 64 (Y64 = 40). 
Column 4 of Table 11 then shows the $3,231 annual contributions (CDx) 
made to her individual account.278  Column 5 of Table 11 and Figure 6 then 
show those annual contributions as a percentage of her annual salary (CDpx), 
starting at 12.36% at age 25 (CDp25 = 12.36%) and then falling to 3.23% at age 
64 (CDp64 = 3.23%).279  Finally, Column 6 of Table 11 shows how the balance 
in her account will grow from $3,311 at the end of the year she turns age 25 
(AccBD25 = $3,311) to almost $400,000 at the end of the year she turns age 64 
(AccBD64 = $399,943).  Given the assumed annuity factor of 10, that $399,943 
balance could again buy her an annuity that would pay her almost $40,000 a 
year for life280—which is again roughly 40% of her $100,000 salary at age 64. 
VII.  BRINGING IN SOME REAL-WORLD CONSIDERATIONS 
The simple model defined benefit and defined contribution plans outlined 
in Parts V and VI above would all provide the hypothetical worker with a 
pension starting at age 65 that would replace 40% of her preretirement earnings.  
So far, however, those model plans have failed to account for many real-world 
complications, and this Part addresses the most important of those 
complications. 
A.  Underfunding in the Real World 
The model pension plans described in Parts V and VI above are all designed 
to provide pensions that would replace 40% of the preretirement earnings of 
workers, and they would largely succeed in that task.  In the real world, 
however, relatively few retirees have pensions that replace 40% of their 
preretirement earnings.  With respect to defined contribution plans, it is fairly 
easy to see that not many workers have 7.27% of their salaries saved for 
retirement over a 40-year career.  In particular, many employers do not offer 
 
278. The numbers in this column are the same as those in Column 3 of Table 8 (relating to a 
defined benefit plan that was funded with under the entry age level-dollar method—at $3,231 each 
year).   
279. These are computed as CDpx = CDx / Sx. 
280. $39,994 = $399,943 AccBD64 / 10 annuity factor. 
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defined contribution plans, and many of those employers that do offer plans 
contribute just 3% of salary—or less.281  As a result, only a portion of workers 
ever manage to reach that 7.27%-of-salary contribution hurdle, let alone over 
40 years of service. 
As for traditional defined benefit plans, even if real-world defined benefit 
plans are designed to provide pensions that replace at least 40% of 
preretirement earnings, in practice, the results often fall short of that 40% target.  
Many of those shortfalls have to do with the fact that traditional defined benefit 
plans are backloaded (see, e.g., Figure 2 above), and, as more fully explained 
in Section VII.C.3 below, only workers who spend most of their careers with a 
single employer are likely to get pensions that replace at least 40% of their 
preretirement earnings. 
Moreover, many defined benefit plans are underfunded and will not be able 
to pay their promised benefits in full.  To be sure, traditional defined benefit 
plans that use the entry age normal cost level-percentage-of-salary method to 
determine their contributions—and, in fact, make their annual required 
contributions—should almost certainly be overfunded (absent extraordinarily 
adverse investment experience).282  However, defined benefit pension plans are 
not required to make contributions that follow the entry age normal cost level-
percentage-of-salary method.  While ERISA imposes minimum funding 
requirement on plan sponsors, those requirements are not all that demanding.283  
In short, private employers are only expected to make contributions that are 
sufficient to cover each worker’s annual benefit accruals.  For example, 
consider the hypothetical worker from Section V.A above.  At age 25, she 
 
281. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE, USDL-19-
1002, EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION – MARCH 2019, at 4 tbl.1 (2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_06182019.pdf [https://perma.cc/YZW3-6PD4] 
(showing that defined contribution plans were just 2.0% of the compensation of civilian workers in 
December 2018); VANGUARD, HOW AMERICA SAVES 2018, at 20−23 (2018), 
https://pressroom.vanguard.com/nonindexed/HAS18_062018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6LV-D9G9] 
(discussing the range of employer contributions to defined contribution plans); G.E. Miller, Does your 
401K Match Up Against the Averages?, 20 SOMETHING FINANCE (Jan. 4, 2020), 
https://20somethingfinance.com/401k-match/ [https://perma.cc/PH5M-494U] (noting that the average 
401(k) match is around 3.5%); Tim Parker, What is a Good 401(k) Match?, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 10, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/120315/what-good-401k-match.asp 
[https://perma.cc/BM88-MAQS] (noting that “[t]he majority of companies offer some sort of matching 
contribution for an average of 2.7% of a person’s pay”); Eli R. Stoltzfus, Defined Contribution 
Retirement Plans: Who Has Them and What Do They Cost?, BEYOND THE NUMBERS, Dec. 2016, 1, 2, 
5 tbl.2 (showing that just 44% of private-sector workers participated in defined contribution plans in 
March of 2016 and that employers spent an average of just $1.59 per hour worked on these plans). 
282. See supra notes 256–57, 262 and accompanying text. 
283. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
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accrued a pension benefit worth $380 (B25 = $380, Column 7 of Table 5).  While 
the entry age normal cost level-percentage-of-salary method of prefunding her 
pension would require the plan sponsor to contribute $1,900 to the plan that 
year ($1,900 CLP25, Column 3 of Table 9), ERISA would only require the 
employer to contribute $380 that year, as would be required by the traditional 
unit credit (TUC) method ($380 CTUC25, Column 3 of Table 6).284  Moreover, if 
the plan sponsor falls behind in funding its plan, ERISA typically gives the plan 
sponsor 7 years to make up the shortfall.285  Making even these minimum 
contributions can be difficult for employers with aging or declining workforces 
as contribution burdens increase dramatically as workers complete more years 
of service (see Figure 2 above).  Not surprisingly, in the real world many 
private-sector single-employer and multiemployer plans are underfunded.286  
Moreover, as already mentioned, many federal and state and local government 
















284. Basically, ERISA allows plan sponsors to fund their plans using something like the TUC 
method.  To be sure, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) does require companies to use 
the projected unit credit (PUC) method, but only for financial accounting purposes (i.e., for what they 
report to managers, shareholders, leaders, supplies, tax authorities, and regulators).  Schieber, supra 
note 244, at 35–36; BUSINESS DICTIONARY, supra note 244. 
285. I.R.C. § 430(c)(2)(A) (2018); ERISA § 303(c)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 1083(c)(2)(A) (2018). 
286. See supra Section III.D. 
287. See supra Section III.D. 
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B.  Cost-of-Living Adjustments (COLAs) 
The model pension plans assumed that the typical retiree would collect a 
level-dollar pension—throughout her retirement (e.g., $40,000-a-year over a 
20-year retirement).  In the real world, however, retirees face inflation, and that 
inflation will erode the real value of any level-dollar pension.  This Section 
explains how greater savings would be needed to offset that postretirement 
inflation.  In short, more money must be saved if the retiree wants to ensure that 
she will have a pension that does not decline in real value over time.  In passing, 
it is worth recalling that Social Security benefits are adjusted for post-retirement 
inflation.288 
1.  How Will Post-Retirement Inflation Affect a Level-Dollar Pension?  
At the outset, Table 12 shows how inflation can erode the real value of any 
level-dollar pension over time.  Column 1 of Table 12 shows the retiree’s age 
(x) from age 65 through age 85 as this Article has so far modeled—and also 
through age 105 as, in the real world, many Americans will live past 100.289  In 
that regard, Columns 6 and 7 of Table 12 show the Social Security 
Administration’s estimates of period life expectancy in 2016 for males and 













288. See 2020 SOCIAL SECURITY CHANGES, supra note 20. 
289. While the average life expectancy of a 65-year-old is around 20 years, many will live to be 
100 or more.  For example, the Social Security Administration’s 2016 period life table shows 994 live 
males at age 100 (compared with 79,893 living 65-year-old males out of 100,000 live births), and 2,892 
live females at age 100 (compared with 87,574 living 65-year-old females out of 100,000 live births).  
Actuarial Life Table, supra note 170. 
To be sure, the Social Security Administration’s 2016 period life table actually has entries through 
age 119 (i.e., that table assumes that the last survivor dies at age 120).  Id.  However, that level of detail 
is not necessary for the present discussion. 
290. Id. 
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with a Constant 















2.5% $40,000 $40,000 17.92 20.49 
66 $40,00
 
2.5% $39,024 $41,000 17.20 19.69 
67 $40,00
 
2.5% $38,073 $42,025 16.49 18.89 
68 $40,00
 
2.5% $37,144 $43,076 15.78 18.11 
69 $40,00
 
2.5% $36,238 $44,153 15.09 17.33 
70 $40,00
 
2.5% $35,354 $45,256 14.40 16.57 
71 $40,00
 
2.5% $34,492 $46,388 13.73 15.82 
72 $40,00
 
2.5% $33,651 $47,547 13.07 15.09 
73 $40,00
 
2.5% $32,830 $48,736 12.43 14.37 
74 $40,00
 
2.5% $32,029 $49,955 11.80 13.66 
75 $40,00
 
2.5% $31,248 $51,203 11.18 12.97 
76 $40,00
 
2.5% $30,486 $52,483 10.58 12.29 
77 $40,00
 
2.5% $29,742 $53,796 10.00 11.62 
78 $40,00
 
2.5% $29,017 $55,140 9.43 10.98 
79 $40,00
 
2.5% $28,309 $56,519 8.88 10.35 
80 $40,00
 
2.5% $27,619 $57,932 8.34 9.74 
81 $40,00
 
2.5% $26,945 $59,380 7.82 9.15 
82 $40,00
 
2.5% $26,288 $60,865 7.32 8.58 
83 $40,00
 
2.5% $25,647 $62,386 6.84 8.04 
84 $40,00
 
2.5% $25,021 $63,946 6.38 7.51 
85 $40,00
 
2.5% $24,411 $65,545 5.94 7.01 
86 $40,00
 
2.5% $23,815 $67,183 5.52 6.53 
87 $40,00
 
2.5% $23,235 $68,863 5.12 6.07 
88 $40,00
 
2.5% $22,668 $70,584 4.75 5.64 
89 $40,00
 
2.5% $22,115 $72,349 4.40 5.23 
90 $40,00
 
2.5% $21,576 $74,158 4.08 4.85 
91 $40,00
 
2.5% $21,049 $76,012 3.78 4.50 
92 $40,00
 
2.5% $20,536 $77,912 3.50 4.18 
93 $40,00
 
2.5% $20,035 $79,860 3.25 3.88 
94 $40,00
 
2.5% $19,546 $81,856 3.03 3.61 
95 $40,00
 
2.5% $19,070 $83,903 2.83 3.37 
96 $40,00
 
2.5% $18,605 $86,000 2.66 3.16 
97 $40,00
 
2.5% $18,151 $88,150 2.51 2.96 
98 $40,00
 
2.5% $17,708 $90,354 2.37 2.79 
99 $40,00
 
2.5% $17,276 $92,613 2.25 2.63 
100 $40,00
 
2.5% $16,855 $94,928 2.13 2.48 
101 $40,00
 
2.5% $16,444 $97,301 2.02 2.33 
102 $40,00
 
2.5% $16,043 $99,734 1.91 2.19 
103 $40,00
 
2.5% $15,651 $102,227 1.81 2.06 
104 $40,00
 
2.5% $15,270 $104,783 1.71 1.93 
105 $40,00
 
2.5% $14,897 $107,403 1.61 1.81 
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Column 2 of Table 12 then shows that the nominal value of the hypothetical 
worker’s model pensions developed in Parts V and VI above would be $40,000 
a year (NP65 = $40,000), and Column 3 then assumes that post-retirement 
inflation is 2.5% (the same as it was before retirement).291 
Next, Column 4 of Table 12 shows how the real value of a level-dollar 
pension would decline throughout retirement.  For example, while a nominal 
pension of $40,000 at age 65 (NP65 = $40,000, Column 2 of Table 12) would 
also have a real value of $40,000 at age 65 (RVP65 = $40,000, Column 4 of 
Table 12); a nominal pension of $40,000 at age 66 (NP66 = $40,000, Column 2 
of Table 12) would be worth just $39,024 in real dollars at age 66 ($39,024 
RVP66 = $40,000 / 1.025 = $40,000 / (1.000 + 0.025), Column 4 of Table 12).  
All in all, Column 4 shows how the real value of the hypothetical worker’s 
pension will decline from $40,000 (RVP65 = $40,000) at age 65 to just $25,021 
at age 84 (RVP84 = $25,021), and to just $14,897 at age 105 (RVP105 = $14,897). 
2.  How Can a Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA) Maintain the Real Value 
of a Pension? 
In order to ensure that a retiree’s pension maintains its real value throughout 
retirement, that pension should be adjusted for inflation each year.  For 
example, if inflation is 2.5% at age 65, then the retiree will need a pension of 
$41,000 at age 66 for that pension to retain its real value ($41,000 = $40,000 × 
1.025 = $40,000 × (1.000 + .025)).  Accordingly, Column 5 of Table 12 shows 
how the hypothetical worker’s nominal pension should increase each year in 
order to maintain a constant real value of $40,000: starting at $40,000 at age 65 
(NRP65 = $40,000), her pension should grow to $63,946 at age 84 (NRP84 = 
$63,946), and to $107,403 at age 105 (NRP105 = $107,403). 
3.  How Much Should Be Saved to Pay for that COLA? 
To be sure, with $400,000 saved for the hypothetical worker at age 65, she 
could get an inflation-adjusted pension—but not one that would pay her 
$40,000 a year for life in real dollars.  That is, an inflation-adjusted pension 
would cost more than $400,000—about 23% more according to the author’s 
estimate.292  In short, contributions would need to be roughly 23% higher.  For 
 
291. See supra Parts V and VI. 
292. As a rough estimate, the author thought about this problem in the following way.  The model 
pensions in this Article all assumed that if there was $400,000 in retirement savings at age 65, then, 
given the annuity factor of 10, and 20-year retirement period, that $400,000 would generate 20 annual 
payments of $40,000.  It turns out that the present value of those 20 $40,000 payments at age 65 at a 
5% discount rate is $523,412.  On the other hand, the present value at age 65 of the first 20 entries of 
column 5 of Table 12 at a 5% discount rate is $642,470; and $642,470 divided by $523,412 equals 
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example, since career-long contributions of 7.27% of payroll were enough to 
provide the hypothetical worker with a $40,000-a-year, level-dollar pension, 
then career-long contributions of around 9% of salary would be needed to 
instead provide her with an inflation-adjusted pension starting at $40,000 a year 
and growing to $63,946 at age 84 (8.94% = 1.23 × 7.27%).  Alternatively, since 
level-dollar contributions of $3,231 were enough to provide her with that 
$40,000-a-year, level-dollar pension, then career-long contributions of around 
$4,000 a year would be needed to instead provide her with that inflation-
adjusted pension ($3,974.13 = 1.23 × $3,231). 
C.  Working Careers and Benefit Accumulation in the Real World 
As Section V.A.2 above discussed, in the real world, not every worker 
actually has a 40-year career.  Moreover, even if a worker has a 40-year career, 
she may not actually accrue benefits under a pension in every one of those 40 
years.  Finally, even if a worker accrues benefits under a pension every one of 
those 40 years, she may not actually vest in all of those accrued benefits.  
Accordingly, if saving around 9% a year for retirement would provide a worker 
with a 40-year career with an inflation-adjusted pension that would replace 40% 
of her preretirement earnings,293 then workers who have shorter careers or 
accrue or vest in less retirement savings would need to save more than 9% of 
salary in the years that they do save for retirement.  On the other hand, workers 
who accumulate retirement savings for more years—for example, because they 
do not retire until age 70—could have secure pensions even if they save less 
than 9% of salary in each year that they do work. 
 
1.22747.  Accordingly, if $400,000 would be enough to make those 20 payments of $40,000, then 
roughly 23% more retirement savings would be needed (at age 65) in order to make the first $40,000 
pension payment and the next 19 inflation-adjusted pension payments in column 5 of Table 12 
(0.22747 = 1.22747 – 1.0).  (To be sure, the $523,412 present value does seem anomalous when 
compared with the $400,000 actually accumulated retirement savings for the model pensions in this 
Article; but, for simplicity, this Article assumed an annuity factor of 10 rather than actually generating 
a model-specific annuity factor based on the other economic and demographic assumptions.  Moreover, 
for purposes of the 23% estimate computed in this footnote, all that matters are the relative values of 
the level-dollar pension and the 2.5%-inflation-adjusted pension, and the absolute values of the two 
pensions are irrelevant.  Accordingly, if $400,000 would be enough for a $40,000-a-year level-dollar 
pension, then $491,000 would be enough for an inflation-adjusted pension starting at $40,000 at age 
65 and growing to $63,946 at age 84 [$490,986 = 1.22746517 × $400,000 = $400,000 × $642,470 / 
$523,412]). 
A proper estimate of the cost of a real-world COLA would require using real life expectancies 
instead of the assumed 20-year-certain retirement period assumed in this Article and would involve 
using an annuity factor that itself takes the cost-of-living adjustment rate into account.  See Forman & 
Sabin, supra note 201, at 793–94 n.143. 
293. See supra Section VII.B.3. 
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This Section highlights many real-world factors that impede the 
accumulation of sufficient retirement savings to ensure that every American 
retiree has a pension that would replace 40% of her preretirement earnings.  In 
thinking about this problem, it can make sense to compare the current voluntary 
pension system with an imaginary universal pension system that would ensure 
that virtually every worker would accumulate meaningful retirement savings in 
every job she works.  For example, one can imagine a simple system of 
individual retirement savings accounts added on top of the current Social 
Security system.  Under such a universal pension system, an additional, say, 7 
to 9% of payroll could be withheld from every worker’s paycheck and 
contributed to her individual account.294  In short, this Section highlights some 
of the ways that our current voluntary pension system falls short of that 
imaginary universal pension system and so cannot reasonably be expected to 
provide most Americans with lifetime pensions that will replace 40% of their 
preretirement earnings. 
1.  Work Patterns in the Real World 
As already mentioned, in the real world, relatively few employees actually 
work for 40 years before retiring,295 let alone for 40 years with the same 
employer.296  Many workers come in and out of the workforce as they pursue 
higher education, raise children, take care of aging parents and partners, or 
change jobs.  Many Americans also work part-time jobs for significant portions 
of their careers.297  In planning for adequate retirement incomes however, 
 
294. See infra Section VIII.B.1 for a more detailed discussion of universal pension systems. 
295. See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
296. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
297. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, NEWS RELEASE, USDL-19-
2105, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—NOVEMBER 2019 tbl.A-9 (2019), 
https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5GV-XQ8G] (showing that 27.6 
million people worked part-time in November of 2019); Megan Dunn, Who Chooses Part-Time Work 
and Why?, MONTHLY LABOR REV. (Mar. 2018), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2018/article/who-
chooses-part-time-work-and-why.htm [https://perma.cc/CD4H-B3S9] (explaining that many workers 
voluntarily choose to work part-time for noneconomic reasons, e.g., childcare problems and other 
family obligations); see also Rob Valletta & Catherine van der List, Involuntary Part-Time Work: Here 
to Stay?, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER 2015-9 (June 8, 2015), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/files/el2015-19.pdf [https://perma.cc/W689-2JLH] (discussing the increase in involuntary 
part-time work); Lonnie Golden, Still Falling Short on Hours and Pay, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Dec. 5, 
2016), https://www.epi.org/publication/still-falling-short-on-hours-and-pay-part-time-work-
becoming-new-normal/ [https://perma.cc/TAY9-L2F5] (explaining that employers are increasing their 
reliance on part-time workers and that an increasing number of workers are working part-time 
involuntarily, as employers have intentionally shifted to more intensive use of part-time employment).  
Pertinent here, to give more part-time employees the opportunity to save for retirement, Congress 
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workers should want to earn some kind of pension coverage in almost every job 
that they hold and certainly on almost every job from age 25 until retirement.  
Unfortunately, workers do not always accumulate meaningful retirement 
savings on every job. 
2.  The Current Pension System Does Not Provide for Universal Participation 
and Coverage 
Private employers are not required to offer pension plans to their 
employees, and, as already mentioned, at any point in time only around 56% of 
private-sector workers are covered by a pension.298  Moreover, even if an 
employer does offer a plan, the employer does not have to cover all of its 
workers.  Basically, in part to make plan administration relatively simple, 
ERISA allows plan sponsors to exclude many of their employees from 
participation and coverage.  For example, employers do not always have to 
allow part-time workers or workers under the age of 21 to participate in their 
plans, nor do employers have to permit workers to participate until those 
workers have completed one year of service.299  Moreover, while employers 
must usually cover a large percentage of their full-time workers under the 
minimum coverage rules, they certainly do not have to cover them all.300 
3.  Workers Do Not Always Accrue Significant Benefits on Every Job 
Moreover, ERISA does not mandate any specific benefit levels for 
participating employees, nor does it require that benefits accrue evenly over 
time.301  Indeed, as Figure 2 above showed, benefit accruals can be significantly 
backloaded in favor of long-service employees.  Moreover, ERISA’s benefit 
 
recently enacted legislation that will require 401(k) plans to permit participation by long-term, part-
time employees.  See infra note 299. 
298. See NATIONAL COMPENSATION SURVEY, 2019, supra note 15, at 3 tbl.2. 
299. See I.R.C. § 410(a) (2018); ERISA § 202, 29 U.S.C. § 1052 (2018).  However, starting in 
2021, 401(k) plans will generally have to permit participation by long-term, part-time employees who 
have worked at least 500 hours for 3 consecutive years (and have reached age 21).  
I.R.C. §§ 401(k)(2)(D), (k)(15) (as revised by the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. 
L. No. 116-94, Division O—Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement § 112). 
300. I.R.C. § 410(b).  For example, an employer can satisfy the so-called percentage test if the 
plan covers just 70% of the employer’s nonhighly compensated workers.  I.R.C. § 410(b)(1)(A).  
Under the alternative coverage tests, a plan sponsor can usually cover an even smaller percentage of 
its nonhighly compensated workers.  See A Guide to Common Qualified Plan Requirements, supra 
note 53. 
301. Jonathan Barry Forman, Pensions and Retirement, in 2 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 539, 549 (Kenneth G. Dau-
Schmidt, Seth D. Harris, & Orly Lobel eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
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accrual rules allow employers to create benefit accrual formulas that result in 
even more backloading in favor of older and long-service employees.302 
In particular, traditional defined benefit pension plans tend to penalize 
workers who change jobs frequently.  For example, Table 13 shows the 
magnitude of these financial penalties by comparing the retirement benefits of 
four workers.  These workers all have the same 40-year pay histories as the 
hypothetical worker used throughout this Article (3.5% annual pay increases 
starting at $26,141 and ending at $100,000), and all of their employers have the 
same final-average-pay pension plan (1% times years of service times then-
final pay).  The only difference among these workers is that the first worker 
spent her entire 40-year career with just one employer, while the other workers 
divided their careers among two or more employers.  The worker who worked 
40 years for a single employer (Worker No. 1) would receive a pension of 
$40,000 a year at retirement, but the worker who worked for 5 different 
employers (Worker No. 4) would receive pensions totaling just $24,853 a year.  
All in all, traditional final-average-pay defined benefit plans tend to penalize 

















302. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 411(b); ERISA § 204, 29 U.S.C. § 1054. 
303. Forman, supra note 301, at 563−66; see WILLIAM J. WIATROWSKI, BUREAU OF LABOR 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, RETIREMENT PLAN DESIGN AND THE MOBILE WORKFORCE 2 
(2005), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/retirement-plan-design-and-the-mobile-workforce.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4RHJ-NKLT]. 
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1 1 1% 40 $100,000 $40,000 
2 1 1% 20 $50,257 $10,051 
 2 1% 20 $100,000 $20,000 
     $30,051 
3 1 1% 10 $35,628 $3,563 
 2 1% 10 $50,257 $5,026 
 3 1% 10 $70,892 $7,089 
 4 1% 10 $100,000 $10,000 
     $25,678 
4 1 1% 8 $33,259 $2,661 
 2 1% 8 $43,796 $3,504 
 3 1% 8 $57,671 $4,614 
 4 1% 8 $75,941 $6075 
 5 1% 8 $100,000 $8,000 
     $24,853 
4.  Workers Do Not Always Vest in Their Accrued Benefits  
Even if workers accrue valuable retirement benefits, they do not always 
vest in those benefits.  While employees always immediately vest in their own 
contributions to ERISA-covered plans, they can be required to wait 5 years or 
more to vest in a defined benefit plan and 3 years or more to vest in employer 
contributions to a defined contribution plan.304  Given how mobile the 
American workforce is,305 many employees simply will not vest in all of the 
benefits that they accrue. 
 
304. I.R.C. § 411(a)(2)(A)–(B); ERISA § 203, 29 U.S.C. § 1053; see supra note 45 and 
accompanying text; see also Jack Towarnicky, Narrowing Retirement Savings Gaps, PLAN SPONSOR 
COUNCIL OF AM. (May 15, 2019), https://www.psca.org/blog_jack_2019_31 [https://perma.cc/7F5X-
7DTK] (noting that 60.1% of 401(k) sponsors allow workers to start contributing at hire and that 38.5% 
now provide for immediate vesting). 
305. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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5.  Retirees Do Not Always Annuitize Their Retirement Savings 
As already mentioned, while defined benefit plans typically provide 
lifetime annuities as the default option for retirees,306 defined contribution plans 
usually provide lump sum distributions.307  While annuities hold at least some 
of their value over time, when retirees take lump sum distributions, it seems 
likely that they will dissipate those distributions over just a few years and not 
use them to generate retirement income that can last a lifetime.  Defined 
contribution plans are particularly leaky: they often allow participants to 
withdraw all or a portion of their individual accounts when they change jobs, 
and many plans allow participants to borrow against their accounts.308  All in 
all, a significant portion of those premature distributions and loans will be 
dissipated before retirement.309 
D.  Social Security Replacement Rates Vary with Lifetime Income 
The model pensions developed in this Article assumed that Social Security 
would replace around 35% of preretirement earnings for the typical worker, and 
that is a plausible rough estimate.  In the real world, however, Social Security 
replaces a larger percentage of the preretirement earnings of workers with low 
lifetime earnings than it replaces for those with higher lifetime earnings.310  That 
suggests that in the real world, low-earners could save a lower percentage of 
their salaries and still be able to replace a total of 75% of their preretirement 
 
306. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
307. See WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, supra note 14, at 17. 
308. See Reducing Retirement Savings Leakage, EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. NOTES 1, 2 (Aug. 
2016), https://www.ebri.org/docs/default-source/ebri-notes/ebri_notes_07-no9-
aug16.pdf?sfvrsn=d1c5292f_0 [https://perma.cc/8SB7-7636]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GAO-19-179, RETIREMENT SAVINGS: ADDITIONAL DATE AND ANALYSIS COULD PROVIDE INSIGHT 
INTO EARLY WITHDRAWAL 3 (2019), https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/698041.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/APX2-BJHD]; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-715, 401(K) PLANS: 
POLICY CHANGES COULD REDUCE THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF LEAKAGE ON WORKERS’ 
RETIREMENT SAVINGS 12 (2009), 
https://web.archive.org/web/20191015130110/https://www.gao.gov/assets/300/294520.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EH65-UTWH]. 
309. See The Impact of Leakages on 401(k) Accumulations at Retirement Age: Hearing on 
Lifetime Participation in Plans Before the ERISA Advisory Council of the U.S. Dep’t of Labor 9–11 
(2014) (statement of Jack VanDerhei, Research Director, EBRI), 
https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/about-us/erisa-advisory-council/2014-
facilitating-lifetime-plan-participation-vanderhei-06-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/7UAD-QQNB]. 
310. PETER J. BRADY, HOW AMERICA SUPPORTS RETIREMENT: CHALLENGING THE 
CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON WHO BENEFITS 75 fig.2.10 (2016). 
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earnings.311  On the other hand, high-earners would need to save an even larger 
percentage of their salaries in order to replace a total of 75% of their 
preretirement earnings. 
Figure 7 provides a graphic representation of this phenomenon.312  Figure 
7 shows the Social Security replacement rates of various workers who were 
born in 1954 and turned age 65 in 2019, as estimated by the Chief Actuary of 
the Social Security Administration.  Figure 7 also shows the implied retirement 
savings gaps that could be made up with a pension.  For example, the first bar 
in Figure 7 shows that Social Security is currently replacing 73.5% of the 
preretirement earnings of workers with low lifetime earnings (scaled very-low 
lifetime earnings—career-average-earnings for 2018 equal to $12,959).  That 
leaves those workers with an implied retirement savings gap of just 1.5% of 
preretirement earnings (1.5% = 75% of preretirement earnings target − 73.5% 
Social Security replacement rate).  On the other hand, the third bar in Figure 7 
shows that Social Security is currently replacing just 39.7% of the preretirement 
earnings of workers with average lifetime earnings (scaled medium earnings—
career-average earnings for 2018 equal to $51,795); and they have an implied 
retirement savings gap of 35.3% (35.3% = 75% of preretirement earnings 
target – 39.7% Social Security replacement rate).  Finally, Social Security is 
currently replacing just 26.1% of the preretirement earnings of workers with 
the highest lifetime earnings (steady maximum earnings—career-average 














311. See BRADY, BURHAM, & HOLDEN, supra note 2, at 18–19; see also BRADY, supra note 
310, at 62−63. 
312. Figure 7 is based on CLINGMAN, BURKHALTER, & CHAPLAIN, supra note 2, at 5−6 tbl.B. 
313. To be sure, many analysts suggest that somewhat higher replacement rates are needed for 
workers with lower lifetime earnings than for those with higher lifetime earnings.  See, e.g., AON 
CONSULTING, supra note 112, at 24. 
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FIGURE 7: SOCIAL SECURITY REPLACEMENT RATES AND IMPLIED GAPS BY 
INCOME QUINTILE, FOR WORKERS BORN IN 1954 
 
Table 14 shows similar estimates of Social Security replacement rates for a 
variety of workers.  For example, Row 2 of Table 14 shows that for workers 
born in the 1950s (baby-boomers), Social Security is currently replacing 56% 
of the preretirement earnings of workers in the lowest quintile of lifetime 
household earnings, but just 43% for those in the middle quintile and just 26% 
for those in the top quintile.  For workers born in the 2000s (generation Z), Row 
7 of Table 14 shows that Social Security is scheduled to replace 73% of the 
income of workers in the lowest quintile of lifetime household earnings, 44% 
for those in the middle quintile, but just 24% for those in the top quintile.  
However, if Social Security’s underfunding problem is not addressed, across-
the-board benefit cuts could result in Social Security benefits payable to those 
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lowest quintile of lifetime household earnings, just 30% for those in the middle 
quintile, and just 20% for those in the top quintile.314 
TABLE 14: MEAN INITIAL REPLACEMENT RATES FOR RETIRED WORKERS, 

































1940s 42 60 49 45 39 28 
1950s 40 56 47 43 37 26 
1960s 40 58 48 42 35 25 
1970s 41 65 50 42 35 23 
1980s 44 70 53 44 36 24 
1990s 45 74 54 44 36 24 
2000s 44 73 53 44 36 24 
 
All in all, the retirement savings burden for real-world workers with low 
lifetime earnings is lower than what the model pension plans in this Article 
estimated, and they should have comfortable retirements even if they save less 
than the 7.27% of career-long salary for the level-payment pension.  On the 
other hand, workers with high lifetime earnings who want to replace 75% of 
their preretirement earnings already need to save a greater percentage of their 
salaries than the model pensions estimated, and depending on how the Social 
Security underfunding problem is resolved, perhaps, these high earners will 
need to save a great deal more. 
E.  Spousal Issues 
The model pensions in this Article assumed that pension benefits would be 
paid in the form of a single-life annuity, but the models could easily be 
enhanced to pay benefits in the form of a qualified joint and survivor annuity 
 
314. WILLIAM R. MORTON & BARRY F. HUSTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33514, SOCIAL 
SECURITY: WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF THE TRUST FUNDS RAN OUT? 12, 12 fig.3 (2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33514.pdf [https://perma.cc/UR7U-4UES] (discussing scheduled and 
payable benefits). 
315. CBO’S 2019 LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS, supra note 2, at tbl.B-8.  A cohort is defined as a 
group of people who are the same age.  Cohort, VOCUBULARY.COM, 
https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/cohort [https://perma.cc/FE25-F4NC]; see also CLINGMAN, 
BURKHALTER, & CHAPLAIN, supra note 2, at 1–2, 2 n.3. 
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(QJSA).316  As the joint life expectancy of a couple would be longer than that 
of a single participant,317 an actuarial reduction would be needed, and the QJSA 
would not replace 40% of preretirement earnings.318  At the same time, 
however, married couples are eligible for additional spousal benefits under 
Social Security that would often more than offset the actuarial reductions that 
can result from selecting QJSAs over a single-life annuities.319 
Pertinent here, while a QJSA is the default form of benefit for defined 
benefit plans,320 the usual rule for defined contribution plans is instead that the 
balance in participant’s account is payable to the spouse at death.321  In short, 
the typical defined contribution plan participant is generally free to spend her 
defined contribution savings as she pleases and may not end up leaving 
anything behind for the benefit of her surviving spouse, let alone leaving her 
spouse a survivor annuity.  The rules governing IRAs are even more relaxed: 
an individual with an IRA is free to spend the balance in her account as she 
wishes and, furthermore, is free to designate whoever she wants as her 
beneficiary.322  Congress could help protect nonemployee spouses by extending 
the QJSA regime to defined contribution plans and IRAs, or by requiring that 
 
316. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
317. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
318. I.R.C. § 417(b)(2) (2018); ERISA § 205(d)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1055(d)(1)(B) (2018); see 
also Donald Bell & Avy Graham, Surviving Spouse’s Benefits in Private Pension Plans, MONTHLY 
LABOR REV. (Apr. 1984), https://www.bls.gov/mlr/1984/04/art3full.pdf [https://perma.cc/72GP-
B6BN].  For example, while a 65-year-old man could have purchased an immediate fixed (lifetime) 
annuity without inflation protection that paid around $6,660 a year for $100,000 in December of 2018, 
see supra note 103 and accompanying text, $100,000 would have gotten a couple (consisting of a 65-
year-old male and a 60-year-old female) a joint-and-50%-survivor annuity that paid only around 
$6,168 a year.  Immediate Annuities Update, supra note 103, at 25 tbl.11 ($6,168 = 12 × an average 
payment of $514 per month).  That is around 8% less for this joint-and-survivor annuity (1.0798 = 
$6,660 / $6,168). 
319. A retirement-age wife or husband of a retired worker can claim a monthly benefit equal to 
50% of the worker’s primary insurance amount (PIA).  42 U.S.C. § 402 (2018).  Consequently, a retired 
worker and retirement-age spouse can claim a monthly benefit equal to 150% of what the retired 
worker alone could claim.  For example, if a retired worker could claim a benefit equal to $1,000 a 
month, a retired couple could claim a benefit of $1,500 a month.  In addition, a retirement-age widow 
or widower of the worker is entitled to a monthly surviving spouse benefit equal to 100% of the 
worker’s PIA.  For example, if a retired worker could claim a benefit of $1,000 a month (and a retired 
couple benefit of $1,500 a month), the surviving spouse could claim a benefit of $1,000 a month. 
320. See I.R.C. § 401(a)(11); see also supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
321. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11); ERISA § 205, 29 U.S.C. § 1055. 
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the nonemployee spouse consent to the cashing out of defined contribution 
plans and IRAs.323 
F.  Variability in Economic and Demographic Variables 
The model pensions developed in this Article could easily accommodate 
simple alternative assumptions about economic and demographic variables.  
Modeling real-world fluctuations and variance in such variables as the interest 
rate and the inflation rate would be more challenging but is certainly possible.  
In this Section, however, the most important assumptions to reconsider are the 
ones that relate to mortality. 
First, this Article assumed an annuity factor of 10 for both the model 
defined benefit plan and the model defined contribution plans, and that annuity 
factor is probably too low.324  It would be more realistic if the model plans 
instead used an annuity factor of 12 or 13.325  The model plans used an annuity 
factor of 10, largely because it is so easy to see the connection between 
$400,000 of retirement savings and a pension of $40,000 a year (i.e., $40,000 
= $400,000 / 10).  Mathematically, the higher the annuity factor, the more 
retirement savings that are needed in order to pay a given annual pension.  For 
example, if the real-world annuity factor is actually 13—not 10—then a worker 
will need to save 30% more for retirement (130% = 1.3 = 13 / 10).  In short, if 
the correct annuity factor is 13—not 10, then a typical worker will need to save 
$520,000 for retirement—not $400,000 (i.e., $40,000 = $520,000 / 13).  That 
means that the typical worker should save around 9.45% a year as a level 
percentage of her salary each year for 40 years—not 7.27% (9.451 = 1.3 × 
7.27); alternatively, she should save around $4,200 a year as a level dollar 
amount each year for 40 years—not $3,231 a year ($4,200.30 = 1.3 × $3,231).  
Accordingly, readers need to be a little bit cautious about the accuracy of the 
7.27%-of-salary and the $3,231-a-year retirement savings targets. 
Second, the model pensions in this Article assumed that all workers lived 
from age 25 to age 65.  In fact, only around 85% of workers are likely to live 
from age 25 to age 65 and collect a pension.326  As those workers who die before 
65 do not need pensions (ignoring any surviving spouse benefits), the actual 
cost of providing pensions for the surviving participants should be somewhat 
lower than what was estimated based on the model pensions.  As already 
 
323. See, e.g., S. 975, 116th Cong. § 205A (2019) (Women’s Retirement Protection Act 
introduced by Senator Patty Murray [D-WA]). 
324. See supra notes 202, 270−71 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra notes 270−71 and accompanying text. 
326. See supra note 190 and accompanying text. 
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mentioned, with defined benefit plans, any given plan sponsor’s aggregate 
funding obligation (i.e., contributions) would be lower because the accrued 
benefits of those who die before age 65 are typically forfeited.327  Participants 
in defined contribution plans (and IRAs) could also benefit from such mortality 
gains (i.e., save less) if, throughout their careers, they invested their individual 
accounts in lifetime annuities.328 
Third, the model pensions could probably do a better job at estimating the 
costs of providing those pensions to those that live to age 65 and retire.  For 
simplicity, the model pension plans estimated pension costs by modeling 
exactly 20 years’ worth of pension payments for the typical retiree—from age 
65 through age 84 (with death at age 85).  A more complicated model could 
estimate pension costs and outcomes based on the full range of retiree 
characteristics.329  In particular, life expectancy can vary dramatically with such 
demographic factors as gender, income, educational level, and race and 
Hispanic origin.330  For example, as already mentioned, women tend to live 
longer than men.331  Also, there is a growing gap in life expectancy between 
workers with low lifetime earnings and those with higher lifetime earnings.332  
For example, studies have shown that lower-income men approaching 
retirement live, on average 3.6 to 12.7 fewer years than higher-income men (1.5 
to 13.6 fewer years for women).333  Policymakers need to bear in mind that 
 
327. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
328. Individuals who invest in annuity-like products have mortality gains and losses depending 
on when they die.  Individuals who live longer than their peers get mortality gains from those who 
precede them, while individuals who die earlier than their peers suffer mortality losses.  See David 
Blake, Annuity Markets: Problems and Solutions, 24 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 358, 371 (1999) 
(explaining that a mortality cross-subsidy “arises because some annuitants will die shortly after taking 
out an annuity thereby releasing a ‘mortality profit’ which insurance companies share with longer-
surviving annuitants”). 
329. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
330. See, for example, the various sources at U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
such as National Center for Health Statistics: Life Expectancy, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/life-expectancy.htm [https://perma.cc/GZ2Q-4BK8]. 
331. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
332. See KATELIN P. ISAACS & SHARMILA CHOUDHURY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44846, 
THE GROWING GAP IN LIFE EXPECTANCY BY INCOME: RECENT EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY RETIREMENT AGE 9 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44846.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/77EF-SCBP]. 
333. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-354, RETIREMENT SECURITY: 
SHORTER LIFE EXPECTANCY REDUCES PROJECTED LIFETIME BENEFITS FOR LOWER 
EARNERS 21−22 (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676086.pdf [https://perma.cc/354H-JDZW]; 
Joyce Manchester, Vt. Legislative Joint Fiscal Office, Michael Simpson, Cong. Budget Office, & 
Geena Kim, Cong. Budget Office, Presentation to the 2014 Fall Research Conference of the 
Association of Public Policy and Management: Applications of Differential Mortality for Analyses of 
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some policies to encourage greater annuitization might have undesirable 
distributional consequences. 
VIII.  OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
How can we ensure that retirees will have fully funded pensions that will 
provide them with adequate incomes throughout their retirement years?  First, 
we should make sure that the Social Security system is fully funded.  Second, 
we should make sure that virtually every retiree also has an inflation-adjusted 
pension that will replace a meaningful percentage of her preretirement earnings.  
These are discussed in turn. 
A.  Fully Fund Social Security 
First, we should make sure that the Social Security system is fully funded.  
As explained in Section III.C above, the Social Security system operates largely 
on a pay-as-you-go basis (PAYG) and is currently underfunded by $13.9 
trillion.  The federal government should commit to eliminating that funding 
shortfall, and Table 15 shows how some representative changes to the Social 
Security system could reduce that shortfall.  The Social Security Administration 
also routinely provides actuarial estimates of Social Security reform 
proposals.334  In that regard, for example, the recently-introduced Social 
Security 2100 Act would raise taxes enough to both expand benefits for many 
elderly Americans and also ensure that the Social Security system is solvent for 
the rest of the century.335 
 
Social Security Policy Options 6 (Nov. 7, 2014), 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/presentation/49659-presentation-differentialmortality.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6QZT-Y33T]. 
334. SSA, Proposals to Change Social Security, supra note 132. 
335. H.R. 860, 116th Cong. § 203 (2019) (introduced on Jan. 30, 2019 by Representative John 
B. Larson [D-CT]); Letter from Stephen C. Goss, Chief Actuary, Soc. Sec. Admin., to John Larson, 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Soc. Sec., Richard Blumenthal, Senator, Chris Van Hollen, Senator, (Jan. 
30, 2019), https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/LarsonBlumenthalVanHollen_20190130.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2HUU-TWPC].  But see Sylvester J. Schieber, Alice in Wonderland . . . or Is It 
Plunderland? The Generational Implications of Social Security Financing Policy and New Proposals 
to Expand Benefits, 7 J. RETIREMENT 8, 26 (2019) (criticizing the Social Security 2100 Act for shifting 
the costs of benefit increases to future generations).  See generally BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., SECURING 
OUR FINANCIAL FUTURE: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON RETIREMENT SECURITY AND PERSONAL 
SAVINGS 78−100 (2016), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/BPC-Retirement-
Security-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BFS-V5PX] (making recommendations to strengthen Social 
Security’s finances); WILLIAM G. GALE, FISCAL THERAPY: CURING AMERICA’S DEBT ADDICTION 
AND INVESTING IN THE FUTURE 157−63 (2019) (endorsing the Bipartisan Policy Center 
recommendations). 
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TABLE 15: HOW VARIOUS CHANGES COULD REDUCE THE SOCIAL SECURITY 
UNDERFUNDING336 
Description of Proposed Provisions Shortfall Eliminated 
Starting December 2020, reduce the annual COLA by 
1%.  (Proposal A1) 66% 
Price indexing of PIA factors beginning with those 
newly eligible for OASDI benefits in 2026: 
Reduce factors so that initial benefits grow by 
inflation rather than by the SSA average wage 
index.  (Proposal B1.1) 
102% 
After the normal retirement age (NRA) reaches 67 for 
those age 62 in 2022, increase the NRA 2 months 
per year until it reaches 69 for individuals 
attaining age 62 in 2034.  Thereafter, increase the 
NRA 1 month every 2 years. (Proposal C1.4) 
41% 
Increase the payroll tax rate (currently 12.4%) to 
15.4% in 2020 and later.  (Proposal E1.1) 103% 
Eliminate the taxable maximum in years 2020 and 
later and apply full 12.4% payroll tax rate to all 
earnings.  Provide benefit credit for earnings 
above the current-law taxable maximum.  
(Proposal E2.2) 
65% 
Starting in 2020, tax Social Security benefits in a 
manner similar to private pension income.  Phase 
out the lower-income thresholds during 
2019−2038.  (Proposal H2) 
6% 
B.  Fully Fund Pensions for Virtually All Workers 
Second, we should make sure that virtually every retiree also has a secure 
and meaningful pension that will help provide lifetime income security.  These 
pensions could take the form of traditional defined benefit plans, newer defined 
benefit plans, or defined contribution plans.  The key is to make sure that 
enough retirement savings are accumulated for each retiree and that those 
accumulated savings are used to provide lifetime income—ideally in the form 
of an inflation-adjusted lifetime annuity. 
 
336. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACTUARY, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SUMMARY OF PROVISIONS THAT 
WOULD CHANGE THE SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAM 4, 6, 17, 22, 31 (2019), 
https://www.ssa.gov/oact/solvency/provisions/summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/8Z5W-RTW3]. 
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To be sure, there are many ways to increase the incomes of retirees.  In 
particular, it would make sense to expand the Social Security and the 
Supplemental Security Income programs to ensure that all elderly Americans 
have enough retirement income to keep them out of poverty—or to replace even 
more preretirement earnings.337  In this Section, however, the focus is on how 
pensions could instead be used to provide additional retirement income—on top 
of Social Security.  At the outset, building on the model pensions developed in 
Parts V and VI above, this Section shows how a universal pension system could 
be designed to replace, say, 40% of preretirement earnings.  Finally, this 
Section also considers a variety of less extensive reform options that could help 
increase the number of retirees whose pensions would replace a meaningful 
percentage of their preretirement earnings. 
1.  A Universal Pension System 
As mentioned in Section VII.C above, one can imagine a universal pension 
system consisting of a system of individual retirement savings accounts added 
on top of the current Social Security system.  In 1981, for example, the 
President’s Commission of Pension Policy recommended adoption of a 
Minimum Universal Pension System (MUPS) that would have required all 
employers to contribute at least 3% of wages to private pensions for their 
workers.338  The simplest design for such a universal pension system would be 
to piggyback a system of individual retirement savings accounts onto the 
existing Social Security withholding system, and over the years, many analysts 
 
337. See, e.g., MONIQUE MORRISSEY, ECON. POL’Y INST., STEADY CONTRIBUTIONS, 
AFFORDABILITY, AND LIFETIME INCOME ARE THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF A RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
THAT WORKS FOR WORKING FAMILIES 5−11 (2019), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/180680.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/25MN-VXFB]; Jonathan Barry Forman, Universal Pensions, 2 CHAP. L. REV. 95, 
108−114 (1999). 
338. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON PENSION POL’Y, COMING OF AGE: TOWARD A NATIONAL 
RETIREMENT INCOME POLICY 42–46 (1981); Report of the President’s Commission on Pension Policy: 
Executive Summary, 44 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 14, 14 (1981). 
In the long run, such 3% add-on individual accounts could provide an annual retirement benefit 
equal to around 10 to 15% of preretirement earnings.  From the hypotheticals in this Article, lifetime 
contributions of 3% of salary would lead to a pension that would replace around 16.5% of preretirement 
earnings (16.5062 = 40% × 3% / 7.27%), although it would take lifetime contributions of around 3.7% 
of salary for that pension to keep up with inflation (3.69% = 3% × 1.23); see also ADAM L. CARASSO 
& JONATHAN BARRY FORMAN, URBAN BROOKINGS TAX POL’Y CTR., DISCUSSION NO. 28, TAX 
CONSIDERATIONS IN A UNIVERSAL PENSION SYSTEM UPS) 7 (2007), 
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/46936/411593-Tax-Considerations-in-a-
Universal-Pension-System-UPS-.PDF [https://perma.cc/HLA2-PEGS] (estimating that a 3% universal 
pension system could replace an additional 14.4% of final wages for all men retiring at 65 [and 13.3% 
of final wages for all women]). 
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have recommended adding such individual accounts on top of the current Social 
Security system.339 
These universal pension accounts could be held by the government or by 
large financial institutions.  Either way, the funds should be invested well, and, 
at retirement, account balances should be paid out as lifetime annuities.  
Presumably, contributions to these universal pension accounts would be made 
with respect to every job of every worker in Social-Security-covered 
employment, and all contributions would vest immediately. 
As the model pensions developed in Parts V and VI above showed, over a 
40-year career, annual contributions of 7.27% of salary to such universal 
pension accounts would generate enough retirement savings to fund a level-
dollar pension that would initially replace around 40% of preretirement 
earnings for the typical worker.  Similarly, as the discussion of cost-of-living 
adjustments in Section VII.B above showed, contributions of 8.94% of salary 
would generate enough retirement savings to provide the typical worker with 
in an inflation-adjusted pension that would replace 40% of preretirement 
earnings in real dollars for life.  The actual contribution rates might be set even 
lower as Social-Security-covered employment before age 25 and after age 64 
would result in additional contributions to these individual retirement savings 
accounts. 
In the present political climate, however, it seems unlikely that the federal 
government will enact a mandatory universal pension system, let alone a system 
that would require workers to contribute 7% of compensation (or more) to 
individual retirement savings accounts.  Realistically, however, the federal 
government might create a voluntary universal pension system—one where 
workers are automatically enrolled unless they opt out.340  In that regard, a 
 
339. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 337, at 108−12; TERESA GHILARDUCCI & TONY JAMES, 
RESCUING RETIREMENT: A PLAN TO GUARANTEE RETIREMENT SECURITY FOR ALL AMERICANS 47 
(2018) (calling for mandatory 3%-of-salary guaranteed retirement accounts); MORRISSEY, supra note 
337, at 15−17 (endorsing guaranteed retirement accounts).  See generally ALICIA H. MUNNELL, ANEK 
BELBASE, & GEOFFREY T. SANZENBACHER, CTR. FOR RET. RES. AT BOS. COLL., AN ANALYSIS OF 
RETIREMENT MODELS TO IMPROVE PORTABILITY AND COVERAGE 34−55 (2018), 
https://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Portability-and-coverage_Special-report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HG55-WQC6] (discussing mandatory and voluntary approaches for expanding 
coverage). 
340. See, e.g., John A. Turner, Jules Lichtenstein, & Jennifer Erin Brown, Mandating Pension 
Auto-Enrollment in the United Kingdom: Implications for the United States, 6 J. RETIREMENT 82, 83, 
85–86 (2018); JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 484, 
ALTERNATIVE REALITIES: THE IMPACT OF EXTREME CHANGES IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 
ON RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY IN AMERICA 12 (2019), 
https://www.ebri.org/content/alternative-realities-the-impact-of-extreme-changes-in-defined-
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number of states are already creating such universal pension systems—at least 
for workers who are not already covered by an employer-sponsored pension.341 
Contributions to these universal pension accounts could be automatically 
withheld from the salaries of every worker on every job, unless that worker opts 
out (i.e., automatic enrollment).  Moreover, every worker should automatically 
be reenrolled each year, although each worker could again opt out (i.e., 
automatic reenrollment).  Such automatic enrollment features would almost 
certainly lead to high participation rates—and to higher levels of retirement 
savings.342  These universal pension accounts could also be designed to invest 
in target-date funds and/or annuities, unless the worker elects otherwise (i.e., 
qualified default investment alternatives).343 
Finally, these universal pension accounts could also be used to 
automatically combine each worker’s past pensions into a single account (i.e., 
auto-portability).344  With auto-portability, workers would be much less likely 
 
contribution-plans-on-retirement-income-adequacy-in-america [https://perma.cc/X5BL-C8QM] 
(estimating how much more employees would save with a universal defined contribution plan 
scenario); SARAH HOLMES BERK, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., CREATING A FEDERAL AUTO IRA AND 
ENHANCING SOCIAL SECURITY LONGEVITY DATA 4 (2019), 
https://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/Federal%20auto%20IRA%20Holmes%20Berk(2).pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MAF8-56VN] (recommending a federal IRA with automatic enrollment [i.e., an 
“auto IRA”] to help workers without access to a 401(k) or similar retirement plan); see also WILLIAM 
G. GALE, SARAH E. HOLMES, & DAVID C. JOHN, RETIREMENT PLANS FOR CONTINGENT WORKERS: 
ISSUES AND OPTIONS 15–22 (2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/rsp923paper1-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA6F-243C] (recommending 
restructuring retirement accounts so that they follow workers from job to job); JOHN N. FRIEDMAN, 
HAMILTON PROJECT, DISCUSSION PAPER 2015-5, BUILDING ON WHAT WORKS: A PROPOSAL TO 
MODERNIZE RETIREMENT SAVINGS 13–17 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/friedman_modernize_retirement_savings_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/93GW-G7ZV] (recommending combining all of the various types of retirement 
accounts into a single Universal Retirement Saving Account). 
341. See, e.g., State-Based Retirement Plans for the Private Sector, PENSION RTS. CTR., 
http://www.pensionrights.org/issues/legislation/state-based-retirement-plans-private-sector 
[https://perma.cc/75U4-E4BV]; AARP Public Policy Institute: State Retirement Savings Resource 
Center, AARP, https://www.aarp.org/ppi/state-retirement-plans.html [https://perma.cc/6LET-E7NV]; 
JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 494, WHAT IF OREGONSAVES 
WENT NATIONAL: A LOOK AT THE IMPACT ON RETIREMENT INCOME ADEQUACY 1, 6 (2019), 
https://www.ebri.org/docs/default-source/ebri-issue-brief/ebri_ib_494_oregonsaves-
31oct19.pdf?sfvrsn=8bd43c2f_6 [https://perma.cc/JPE4-7T43] (estimating that nationalizing the 
OregonSaves plan would reduce retirement savings shortfalls by 16.3%). 
342. See, e.g., OECD, supra note 76, at 45–76. 
343. Cf. I.R.C. § 404(c) (2018) (allowing 401(k) sponsors to choose qualified default investment 
alternatives for workers who do not otherwise direct their own investments). 
344. Cf. Brian Croce, Auto Portability Program Gets Thumbs up by Regulators, PENSIONS & 
INVS. (July 31, 2019), https://www.pionline.com/regulation/auto-portability-program-gets-thumbs-
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to dissipate pensions when they change jobs, and they would never lose a 
pension because they forgot about it: old pensions would automatically be 
combined into the worker’s new universal pension account.  Thus, auto-
portability would help reduce leakage and preserve retirement savings—for 
retirement purposes.345 
2.  Strengthening the Current Pension System 
Short of adopting add-on Social Security accounts or creating some other 
form of universal pension accounts, there are many reforms that could increase 
the lifetime incomes of many retirees.  In that regard, for example, the 
government could enact legislation to encourage workers to save more for 
retirement, to get better returns on their investments, to work longer, and to 
preserve their retirement savings until they retire.346 
At the same time, the federal government needs to do more to ensure that 
private pensions are better funded.  In the long run, it would make sense to 
toughen the minimum funding rules for defined benefit plans.  For example, 
perhaps, defined benefit plans should be pushed towards faster prefunding 
methods: instead of just funding current benefit accruals (i.e., accumulated 
benefit obligation and termination liability), plan sponsors should be 
encouraged to fund their projected benefit obligations.  For example, if plan 
sponsors were required to use the projected unit credit funding method or the 
entry age normal cost funding method, then virtually every worker’s accrued 
pension would be at least a little bit overfunded.347 
In the short run, however, many single and multiemployer plans are 
currently underfunded, and it is not clear how those problems can be resolved.  
For example, the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation cannot afford to bail 
out all of the underfunded multiemployer plans, and while Congress recently 
bailed out the United Mineworkers of America’s pension fund, so far Congress 
has been unwilling to appropriate more funds for the rest of the underfunded 
multiemployer pension plans.348  Many state and local governments also need 
 
regulators [https://perma.cc/V9MS-67NQ]; Auto Portability, RETIREMENT CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://rch1.com/auto-portability [https://perma.cc/5YER-3PG3]. 
345. See JACK VANDERHEI, EMP. BENEFIT RESEARCH INST., ISSUE BRIEF NO. 489, THE IMPACT 
OF AUTO PORTABILITY ON PRESERVING RETIREMENT SAVINGS CURRENTLY LOST TO 401(K) 
CASHOUT LEAKAGE 1, 14–15 (2019), https://www.ebri.org/docs/default-source/ebri-issue-
brief/ebri_ib_489_autoport-15aug19.pdf?sfvrsn=80723c2f_4 [https://perma.cc/AXC4-XHEY]. 
346. Forman, supra note 105, at 112−22. 
347. See, e.g., supra note 262 and accompanying text. 
348. See supra notes 146−51 and accompanying text. 
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to improve their pension funding policies and stop shifting the burden of 
pensions for today’s workers onto future generations of taxpayers.349 
The federal government could also do more to mandate or at least 
encourage the annuitization of retirement savings.350  The federal government 
could even get into the market of selling annuities.  For example, one recent 
proposal would allow workers to purchase additional Social Security retirement 
benefits on an actuarially fair basis.351 
Other government efforts to expand participation and coverage could also 
increase retirement savings.  In particular, toughening the minimum 
requirements for plan participation, coverage, and vesting should help mobile 
and part-time workers accumulate more savings for retirement. 
Finally, Congress should do a better job promoting pension portability.352  
Ideally, every worker should earn a pension benefit on virtually every job, and 
forfeitures should be extremely rare.  When a worker leaves an employer, her 
accrued pension benefits should go with her to the next employer (or to a 
universal pension account).  Moreover, the benefits that each worker earns 
should be based on her projected final pay so that her final pension would be 
just as large if she worked for ten different employers over the course of her 
career as if she worked for just one.353 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
American workers want to have meaningful incomes throughout their 
retirement years.  At the outset, this Article noted that Social Security benefits 
 
349. See Jonathan Barry Forman & Michael J. Sabin, Full Funding of Traditional State and 
Local Government Pensions: The Entry-Age-Service-Cost Method, 2019 N.Y.U. EMP. BENEFITS & 
EXEC. COMP. 11-1, 11-4, 11-35 (2019). 
350. See, e.g., Forman, supra note 105, at 128−36. 
351. Ian Ayres & Jacob Hacker, Social Security Plus, 26 ELDER L.J. 261, 268 (2019); see also 
Margarida Correia, Thaler Pushing Retirement Idea, PENSIONS & INVS. (Apr. 29, 2019), 
https://www.pionline.com/article/20190429/PRINT/190429886/thaler-pushing-retirement-income-
idea [https://perma.cc/R4JJ-EES2] (discussing Nobel laureate Richard H. Thaler’s recent proposal to 
allow workers to use a portion of their retirement savings to buy additional annuities from the Social 
Security Administration); Robert C. Merton & Arun Muraldihar, Time for Retirement ‘SeLFIES’?, 
RETIREMENT INCOME J. (Apr. 6, 2017), https://retirementincomejournal.com/article/time-for-
retirement-selfies1/ [https://perma.cc/UN5V-8NWE] (describing Standard of Living Indexed, 
Forward-Starting, Income-Only Securities [SeLFIES]). 
352. MUNNELL, BELBASE, & SANZENBACHER, supra note 339, at 20−28 (discussing various 
ways to promote portability).  See generally COMMON WEALTH & ASPEN INST. FIN. SEC. PROGRAM, 
supra note 187. 
353. See supra Section VII.C.3. 
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will replace around 35% of the typical worker’s preretirement earnings354 and 
that the typical worker will want to have a pension that would replace another 
40% of preretirement earnings.355 
This Article then developed several model pension plans and showed how 
those model pensions could replace 40% of preretirement earnings.  More 
specifically, this Article showed that over a 40-year career from age 25 to age 
65, annual contributions of around 7% of salary could generate enough 
retirement savings to fund a level-dollar pension that would initially replace 
around 40% of preretirement earnings.  Similarly, this Article showed how 
contributions of around 9% of salary could generate enough retirement savings 
to fund an inflation-adjusted pension that would replace 40% of preretirement 
earnings in real dollars for life. 
Finally, this Article offered some recommendations about how to improve 
the current pension system.  In particular, this Article showed how a universal 
pension system could be designed to replace 40% of preretirement earnings for 
virtually every worker.  The simplest approach would be to create a system of 
add-on Social Security accounts.  Alternatively, the government could promote 
the creation of universal pension accounts.  While the prospects for adopting 
any type of mandatory universal pension system are dim, the time is ripe for the 
federal government—or the states—to create a voluntary universal pension 
system—one where workers are automatically enrolled in individual pension 
accounts unless they opt out.  Every worker should have an individual pension 
account to hold and invest her retirement savings, and, over time, those 
individual pension accounts would collect significant contributions, earn 
significant income, and ultimately pay meaningful pension benefits that would 
last a lifetime. 
 
 
354. See BRADY, BURHAM, & HOLDEN, supra note 2, at 19. 
355. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. 
